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	ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis attempts to fill gaps in both a theoretical basis and an operational and strategic 
understanding in the areas of social ventures, social entrepreneurship and nonprofit 
business models.  This study also attempts to bridge the gap in strategic and economic 
theory between social and commercial ventures.  More specifically, this thesis explores 
sustainable competitive advantage from a resource-based theory perspective and explores 
how it may be applied to the nonmarket situation of nonprofit organizations and social 
ventures.   
 
It is proposed that a social value-orientation of sustainable competitive advantage, called 
sustainable contributive advantage, provides a more realistic depiction of what is 
necessary in order for a social venture to perform better than its competitors over time.  In 
addition to providing this realistic depiction, this research provides a substantial theoretical 
contribution in the area of economics, social ventures, and strategy research, specifically 
in regards to resource-based theory.  The proposed model for sustainable contributive 
advantage uses resource-based theory and competitive advantage in order to be applicable 
to social ventures. This model proposes an explanation of a social venture’s ability to 
demonstrate consistently superior performance.    
 
In order to determine whether sustainable competitive advantage is in fact, appropriate to 
apply to both social and economic environments, quantitative analyses are conducted on a 
large sample of nonprofit organizations in a single industry and then compared to similar 
quantitative analyses conducted on commercial ventures.  In comparing the trends and 
strategies between the two types of entities from a quantitative perspective, propositions 
are developed regarding a social venture’s resource utilization strategies and their possible 
impact on performance.   
 
Evidence is found to support the necessity of adjusting existing models in resource-based 
theory in order to apply them to social ventures.  Additionally supported is the proposed 
theory of sustainable contributive advantage.  The thesis concludes with recommendations 
for practitioners, researchers and policy makers as well as suggestions for future research 
paths.         
	 	
	SAMMANFATTNING 
 
Den här avhandlingen avser att öka den teoretiska, operationella och strategiska 
förståelsen för frågor inom socialt företagande, socialt entreprenörsskap och nonprofit 
affärsmodeller. Denna studie strävar också efter att överbygga klyftan mellan sociala och 
kommersiella företag inom strategisk och ekonomisk teori. Mera specifikt utforskar den 
här avhandlingen begreppet bestående konkurrensfördel från ett resursbaserat teoretiskt 
perspektiv för att klargöra huruvida begreppet kan tillämpas på nonprofit organisationers 
och sociala organisationer situation som inte verkar kommerciellt.  
 
Det föreslås att en social värde-orientering av begreppet bestående konkurrensfördel, 
skulle benämnas bestående kontribuerande fördel. Bestående kontribuerande fördel utgör 
en mera realistisk beskrivning av vad som behövs för ett socialt företag för att prestera 
bättre än konkurrenterna. Genom att utveckla denna begreppsram bidrar avhandlingen 
väsentligt till teoribildningen kring sociala företag ur ett resursbaserat perspektiv. Den 
föreslagna modellen för bestående kontribuerande fördel utnyttjar resursbaserad teori och 
föreslår att det klassiska begreppet konkurrensfördel ersätts med bestående kontribuerande 
fördel för att tillämpas explicit i kontext av sociala företag. Med hjälp av modellen kan 
man beskriva hur ett socialt företag kan skapa grunden för en fortgående framgång.  
 
För att avgöra om bestående konkurrensfördel kan tillämpas på både sociala och 
traditionella företag utförs en kvantitativ analys på ett stort urval nonprofit organsiationer 
inom en enskild branch i USA. En motsvarande analys görs med kommersiella företag och 
resultaten jämförs. På basis av resultatet utvecklas förslag till det sociala företagets 
strategier för utnyttjande av resurser och deras eventuella inverkan på ekonomisk 
prestation. 
 
Belägg för en omarbetning av existerande modeller inom resursbaserad teori för 
tillämpning på sociala företag presenteras, som stöds av initiala empiriska studier, för en 
teori om bestående kontribuerande fördel. Avhandlingen avslutas med rekommendationer 
för praktiker och forskare samt med förslag till framtida forskning. 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
 
This thesis attempts to fill gaps in both practical understanding and theoretical basis in the 
areas of social ventures, social entrepreneurship and nonprofit business models.  This 
study also attempts to bridge the gap in strategic and economic theory between social and 
commercial ventures. More specifically, this thesis explores sustainable competitive 
advantage from a resource-based theory perspective and explores how it may be applied to 
the nonmarket situation of nonprofit organizations and social ventures.  It is proposed that 
a social value-orientation of sustainable competitive advantage, called sustainable 
contributive advantage, provides a more realistic depiction of what is necessary in order 
for a social venture to perform better than its competitors over time.  In addition to 
providing this realistic depiction, this research provides a substantial theoretical 
contribution in the area of economics, social ventures, and strategy research, specifically 
in regards to resource-based theory. The proposed model for sustainable contributive 
advantage uses resource-based theory and competitive advantage in order to be applicable 
to social ventures.   
 
In order to determine whether sustainable competitive advantage is in fact, appropriate to 
apply to both social and economic environments, quantitative analyses are conducted on a 
large sample of nonprofit organizations in a single industry and then compared to similar 
quantitative analyses conducted on commercial ventures.  In comparing the trends and 
strategies between the two types of entities from a quantitative perspective, propositions 
are developed regarding a social venture’s resource utilization strategies and their possible 
impact on performance.   
 
Evidence is found to support the necessity of adjusting existing models in resource-based 
theory in order to apply them to social ventures.  Additionally supported is the proposed 
theory of sustainable contributive advantage.  The thesis concludes with recommendations 
for practitioners, researchers and policy makers as well as suggestions for future research 
paths.         
 
1.2 Motivation for the Thesis 
 
Social ventures continue to be a major focus of research for scholars from a variety of 
disciplines as well as a focus for social entrepreneurs themselves.  Initially, social venture 
research held its focus on public policy and nonprofit organizations, but has since then, 
grown to include the contexts of both nonprofit and for-profit (Moss, Lumpkin, and Short, 
2010). While the field of social venture research has yet to reach a consensus definition on 
what a social venture is, a definition presented by Nicholls (2006) presents the concept as 
“innovative and effective activities that focus strategically on resolving social market 
failures and creating opportunities to add social value systematically by using a range of 
organizational formats to maximize social impact and bring about change” (23).  Smith 
and Stevens (2010) lend support to this definition as it has much in common with many 
other definitions presented by researchers in the field (i.e. Dees, 2001; Austin, Stevenson, 
and Wei-Skillern, 2006; Zahra et al., 2009) due to its focus on the creation of social value.   
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Social ventures are being formed at a faster rate than commercial ventures (Harding and 
Cowling, 2004).  While nonprofits are only a segment of the social venture space, statistics 
on nonprofit and for-profit business formation are an indication of the growing trend of 
social venture formation.  Between 2006 and 2009, the number of for-profit startups 
decreased by approximately 4 percent while the number of nonprofit organizations 
registered with the Internal Revenue Service increased 19 percent between 1999 and 2009 
(Doms, 2011; Roeger, Blackwood, and Pettijohn, 2011).  However, as of 2004, about 72 
percent of America’s nonprofits had annual revenues of less than half a million dollars 
(Pallotta, 2008).  Social ventures are formed when economic systems fail to successfully 
provide a product or service to a segment of society (Hansmann, 1980).  Social ventures 
are, in some cases, society’s last resort for curing world problems such as hunger, disease, 
poverty, etc.  It is therefore, important to examine the factors surrounding social ventures 
that enable them to grow and be sustainable. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the term ‘social ventures’ encompasses socially focused 
businesses. These socially focused businesses may be for-profit or non-profit 
organizations. An example of a socially focused for-profit venture that has gained 
worldwide attention is TOMS Shoes.  TOMS Shoes’ business model is quite simple, for 
every pair of shoes that is purchased from the company a pair is also given to a needy 
child somewhere in the world.  The company announced in June 2011 that they planned to 
expand their concept into eyewear. Many other organizations are following suit, such as 
BoGo Light solar powered flashlights, One World Futbol Project all terrain soccer balls, 
Baby Teresa children clothes, and Blanket America bedding who all operate on a ‘buy 
one, give one’ business model.  While there are critiques of this model, such as the 
distortion of local markets when products are given away that local businesses sell, it 
represents the growing trend that social ventures are turning towards earned income 
strategies (Short, Moss, & Lumpkin, 2009).   
 
Nonprofits, in particular, are turning to commercial practices to replace shrinking sources 
of funding as well as cover rising costs.  Many leaders of nonprofits are moving towards 
commercial strategies with the belief that market-based revenues may be easier to scale 
and more resilient than philanthropic revenue (Dees, 1998a).  
 
This thesis focuses specifically on the nonprofit organization due to the unique 
restrictions, limitations, benefits, and challenges faced by the organizational type.  The 
reason for this focus is two-fold.  First, this thesis utilizes resource-based theory for the 
majority of its explorations and theory development.  Resource-based theory suggests that 
studies on ventures remain within a single industry as it helps to establish the link between 
the resources and strategies in question (Barney and Clark, 2007).  Hence, the quantitative 
analyses that follow are conducted within a single industry within the nonprofit arena.  
Second, this focus is to explore the some of the limitations and benefits of the nonprofit 
organizational status.  Due to restrictions and public perceptions of how a nonprofit should 
be run, many nonprofits struggle to sustain themselves and are also plagued with amateur 
administration, limited marketing budgets, growing competition, and shrinking resources 
(Helmig, Jegers, and Lapsley, 2004; Pallotta, 2004). In fact, many nonprofits, specifically 
hospitals and educational institutions, have switched from a nonprofit to a for-profit status 
because they found they could sustain themselves easier without the limitations of 
nonprofit status (James, 2003).  This will be discussed in detail in later sections of this 
thesis but it brings into question whether the nonprofit model can be leveraged in a way 
that allows organizations to be competitive and more sustainable than others.   
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Despite the challenges faced in the nonprofit realm, according to the National Center on 
Charitable Statistics, the number of nonprofit organizations continues to grow.  Indications 
of this growth are seen in the statistics, from 1998 to 2008, there was a reported 63% 
increase in 501(c)3 organizations (nonprofits) in the United States.  Unfortunately, in 2009 
it is estimated that over 100,000 nonprofits went out of business. Nearly 56% of executive 
directors of U.S. nonprofits reported they had to reduce their expenses in order to stay 
afloat.  Additionally, 75% reported declines in funding from the year before.  As an added 
challenge, in 2011 the United States Internal Revenue Service reassigned over 21% of 
nonprofit organizations as no longer eligible for nonprofit status and the estimate of that 
impact has yet to be realized.   
 
This failure rate and looming restructuring by the IRS may be an indication that the well-
intentioned social entrepreneurs and leaders of existing social ventures may not be 
managing their organizations in the most effective way. If social entrepreneurs and leaders 
of social ventures are to foster innovative, strong, and effective organizations that can truly 
make the world a better place, it is up to scholars and researchers to give them tools and 
strategies to help them.  In order to do that, we must answer questions such as: can 
existing business strategy theory be applied to social ventures?  Should existing business 
theory be adjusted to reflect the unique competitive dynamics at play among social 
ventures? How different or similar are social and commercial ventures in terms of their 
strategies, operations, resource-utilization, and resource acquisition?  What might be 
learned from applying or modifying existing theories surrounding commercial ventures 
towards social ventures? 
 
1.3 Purpose of the Thesis 
 
The two longstanding and contrasting disciplines that have contributed most to nonprofit 
research and the study of nonprofits are economics and sociology (Helmig, Jegers, and 
Lapspley, 2004). However, neither of these disciplines has resolved all of the dilemmas 
surrounding nonprofit organizations (NPOs). The standard economic model of markets 
and firms does not apply well to the distinctive non-economic market situation of NPOs 
and the sociological perspective fails to develop action plans for NPOs (Helmig, Jegers, 
and Lapsley, 2004).  Even though the research agenda has expanded significantly over the 
last decade, the theoretical challenges remain quite severe and no single theory has come 
to dominate the nonprofit field (Anheier and Salamon, 2006).   
 
In general, social venture research has been described as under-developed and lacking 
capacity and critical mass (Peattie and Morley, 2008; Alter, 2006).  Challenges of 
insufficient data, underdeveloped theory and unresolved definitional issues are frequent 
critiques of social venture research.  Taylor (2007) points out “a major empirical weakness 
in the literature is the small size of data populations and samples, the short time scales of 
research, and the validity of the extrapolations that writers then propose” (6). Additionally, 
Short, Moss, and Lumpkin’s (2009) “review of this literature reveals that conceptual 
articles outnumber empirical studies, and empirical efforts often lack formal hypotheses 
and rigorous methods. These findings suggest that social entrepreneurship research 
remains in an embryonic state” (161). 
 
Even in the strategic management area, the extent to which nonprofits use strategic 
management activities to respond to the changing needs is not certain (Stone, Bigelow and 
Crittenden, 1999).  Certain studies have examined how the use of formal planning was 
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associated with nonprofit organizational growth from a funding perspective (Siciliano, 
1997; Jenster and Overstreet, 1990; Odom and Boxx, 1988) and found that formal 
planning was associated with organizational growth, but as these were all primarily 
correlation studies, the issue of causality was not addressed.  “Little attention has been 
paid to determinants expressing changing demands for services or shifts in client needs” 
(Stone, Bigelow and Crittenden, 1999, 115).  Several studies by Nutt (1986, 1987, 1989) 
found that the behaviors of executive directors were an important determinant in the 
activities of nonprofits.  Additionally there have been numerous studies regarding the 
effects of board members on nonprofit performance (Morris, Coombes, Schindehutte, and 
Allen 2007; Bradshaw, Murray, and Wolpin, 1996; Siciliano and Floyd, 1993; Stone, 
1991).   
 
One notable example comes from the entrepreneurship literature stream and studies the 
effects of an entrepreneurial or market orientation within nonprofit firms (Morris, 
Coombes, Schindehutte, and Allen, 2007). The study found that a strong market 
orientation towards donors and clients led to better performance, but the study does not 
give specific recommendations to nonprofit organizations on how to accomplish this.  
Additionally, the researchers add that the theoretical basis for entrepreneurship within 
nonprofits has not been adequately established.   
 
Coupling entrepreneurial behavior with a sustainable model to support entrepreneurial 
behavior would logically seem to lead to a successful venture.  Understanding venture 
success or failure is central in strategy (Porter, 1991) with a clear focus on firm success. 
The field of strategic management conceptualizes success as having a competitive 
advantage over other firms (Barney, 1991), which is demonstrated by a competitive 
position or series of competitive positions that leads to both above average and sustainable 
financial performance (Porter, 1991).   
 
Using elements of resource-based theory (RBT), to attempt to explain why some social 
ventures seem to perform better than others may be fruitful as a starting point.  Resource-
based theory proposes that resource selection and accrual are a function of both external 
strategic factors as well as internal decision-making (Oliver, 1997). As competition and 
economic issues are transformed through social entrepreneurship practices and business 
models, analysis of external forces can also be helpful in grasping the environment in 
which these firms operate.  However, it does not address why and how some social 
ventures attain success and others fail.  This is why RBT may be suitable in the context of 
social ventures.  Entrepreneurship and resource-based theory adopt exactly the same unit 
of analysis – the firm resource (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001).  It is the analysis of 
resources that becomes the avenue to greater insight into these social ventures. 
 
In taking from entrepreneurship, strategy, and economic literature, this thesis attempts to 
fill some of the gaps by adapting existing theories for entrepreneurial strategy, general 
strategy and competitive advantage, all through a resource-based theory lens, to fit within 
the nonprofit sector.  The thesis then presents an adjusted model for sustainable 
competitive advantage within resource-based theory so that the nonmarket conditions 
facing nonprofits are taken into account.  This adjusted model is called sustainable 
contributive advantage.   The initial empirical/exploratory study then attempts to explore 
whether nonprofits and for-profit enterprises behave more similar than different regarding 
various resources from a quantitative standpoint.  The results of the research demonstrated 
that while there are many similarities, differences do exist.  The study is then replicated on 
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a more in-depth basis in order to ascertain if certain indicators of the resources conditions 
of sustainable contributive advantage play a role in overall firm relative performance.   
 
1.4 The Research Approach 
 
This thesis examines the existing theory of RBT and several concepts in economics within 
the context of social ventures.  It also explores existing models developed within RBT.  
The thesis uses existing RBT concepts and models (initially developed for application in a 
purely economic market context) and explores how they might be used within a market 
that does not operate under typical commercial economic rules.  In other words, theories 
and concepts developed for for-profits will be applied and explored within a social venture 
context.   
 
This thesis does not attempt to disprove an existing concept or theory within RBT or 
economics, but rather explore these concepts and theories in a new context.  Specifically, 
this thesis explores the social venture’s ability to demonstrate consistently superior 
performance.  Social research challenges utilize various approaches.  If the research 
challenge, or problem, is “identifying factors that influence an outcome, the utility of an 
intervention, or understanding the best predictors of outcomes, than a quantitative 
approach is best.  It is also the best approach to use to test a theory or explanation” 
(Creswell, 2003, 21-22). This study attempts to test a proposed explanation of 
understanding the best predictors of outcomes.  The proposed explanation is comprosed of 
the factors introduced in the model for sustainable contributive advantage and the outcome 
is sustainable superior performance, applied specifically to social ventures.  
 
Concepts are defined as phenomena of interest, as also defined in a model (Hanson, 
Creswell, Clark, Plano, Petska, and Creswell, 2005). This thesis will explore and present 
two specific concepts, which are resource conditions, in order to explain and possibly 
predict consistently superior performance by a social venture.  This model is called 
sustainable contributive advantage (SConA).   
 
A contribution to scientific knowledge can take one of five forms: a typology, a prediction 
of future events, an explanation of past events, a sense of understanding about what causes 
events, or a potential for controlling events (Reynolds, 2007). This thesis intends to 
provide an understanding about the conditions surrounding the consistently superior 
performance of a social venture.  A secondary goal of the thesis is to determine whether 
factors can be determined which predict the above marginal performance of social 
ventures.  As this study is somewhat exploratory in nature in order to determine the 
validity of the variables used to represent concepts and those variables contribution to 
overall performance, the secondary goal of prediction will need further testing beyond the 
scope of the study here. However, this secondary goal will be explored as well as its 
possible implications for researchers and practitioners.   
 
In line with Kuhn’s (1962) scientific revolution paradigms, this thesis aims to explore a 
conceptualization of a phenomenon: a social venture’s consistent and above average 
performance. This thesis takes a quantitative or post-positivist assumptive research 
approach in the testing of the model for SConA.  The post-positivist assumption focuses 
on empirical data, causality, rational considerations, and theory verification (Creswell, 
2003).  The development of the model begins with broad questions and considers multiple 
viewpoints.  However, the model and the new concepts presented are developed in such a 
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way as to be empirically tested.  In order to construct meaning from the interactions and 
behaviors of firms operating in the social context, the process of theory development also 
takes mainly an inductive process.      
 
The overall research approach in this thesis uses a ‘theory-then-research’ approach for 
developing a model for sustainable contributive advantage.  This approach, developed by 
Popper (1963) follows the strategy of “developing an explicit [model] in process 
description form and selecting a statement generated by the [model] for comparison with 
the results of empirical research” (147).  As the statement relates to the model for 
sustainable contributive advantage and is shown to correspond with the results of the 
empirical work, further testing suggestions are then developed along with determining 
possible predictive power as well as the limitations of the model.   
 
1.5 Research Questions 
 
The goal of economic and social ventures is to capture enough value from the value that 
they create in order to become a sustainable organization.  Is it possible to develop models 
that bring greater awareness and chances of success by viewing the developing internal 
activities of those firms? 
 
This thesis proposes that the answer to the above question is yes.  It therefore proposes the 
following three research questions:  
1. Can (and should) resource-based theory be applied to social ventures?  
2. Does sustainable competitive advantage exist for social ventures and what could an 
adjusted model, taking the nonmarket effects within the nonprofit sector into account, tell 
researchers about what is happening in and around social ventures?   
3. What does an adjusted model of sustainable competitive advantage; called sustainable 
contributive advantage, look like?  
 
1.6 Theory Development and Analysis 
 
A review of existing literature surrounding social entrepreneurship, resource-based theory, 
competitive advantage, value creation, market failure, and nonprofits is presented in detail. 
Taking into account existing theories, the nonmarket environment within which social 
ventures operate in, various frameworks within which to view social ventures, and 
bridging together some of the economic gaps facing social ventures, the model by Peteraf 
(1993) for sustainable competitive advantage (SCA) is expanded within resource-based 
theory to construct a model of sustainable contributive advantage (SConA).  This 
expanded view utilizes the newly developed concept of social rent (Robb-Post, et al, 2010) 
and includes two new resource conditions to fit the social/nonmarket environment called 
abilities to scale and limits to scarcity.  SConA builds on and includes SCA, but the 
additional resource conditions social ventures must take into account in order to remain 
sustainably contributive reflect the differing value creation logics between social and 
commercial ventures.  This model of SConA within resource-based theory is developed 
and presented along with an expanded discussion on social rent.   
 
The quantitative portion of this thesis uses 147 social ventures’ historical financial data 
reported to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to both examine whether trends in social 
ventures mimic those of commercial ventures as well as attempting to tease out evidence 
of sustainable contributive advantage in these ventures.  The variables of growth and 
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profit, often used in the study of commercial ventures, are problematic in the context of 
social ventures due to their dual-goal of creating social and economic value.  While some 
social ventures, such as non-profit organizations, do not record ‘profit,’ they do possess 
metrics that provide an efficiency measure, which is measured in financial terms.  This 
study uses several variables to define and analyze the ‘growth’ and ‘efficiency’ measures 
within social ventures in order to test hypotheses regarding their relationships. The initial 
exploratory study used revenue growth (growth) and a ratio of revenue vs. expenses 
(efficiency) as measures.  The results indicate that the path to ‘success’ within social 
ventures is somewhat different than the path of commercial entrepreneurship and there are 
financial indicators that provide support for the model of sustainable contributive 
advantage (SConA).   
 
Each study is designed to build upon each other in terms of the development of the theory 
and testing of the model presented in this thesis called sustainable contributive advantage.  
Combining lessons learned, outcomes, and research results from both studies, a discussion 
chapter is developed which reviews implications for practitioners and policy makers.  
Finally, future research directions for further inquiry into social venture strategy and 
sustainable contributive advantage are recommended and reviewed. 
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2 Literature Review 
	
2.1 Social Entrepreneurship and Social Ventures 
 
Social entrepreneurship has emerged at a relatively fast pace as a sector within the 
academic research arena.  Its current stage of development, however, is still in the early 
stages although many are beginning to recognize it as a legitimate field of interest.  
Regardless of its phenomenal growth and attention, research surrounding this topic is 
fragmented and lacking in the rigor it needs to become a clearly established field of 
research (Short, Moss, and Lumpkin, 2009; Peattie and Morely, 2008; Mair and Marti, 
2006; Fiet, 2002).  Numerous perspectives about what social entrepreneurship is (and what 
it is not) have begun to develop.  While many may argue that the existing research is not 
yet rigorous in nature, there have been more than 200 academic articles published on the 
subject, nearly all of which since 2000 (Hill, Kothari, and Shea, 2008).   
 
The field of entrepreneurship research has often been criticized for exactly the same types 
of weaknesses as the social entrepreneurship research field. Sexton (1988, 4) raised the 
question: “Is the field of entrepreneurship growing, or just getting bigger?”  For example, 
the definitional debate surrounding what entrepreneurship has been said to hamper 
research progress (Low and MacMillan, 1988; Gartner, 1985; Vesper, 1983). The 
definitional debate surrounding social entrepreneurship has had a similar progression 
(Dacin, Dacin, and Matear, 2010; Austin, Stevensen, and Wei-Skillern, 2006; Paredo and 
McLean, 2006).  
 
Much of early entrepreneurship research reported the occurrence of entrepreneurs or the 
personality characteristics of entrepreneurs, while lacking investigation of causal 
relationships or implications for practice (Low and MacMillan, 1988). “For a field of 
social science to have usefulness, it must have a conceptual framework that explains and 
predicts a set of empirical phenomena not explained or predicted by conceptual 
frameworks already in existence” (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000, 217).  To date, the 
phenomenon of entrepreneurship has lacked some of this conceptual framework and more 
productive empirical research (Carsrud and Brännback, 2011; Bruyat and Julien, 2000; 
Shane and Venkataraman, 2000).  Other common criticisms of entrepreneurship 
scholarship are that it does not contain anything new and that it lacks both theoretical and 
empirical rigor (Fiet, 2002).  
 
The definition of entrepreneurship has been debated in the similar way that scholars debate 
over what social entrepreneurship is and how it is defined today (Paredo and McLean, 
2006).  Due to the current stage of development, it is helpful to use adjacent or similar 
fields of research as comparables or beginning frameworks. However, one should exercise 
caution when translating findings of from research on the creation of commercial ventures 
directly to the process of creating social ventures because how similar or different those 
processes may be have not yet been made clear (Dorado, 2006).  Many have compared the 
general research field of entrepreneurship to social entrepreneurship, claiming that social 
entrepreneurship is a subset of entrepreneurship.  The word “social” simply modifies 
entrepreneurship (Martin and Osberg, 2007). However, there have been some studies that 
question whether social entrepreneurship is the same as entrepreneurship, different from 
entrepreneurship, or both (Austin, Stevenson, and Wei-Skillern, 2006). 
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Along with debating what social entrepreneurship is and how it is defined; researchers 
have also focused on who the social entrepreneur is, what characteristics the social 
entrepreneur may possess, and what causes a person to become a social entrepreneur 
(Zahra, Gedajlovic, Neubaum, and Shulman, 2008; Light, 2000; Thompson, Alvy and 
Lees, 2000). Many of the initial studies on entrepreneurs examined who the entrepreneur 
was, what made them different, what life experiences caused them to become an 
entrepreneur, etc (Gartner, 1988).  Similar studies of have emerged for social 
entrepreneurs.  Researchers have even explored whether social entrepreneurs are 
entrepreneurs – or some other term relating closer to social change (Steinerowski, Jack, 
and Farmer, 2008) such as a term based on identity theory, where a social entrepreneur is 
actually a social activist (Simms and Robinson, 2006).  Studies have examined what social 
entrepreneurs do and achieve for the community (Thompson, 2002), how exclusive the 
category of social entrepreneurship should be (Light, 2005), how social entrepreneurs rise 
from social welfare challenges (Leadbetter, 1997), and how social entrepreneurs play the 
role of change agent (Dees, 1998b). Another study examined social entrepreneurs’ 
perceptions prior to starting the social ventures and found that a founder’s perceptions of 
an ambiguous institutional environment are the primary factor leading to the type of 
structure (for-profit vs. non-profit) they choose to house their social mission (Townsend 
and Hart, 2008).  
 
As the debate continues surrounding the definition of social entrepreneurship along with 
whom social entrepreneurs are and what motivates them, the actual process of social 
entrepreneurship seems to have been largely ignored. A distinct difference between the 
growth of the research field of social entrepreneurship when compared to the growth of the 
research field of entrepreneurship circles around this issue of outcomes. More specifically, 
how to measure the output of social entrepreneurship, how to compare the outputs of 
different types of social entrepreneurship, and what impact social entrepreneurship may be 
making on the environment they operate in. Overall, there is a “lack of existing research 
on social impact reporting in the social entrepreneurship area” (Nicholls, 2009, 757). This 
challenging domain of the research has yet to become a rigorous and theory-based domain.   
 
There have been new developments in measuring social impact and SROI that account for 
“financial performance but also disclose nuanced and contingent social and environmental 
impacts and outcomes” (Nicholls, 2009, 755). Researchers have presented helpful 
analytical tools for cross-comparison.  These include such tools as blended value 
accounting, triple bottom line (or 3BL), social return on investment (or SROI), and the 
Internal Revenue Service 990 statement of functional expenses which partitions expenses 
into three activities: charitable, administrative, and fundraising (Yetman and Yetman, 
2008). However, each of these methods has significant limitations when trying to uncover 
how efficient or effective an organization may be.   
 
Advocates of 3BL believe that the triple bottom line and corporate responsibility are one 
and the same, as for-profit firms have socially-related responsibilities in addition to 
maximizing shareholder value (Norman and MacDonald, 2004). The core SROI analysis 
does not try to quantify and capture all aspects of the value created in line with the firm’s 
social mission, but rather to show demonstrable financial cost savings or revenue 
contributions that result the activity (Emerson, Wachowicz, and Chun, 2001).  Blended 
value accounting utilizes a full spectrum of reporting tools from SROI to audits to 
qualitative social value data (Nicholls, 2009).  However, Nicholls (2009) also cautions that 
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many of these models are taken directly from the commercial sector and therefore cause 
the results to “reflect larger power structures and normative social pressures, rather than 
internal processes” (766). Previous research on the IRS 990 reporting has shown a large 
number of non-profits reporting zero fundraising costs (Wing, Gordon, Hager, Pollak, and 
Rooney, 2006). In order to appear as an efficient organization to potential donors, prior 
research has found stakeholders reward nonprofits that report larger charitable, rather than 
administrative or fundraising, expenses (Yetman and Yetman, 2008).  Specific findings 
included 37 percent of nonprofits reporting over $50,000 in contributions reporting zero 
fundraising or special event costs (Wing, Gordon, Hager, Pollak, and Rooney, 2006).   
 
As helpful as these analytical tools may be, a one-size-fits-all basis for cross-comparison 
in social entrepreneurship across industries has not yet emerged.  “There are no 
standardized calculative mechanisms for social value creation, nor any comparative unit of 
measurement” (Paton, 2003; Nicholls 2009, 758). It then becomes challenging to ascertain 
from an external perspective, why some social ventures perform better than others and 
which best practices encourage social ventures to become ultimately successful.   
 
Additionally, there are many terms used by both entrepreneurship and social 
entrepreneurship researchers to describe the entrepreneur vs. the social entrepreneur.  
Classic entrepreneurship, business entrepreneur, traditional entrepreneur, economic 
entrepreneur, and economic entrepreneur are all appropriate terminology.  For purposes of 
clear discussion, the term commercial entrepreneur or commercial enterprise will be used 
to differentiate from a social entrepreneur or social enterprise.    
 
2.1.1 Entrepreneurship Areas of Research 
 
When considering social entrepreneurship as an area of research, it is helpful to also look 
at entrepreneurship as a comparable area of research.  While the field of social 
entrepreneurship research certainly new, entrepreneurship, as an academic field of study, 
is relatively new as well with the first course in entrepreneurship being taught at Harvard 
in 1947 (Cooper, 2003).   From a conceptual research standpoint, the field is relatively 
young with the first research published in 1921 by Knight on the “factors bearing upon 
profits realized by entrepreneurs” (Cooper, 2003, 24).  Regardless, the research field of 
entrepreneurship is much more developed by comparison to the research field of social 
entrepreneurship.  If research in social entrepreneurship is to find itself with a similar 
growth process as entrepreneurship research, it may be of great value to model one after 
the other and then begin the exploration of social entrepreneurship from the vantage point 
of the entrepreneurship field of research. 
 
Davidsson (2005) outlines three distinct areas of entrepreneurship research:  
1. “Why, when and how opportunities for the creation of goods and services come 
into existence 
2. Why, when and how some people and not others discover and exploit these 
opportunities 
3. Why, when and how different modes of action are used to exploit 
entrepreneurial opportunities” (19) 
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2.1.1.1 Opportunity Area 
 
The term opportunity is often used hand in hand with the term entrepreneurship.  Adding 
evidence to the discourse within the field of entrepreneurship research, three seemingly 
opposing views of opportunity are discussed in the field.  The discussion involves 
opportunity recognition, opportunity discovery, and opportunity creation (Shane 2003; 
Fiet, 2002).  
 
Opportunity recognition happens when the opportunity for bringing together supply and 
demand is “recognized.” The match-up happens when something new is created (i.e. a 
firm).  Opportunity discovery only concerns itself with one side of the equation, for 
example; supply exists, and demand does not exist (or vise versa).   It is the side that does 
not exist that is waiting to be discovered (Sarsvathy, Dew, Velamuri and Venkataraman, 
2003). However, this lends to a bit of confusion.  If an opportunity is discovered, it implies 
that it was always there, waiting for the entrepreneur to discover.  Although these 
discoveries can take many forms, they all share in that the information that was uncovered 
was previously unknown (Fiet, 2002).  Therefore, the word discovery may be a bit 
misleading.  Many researchers have used the word discovery to imply a process 
(Venkataramn, 1997) and simply used the word discovery to keep some accord within the 
field.  Finally, opportunity creation purports that neither supply nor demand exist and both 
must be created using several economic inventions (Sarasvathy, Dew, Velamuri and 
Venkataraman, 2003).  It has also been posited that it takes discovery and exploitation to 
create opportunity (Shane and Venkataramn, 2000).   
 
In the social entrepreneurship opportunity area of research, social entrepreneurs have often 
been compared to commercial entrepreneurs.  Commercial entrepreneurs recognize, 
discover, create and exploit opportunities when there are unmet needs in the marketplace.  
Social entrepreneurs realize where there is an opportunity to satisfy some unmet need that 
the government or commercial marketplace will not or cannot meet (Thompson, Alvy, and 
Lees, 2000).  Social entrepreneurs then gather together the necessary resources to fill that 
need without the promise of a direct economic return (Robb, Stamp, Brännback, Carsrud, 
Östermark, 2011). “Much like commercial entrepreneurs, social entrepreneurs identify 
opportunities in the environment and then seek resources and an entrepreneurial team to 
anticipate them” (Cool and Vermeulen, 2008, 4). 
 
The focus of the opportunity itself within and surrounding social entrepreneurship has 
been sparse and unpredictable in terms of its development in the research field.  Due to its 
cross-industrial nature, social entrepreneurship is indeed a multifaceted activity.  Some 
have described it as a multidimensional construct involving entrepreneurship behaviors, 
thinking, and frameworks (Martin and Osberg, 2007; Thompson, Alvy, and Lees, 2000).  
One of the key differentiating factors is the ability to recognize social value-creating 
opportunities (Mort, Weerawardena, and Carnegie, 2002).  The very word “opportunity” 
indicates a positive result and therefore, is fundamentally opposed to acknowledging some 
uncertain outcome (Davidsson, 2005). The economic perspective, as it relates to 
entrepreneurship, describes opportunity as “those situations in which new goods, services, 
raw materials, and organizing methods can be introduced and sold at greater than their cost 
of production” (Casson, 1982, pg. 200).  However, Singh (2001) states:  
 
Researchers should not limit study to what they perceive to be "good" 
opportunities, because the entrepreneur's perceived reality of what constitutes an 
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opportunity may be difficult to assess, particularly with respect to highly 
innovative new venture concepts. In such cases there is no direct historical data 
from which to make financial projections or to estimate potential market size, 
because the market has not been established. This makes it difficult to evaluate the 
economic potential for such opportunities (2001,11). 
 
Adding to the argument, Drucker (1985) points out that failures are rarely associated with 
opportunities and that researchers must recognize many firm failures occur independent of 
opportunity. “Many failures are simply mistakes resulting from greed, stupidity, 
thoughtless bandwagon climbing, or incompetence whether in design or execution.  A 
researcher might be tempted to dismiss the idea as not being an opportunity when, in 
reality, other factors may have caused the failure” (Drucker, 1985, 46).  
 
Ultimately, Singh (2001) concludes that opportunity is a poorly defined concept in 
entrepreneurship research, but concedes to the fact that an opportunity does follow market 
economic rules.  Therefore, an opportunity should be profit driven designed to take 
advantage of gaps in the marketplace.  This places social entrepreneurship in the midst of a 
precarious debate about whether the pursuit of a social venture is the pursuit of an 
opportunity, or something else such as social impact.   
 
Dees (1998b) borrowed from classic entrepreneurship definitions (Schumpeter, 1934) who 
described entrepreneurs as innovators who drive the “creative-destructive” process of 
capitalism, and Say (1803, 1971), who described entrepreneurs as those who shift 
economic resources out of areas of lower productivity and towards areas of higher 
productivity therefore, greater profit.  Dees (1998b, 3) included opportunity as an integral 
part of social entrepreneurship. “Social entrepreneurs play the role of change agents in the 
social sector, by: 
• Adopting a mission to create and sustain social value (not just private value) 
• Recognizing and relentlessly pursuing new opportunities to serve that mission 
• Engaging in a process of continuous innovation, adaptation, and learning 
• Acting boldly without being limited by resources currently in hand, and 
• Exhibiting heightened accountability to the constituencies served and for the 
outcomes created (3)”  
 
Entrepreneurship itself has been described as the study of opportunities (Eckhart and 
Shane, 2003).  Entrepreneurial decisions can also be described as creative decisions.  
Unlike a decision maker who is trying to use the means to achieve the ends, entrepreneurs 
create the means, the ends, or both.  Eckhart and Shane (2003) call this the means-ends 
framework.  If then, a true opportunity is indicated by financial success after the fact, 
perhaps then social entrepreneurship could be described as the study of opportunities for 
social impact.   
 
Going back to the commercial entrepreneurship arena and from the standpoint of 
economic equilibrium, prices fail to provide all of the information an entrepreneur needs to 
make decisions about resources (Acs and Audretsch, 2010).  As prices cannot provide 
information regarding new markets or future demand, entrepreneurs must guess in the face 
of uncertainty (Hunt, 2000). In the case of opportunities and entrepreneurial decision-
making, the majority of decision-making has little to do with current price information.  
Therefore, the process of discovery describes how entrepreneurs create new means-ends 
frameworks (Eckhart and Shane, 2003). 
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It is from this economic standpoint that clear differentiation emerges between social 
entrepreneurship and commercial entrepreneurship.  The primary goal of commercial 
entrepreneurship is to take advantage of economic opportunities in the market.  The 
opportunity therefore only exists if the entrepreneur is able to predict that the future price 
of an item will exceed the cost and future demand will exist.  Adding to the phenomenon, 
if that prediction indeed comes to fruition, the value of the opportunity will decrease over 
time due to competition also taking advantage of the opportunity.  Generally speaking, 
when commercial entrepreneurs exploit opportunities, they also then transfer that 
information to others about the opportunity and how to pursue it, whether intentionally or 
not (Eckhart and Shane, 2003).   
 
When considering social entrepreneurship, replication of promising organizations and 
programs has been crucial to the development of the field (Racine, 2003).  In fact, one of 
the world’s leading social entrepreneur associations, Ashoka, supports the notion of 
replication and places it high among the criteria that gauge success for the social 
entrepreneur.  Only by creating a solution that can be replicated and spread by local actors 
can social entrepreneurs achieve the scale and impact that is their life’s mission (Schindler 
and Wells, 2006).  Therefore, the goal and thereby the metrics used to judge success 
toward achieving that goal are glaring differentiators for commercial versus social 
entrepreneurship.  This also brings into question what entrepreneurship or business-related 
terms may be appropriately applied to social ventures, such as competitive advantage, 
first-mover advantage, or economic rents.  
 
2.1.1.2 Individual Area 
 
Individual characteristics of entrepreneurs are also a large area of entrepreneurship 
research.  The Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics, a widely known and recognized 
U.S. national four-wave study of entrepreneurial activity, dedicated an entire portion of its 
study to the characteristics of the entrepreneur.  It examined cognitive characteristics, 
reasons for becoming an entrepreneur, and their demographic patterns (Gartner, Shaver, 
Carter, Reynolds, 2004).  The study also looked a number of other characteristics such as 
how they made decisions, planned for the future, saw opportunities, and ascertained risk, 
along with how satisfied they were in their jobs.  However, these types of factors have 
been proven to be poor indicators of whether or not the person will become an 
entrepreneur. “Situational (for example, employment status or informational cues) or 
individual (for example, demographic characteristics or personality traits) variables are 
poor predictors. That is, predicting entrepreneurial activities by modeling only situational 
or personal factors usually resulted in disappointingly small explanatory power and even 
smaller predictive validity” (Krueger, Reilly, and Carsrud, 2000, 411).  
 
In order for a researcher to truly understand the process of entrepreneurship, figuring out 
what the catalyst is for entrepreneurship behavior is an important first step.  Since the 
predictive power of situational factors or personal characteristics is low, entrepreneurship 
researchers have borrowed from the psychology literature in order to try and predict 
behavior.  A particular focus has evolved around intention. Studies of entrepreneurial 
intentionality have shown that modeling intentions have shown the highest accuracy in 
predicting behavior (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980, Shapero, 1982, Krueger, Reilly, and 
Carsrud, 2000).  Some of the intention-related research has been extended to demonstrate 
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the impact of entrepreneurship education on entrepreneurial intentionality.  Numerous 
studies have been conducted in order to ascertain whether entrepreneurship education 
increases or decreases a student’s intention to start a business (Sanchez, 2011; Graevenitz, 
Harhoff, and Weber, 2010; Souitaris, Zerbinati, and Al-Laham, 2007).  Yet, even these 
methods of research have been criticized by those stating that “attributes that differentiate 
entrepreneurs from other members of society are often questionable simply because those 
attributes confound the influence of opportunities” (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000, 218).   
 
Researchers have looked at social entrepreneurs as individuals in the same way other 
studies have looked at commercial entrepreneurs.  Although in recent years, researchers 
have generally moved away from approaches that focus on identifying types of people in 
society who tend to start firms (Eckhardt and Shane, 2003).  Social entrepreneurs have 
been described as people with the same qualities and behaviors as commercial 
entrepreneurs, but who focus on their communities (Thompson, 2002).  Aside from the 
characteristics of social entrepreneurs, many researchers have looked at the motivating 
factors behind becoming a social entrepreneur.  As pure economic reasons do not seem to 
lend enough of a reason to engage in social entrepreneurship, personal morality and values 
have been linked to socially conscious behavior (Hemingway, 2005).   
 
A review of social entrepreneurship research by Short, Moss and Lumpkin (2009) 
highlights eight different articles that describe the characteristics of social entrepreneurs 
(e.g. Dearlove, 2004; Vasakarla, 2008). Vega and Kidwell (2007) compared social and 
commercial entrepreneurs and found that there are similarities, but differences in terms of 
traits, goals, tendencies and motivational sources.    Additionally, Zahra, Gedajlovic, 
Neubaum, and Shulman (2009) offer one notable contribution of defining three types of 
social entrepreneurs:  social bricoleur, social constructionist, and social engineer.  
 
In utilizing a communitarian perspective toward entrepreneurship, Cornwall (1998) 
suggests that the individual entrepreneur acts in a self-sacrificing manner, a manner that 
has direct impact on his or her own personal level of wealth, just as a social entrepreneur 
would act.  This is compared to a corporate manager who may not think about their own 
motivations and the effect of their actions on the immediate community.  “Entrepreneurs, 
regardless of the type of entrepreneur, contribute directly to the economic vitality of the 
communities their businesses are located in.  The result is a growth in employment and 
wages for many for many of its members and can have the classic multiplier effect on the 
community economy and can create ever-growing employment opportunities within the 
community” (Cornwall, 1998, 142).  
 
2.1.1.3 Action Area 
 
Finally, there is the area of entrepreneurship research surrounding the different types of 
action used to exploit an opportunity.  Primarily, there are two types of exploitation: the 
creation of a new firm or the creation of a new market (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000).  
Borrowing from economic, strategy, and management literature, there is a fair amount of 
research in the entrepreneurship field on firm creation, resource acquisition, resource 
management, market demand, governance, and organizational behavior.  It is this 
particular area of entrepreneurship research that the majority of focus for this study will 
encompass.    
 
	 15	
2.1.2 Process of Social Entrepreneurship 
 
As discussed previously, social entrepreneurship can be considered as a something certain 
people do or as a phenomenon.  Social entrepreneurship can also be described as a 
“process involving the innovative use and combination of resources to pursue 
opportunities to catalyze social change and/or address social needs” (Mair and Martí, 
2006, 37).   This is a key distinction in viewing social entrepreneurship because to imply 
that social entrepreneurship is indeed a unique process, also implies that it is indeed at 
least akin to the process of entrepreneurship and perhaps even something a little different. 
Mair and Marti (2006) view “social entrepreneurship as a process of creating value by 
combining resources in new ways. These resource combinations are intended primarily to 
explore and exploit opportunities to create social value by stimulating social change or 
meeting social needs. When viewed as a process, social entrepreneurship involves the 
offering of services and products but can also refer to the creation of new organizations” 
(2006, 37). 
 
The above definition rings close to the following popular definition of entrepreneurship 
(Morris, 1998) which states “entrepreneurship is the process through which individuals 
and teams create value by bringing together a unique package of resource inputs to exploit 
opportunities in the environment.  It can occur in any organizational context and results in 
a variety of possible outcomes, including new ventures, products, services, processes, 
markets, and technologies” (1998, 16). 
 
The two definitions are similar to each other, using such terminology as resource 
combinations and exploitation of opportunities.  While clearly, the Morris (1998) 
definition can be applied to any type of entrepreneurship, Mair and Marti’s (2006) cannot.  
Which begs the question, are they indeed different processes? As opposed to Austin, 
Stevenson and Wei-Skillern (2006) who attribute the main differences between social and 
commercial entrepreneurship to their inputs and outputs; Mair and Martí (2006) suggest 
the main difference lies in the relative priority in managing the processes toward social 
value versus wealth creation. (Mair and Martí, 2006). 
 
Waddock and Post (1991) go further to suggest that social entrepreneurs operate within a 
completely different realm than commercial entrepreneurs.  In fact, their processes and 
individual characteristics are mapped out quite differently. They posit that social 
entrepreneurs are catalytic in that they do not cause the change or bring about the social 
change, but influence others to take action and thereby indirectly impacting society, such 
as through public policy making (Waddock and Post, 1991).  However, they describe 
social entrepreneurship as more of a phenomenon than a process, as no specific strategies 
are laid out.   
 
A graphical depiction of the phenomenon as they describe social entrepreneurship is 
shown in Figure 1.  The “problem/complexity” contributes to the vision of the social 
entrepreneur, which then becomes the catalyst for collective action (societal), which then 
contributes to the commitment of the social entrepreneur. In a somewhat circular pattern, 
these social entrepreneurs deal with problem complexity by offering a vision and tapping 
into their personal resources (credibility). Together these factors draw a network together 
to work on the collective purpose embodied in the vision, making the circular process 
complete (Waddock and Post, 1991).  From these factors, they propose that a network is 
created, attention is drawn to the cause, and societal change begins to occur.  
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Figure1: Catalytic social entrepreneurship process (adapted from Waddock and Post, 
1991) 
 
Unfortunately, the figure merely depicts a phenomenon and gives little insight into the 
actual process of building a social venture.   This model suggests that if a social 
entrepreneur has a vision, creditability, and commitment, a network will somehow appear 
around his/her cause.  The social entrepreneur has almost magically become a catalyst for 
social change without an operating model or a resource acquisition strategy. This type of 
approach leaves little opportunity for future research or the identification of best-
demonstrated practices within social entrepreneurship.   
 
Guglu, Dees, and Anderson (2002) describe the process of social entrepreneurship as 
separated into two main steps.  “First, a social entrepreneur generates a promising idea. 
Second, the social entrepreneur attempts to develop that idea into an attractive opportunity” 
(Guglu, Dees, and Anderson, 2002:1) The first step “generating the promising idea” and the 
second step “developing promising ideas” are further divided into modules.  See Figure 2 
below.  In the first step, they attribute the success of the idea generation phase to the 
individual social entrepreneur’s experience, background, and environment.  The success of 
the second step in the process is dependent on the individual’s skill at adopting an 
entrepreneurial mindset (or opportunity-oriented mindset) (Guglu, Dees, and Anderson, 
2002).   
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Figure 2: Opportunity creation process (Guglue, Dees, and Anderson, 2002) 
 
The second step in the process is the point in the process that social entrepreneurs create 
the most value and is shaped like a funnel as that is where the majority of the promising 
ideas fail to make it through the process (Guglu, Dees, and Anderson, 2002).  However, 
the process described is somewhat nebulous and not specific in terms of strategies for 
social venture success.  They fail to clearly articulate how the various pieces fit or interact 
with each other and simply state that each element must be present for the social venture’s 
success.  They state that “when all these elements are feasible and aligned, the chances of 
success are relatively high” (Guglu, Dees, and Anderson, 2002, 14).  Success and 
alignment perhaps might be easy to observe after the fact, but the authors fail to describe 
pro-forma strategies for implementation.   
 
2.1.3 Social Entrepreneurship Versus Commercial Entrepreneurship 
 
Similar to the definition of commercial entrepreneurship, which states “entrepreneurs 
creates value by bringing together a unique package of resources inputs to exploit 
opportunities in the market” (Morris, 1998, 16), social entrepreneurship could be 
considered similarly.  However, social entrepreneurship attempts to addresses unmet social 
needs and create social value (Mair and Marti, 2006; Weerawardena and Mort, 2006), 
while commercial entrepreneurship could be considered to seek the creation of economic 
value (Austin, Stevenson and Wei-Skillern, 2006).  Dees (1998b) proposed that in social 
entrepreneurship, “the social mission is explicit and central”(2).  Others describe social 
entrepreneurship as “an entrepreneurial activity with an embedded social purpose” 
(Austin, Stevenson and Wei-Skillern, 2006, 1) or an event “where persons aim either 
exclusively, or in some prominent way, to create social value of some kind” (Peredo and 
McLean, 2006, 56). Still others classify it as “organizations that are not owned by 
shareholders and do not pursue profit as their main objective” (Leadbetter, 1997, 11). 
Others see it as “an innovative, social value creating activity that can occur within or 
across the non-profit, business, or government sectors” (Austin, Stevenson, and Wei-
Skillern, 2006, 2). Dorado (2006) proposed it simply as taking a strategic approach to limit 
a reliancy on donations and government funding in order to become a self-sufficient 
organization (Dorado, 2006).  Martin and Osberg (2007) described social entrepreneurship 
as a subset of entrepreneurship and that word ‘social’ simply modifies entrepreneurship.  
In fact, the prefix ‘social’ itself is vague enough to create an example where just about any 
venture could be called ‘social entrepreneurship’ (Zahra, Gedajlovic, Neaubaum, and 
Shulman, 2009).  Mair and Martí (2006) identified the term ‘social’ as somewhat 
misunderstood.  They presented the simplistic view of profit motives vs. altruistic motives 
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and cautioned against thinking in this dichotomous nature. These two motives have been 
discussed at detail often through interviews or surveys of the entrepreneurs themselves 
(Neck, Brush, and Allen, 2009).  
 
Dees (1998b) identified the primary characteristics of social entrepreneurship as 
innovativeness, risk-taking, resourcefulness, accountability and social mission. Some 
researchers have added on to Dees’ definition by discussing the conditions of the social 
venture itself, such as earned income (Dees, 1998a; Dees and Anderson, 2003; Emerson 
and Twersky, 1996), levels of innovative practices (Alvord, Brown, and Letts, 2003; 
Bornstein, 2004; Dees and Anderson, 2006; Schumpeter, 1934), business strategies (Dees 
and Anderson, 2006), and business legal structure (Dees and Anderson, 2003; Dorado, 
2006).   
 
In what makes up the entrepreneurial process, social and commercial ventures are both 
similar and different when it comes to inputs, outputs, and resources mobilization 
techniques (Austin, Stevenson, and Wei-Skillern, 2006).  A venture, whether social or 
commercial, produces several outputs, which may be those such as products, services, 
assets, loss, and value (Morris, Lewis, and Sexton, 1994).    
 
Figure 3 identifies depicts the inputs and outputs of both kinds of ventures as different as 
well as similar.  This study focuses on the ‘process’ portion of the framework.  In other 
words, this study focuses on the mechanisms that occur between the input social ventures 
receive and the outputs social ventures produce. It is proposed by Meyskens and Robb-
Post (2008) that the process of entrepreneurship, whether commercial or social in nature, 
are the same.      
 
 
 
 
Figure3: Social and Commercial Entrepreneurial Process Framework (adapted from 
Meyskens and Robb-Post, 2008) 
 
The difference in the motivating factors behind the allocation of resources to each type of 
venture, social venture stakeholders being philanthropic, and commercial venture 
stakeholders focused on financial return on investment, certainly implies different resource 
acquisition strategies for each types of venture (Austin, Stevenson, and Wei-Skillern, 
2006).  However, the resource utilization process compared between social and 
commercial organizations demonstrate similar patterns in terms of the organization of 
resources. As part of this process, both types of organizations (or entrepreneurs) must 
implement profitable growth strategies as well as manage diverse relationships and 
partnerships to gain these financial and human resources and build organizations (Dorado, 
2006).   
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2.2 History of Nonprofits in the United States 
 
The primary focus of this study is on the nonprofit sector within social ventures.  The 
discussion and review of the literature that follows will focus on this nonprofit sector 
although much of the research may be applicable to social ventures from a broader 
standpoint.  Figure 4 illustrates the relationships between social entrepreneurship and the 
private, public and nonprofit sectors.  This study focuses on all of those ventures included 
in the bottom, right-hand circle. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Relationship between social entrepreneurship and the private/public/voluntary 
sectors (Venture Pragmatist, 2010) 
 
In the United States, due to federal and state funding cuts that began during the Reagan 
Era, nonprofit organizations have been forced to explore new strategies to sustain their 
operations (Besel, et al., 2004). Typically, these strategies have been merging, 
decentralizing, or cost cutting; these strategies have also been representative of recent 
trends in the for-profit sector (Ortiz and Bassof, 1988; Strom-Gottfried, 1997).  The result 
is a competitive landscape for social enterprises similar to the competitive landscape of 
commercial ventures, but with more complex success criteria.  This shift in competitive 
landscape prompts the need to examine trends in social ventures and compare those with 
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commercial ones in order to examine whether strategies borrowed from commercial 
ventures might also be appropriate for social ventures.  
 
In tracing back the roots of nonprofit organizations, “religion has been called the 
godmother of the nonprofit sector” (O’Neill, 1989, 20). For the past two centuries, 
nonprofit organizations have been managed based on this religious and historical tradition 
of charity and philanthropy (Bush, 1992). 
 
The actual term nonprofit was coined by economists in the years after World War II in 
order to identify a tax status classified in section 501(c)(3) and 501 (c)(4) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954 described as non-stock corporations and trusts formed for 
charitable, educational, religious and civic purposes (Hall, 2006).  A nonprofit 
organization does not distribute its profits to shareholders, but instead reinvests those 
profits back into the company.  Due to its nonprofit status, those profits are usually exempt 
from federal and state income tax.  Additionally, a nonprofit does not pay sales tax on 
many of their purchases.  Individuals and corporations that contribute financially to the 
nonprofit enjoy their contributions as being tax deductable on their own tax returns 
(Grobman, 2008). There are additional types of organizations included under the umbrella 
of nonprofit and tax-exempt status with varying degrees of tax status and different degrees 
of tax exemption are based on the nature of the business. These include such entities as 
political organizations, farmers’ cooperatives, homeowner associations, religious 
organizations, social and recreation clubs. 
 
The roots and principals of charity and nonprofits in the United States were born out of the 
ideals and values of the New England Puritans who settled in Massachusetts in the 16th 
and 17th centuries (Pallotta, 2008).  However, the Western roots of charity and its ideals 
can be traced back to Ancient Rome, Judaism, and Christianity. The Christians are 
believed to have created the first voluntary groups for purposes of helping the needy (Hall, 
2006).  The Puritans are credited to have created the free market system and capitalism 
here in the U.S., but they also created a system for helping the poor (Pallotta, 2008).  In 
their view, helping the poor was a duty and a product of their economic gains.  However, 
they were kept distinctly separate.  “They authorized a regime of private property and 
freedom of contract but endeavored to see that it was checked and balanced by moral 
witness and civic restraint” (Ines, 1995, 25).   
 
Volunteering groups and charitable giving started to appear in urban centers, such as 
Philadelphia and Boston by the 1750s, although they were still embryonic (Hall, 2006).  
By the end of the nineteenth century a handful of states recognized and encouraged 
philanthropic, charitable, and voluntary associations through tax exemptions.  Religious 
organizations and universities were also a key force in the shifting of the American 
mindset towards associational activity and giving for public purposes (Hall, 2006). 
Between 1947 and 1954, Congress worked to introduce a new taxation system, which led 
to the 1954 Internal Revenue Code (IRC) of 501(c), which created a unified taxation 
system and regulatory oversight for nonprofit entities (Hall, 2006).   
 
Today, charitable organizations, under the IRC 501(c)(3) code, represent the largest subset 
of tax-exempt organizations (Borris and Steuerle, 2006). These nonprofits are the only 
kind of nonprofit able to accept tax-deductible contributions.  All the law requires of 
nonprofits is that they do not distribute their excess revenue in the form of dividends and 
that their beneficiaries are a general class of persons rather than individuals who may 
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benefit from the organization (Steinberg, 2006).  As long as the organization conforms to 
the general requirements, the range of purposes for nonprofits is quite varied.  However, 
those falling under the IRC 501(c)(3) status must be engaged in educational, religious, 
scientific, or other forms of charitable behavior. Other types of nonprofits can hold tax-
exempt status, such as social clubs and unions, but they cannot receive tax-deductible 
charitable contributions (Boris and Stuerle, 2006).   
 
2.2.1 Growth of Nonprofits 
 
Data from the National Center for Charitable Statistics at The Urban Institute suggest that 
the number of nonprofit organizations continues to rise in numbers within the United 
States (Kerlin, 2006). According to the Independent Sector’s 2005 study, the Panel on the 
Nonprofit Sector, pg. 10:  
 
The United States is home to an estimated 1.3 million public charities, private 
foundations, and religious congregations. However, only 4 percent of all charitable 
organizations have annual budgets of more than $10 million. Most are small, with 
nearly three-quarters operating with budgets of less than $500,000.   
 
When compared to the annual budgets of U.S. for-profit firms, the growth and size of for-
profit U.S. firms far out paces those in the nonprofit sector.  In 2007, statistics about 
business size from the U.S. Census Bureau indicated that nearly 27% of for-profit 
businesses operated above $10 million compared to only 4% of all charitable 
organizations.    
 
2.2.2 Economics of Nonprofits and The Nondistribution Constraint 
 
“Economics is the study of choices under scarcity” and this applies to purchasing choices 
as well as time allocation and could be applied in the case of any type of resource 
(Steinberg, 2006, 117).  The basic premise of economics is that each individual will pursue 
their own self-interests (Steinberg, 2006).  In regards to volunteers and donors in the 
nonprofit sector, their self-interest may lie in the satisfaction of helping others or 
impacting society in a positive way.   
 
Economic models typically assume that for-profit firms maximize profits because 
that is what the owners want to do.  Framed in this way, departures from profit 
maximization appear as ‘market failures’ or ‘agency problems’ cured by providing 
the proper financial incentives.  Nonprofits cannot be analyzed from the same 
starting point.  These organizations may indeed maximize their ‘profits’ (or 
financial surplus or endowment) under some circumstances.  However, be 
interpreted anew (Steinberg, 2006, 117).   
 
Similar to a for-profit venture, nonprofits attempt to generate revenue and keep costs low.  
Sometimes this results in more revenue than expenses.  Just as with a for-profit, any 
annual amount of revenues in excess of expenses will result in a “profit.”  In nonprofit 
accounting terms, the result of “profit” is sometimes referred to as “a change in net 
assets.”  This “profit” is tax-free and while nonprofits are allowed to earn a “profit” within 
a given year, it is expected that these profits will be used to provide future mission-related 
services in line with the nonprofit’s mission (Hansmann, 1980).  
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One of the key differentiating factors for nonprofits is their restriction regarding excess 
earnings.  Early economic work on nonprofit organizations developed the notion of 
quantity maximization subject to a zero profit or nondistribution constraint (Newhouse, 
1970). Net earnings, if any, must be retained (via endowments, reserves, or temporarily 
restricted funds) and then invested into the further growth or production of services the 
organization was formed to provide (Hansmann, 1980).  These excess revenues must be 
distributed in one of three ways, each of which that will contribute to the overall mission 
of the nonprofit: increases operating expenses, investment in fixed assets, or kept in 
retained earnings.   
 
The Internal Revenue Service has no restrictions or regulations regarding net asset 
accumulation and no public policy exists regarding how much surplus a nonprofit may 
earn in a given year, nor how long these surpluses may be retained (Calabrese, 
forthcoming). However, public views and recent government regulations have pushed for 
such restrictions to exist.  In 2001, the American Red Cross became the subject of public 
scrutiny and a House of Representatives special hearing when it was discovered that the 
American Red Cross kept a portion of the donations made on behalf of 9/11 victims in 
order to set aside funds for future catastrophes.  The public outcry was so significant that 
the organization’s president resigned. 
 
It is somewhat naïve to assume (and research does not support) that a nonprofit’s excess 
earnings occur only due to unexpected donations or inaccurate forecasting (Chang and 
Tuckman 1990).  Rather, operating profits (or positive change in net assets) may be a goal 
of management in an effort to either expand the organization or to serve as protection from 
unexpected revenue changes (Calabrese, forthcoming).  However, a positive change in net 
assets is still not a sufficient measure for how efficient or “profitable” a nonprofit may be.  
This is due to the simple fact that market prices for the outputs of nonprofit organizations 
and even for some inputs (for example, volunteer work) do not exist (Speckbacher, 2003).   
 
2.2.3 Market Failure 
 
The regulations and tax exemptions provided to nonprofits, specifically those of 501(c)3 
status, were designed to assist nonprofits in the covering the costs of providing services to 
those that either the government or the market failed to provide.  Weisbrod (1975) 
identified two types of failures that lead to the role of the nonprofit: market failure and 
government failure.  To summarize, markets fail to provide adequate quantities of 
collective goods to those in need of them and governments provide these goods in accord 
with the will of the people.  Those who desire to see higher levels of service than the 
government provides, then choose to support nonprofits. 
 
The work of Hansmann (1980) is a frequently referred to as research which built onto 
Weisbrod’s (1975) work on nonprofit organization.  Contract failure was added to the 
types of failures responded to by nonprofits in that it “emerges in situations of asymmetric 
information typical of experience goods – goods whose quality is adjustable but cannot be 
assessed by inspection – such as car repairs, organic fruit, education, and health, day, and 
elder care” (Ortmann, 1996, 471). The nondistribution constraint, described previously, is 
said to serve as “a crude but effective consumer protection device” from this type of 
failure due to the fact that stakeholders of nonprofits cannot benefit from any excess 
revenue, they therefore, have no reason to provide inferior quality (Hansmann, 1996, 28).   
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Nonprofits work to fill needs and gaps, which neither markets, nor governments, are able 
to fill (or choose to fill).  Therefore, nonprofits operate in a unique environment where 
supply and demand functions and their effects on price do not function normally.  From 
1986 to 2006 in the United States, the number of nonprofits has increased by 63% and data 
from the National Center for Charitable Statistics at The Urban Institute suggest that 
nonprofit numbers will continue to rise (Kerlin, 2006).  As more and more nonprofits enter 
this unique non-market environment, resources for the support of these nonprofits become 
harder to acquire.  However, in the face of increasing competition for resources among 
nonprofits, it becomes important to examine how competition behaves in a non-market 
environment.     
 
The two longstanding and contrasting disciplines that have contributed most to nonprofit 
research and the study of nonprofits are economics and sociology (Helmig, Jegers, and 
Lapsley, 2004). However, as previously stated neither economics nor sociology have been 
able to resolve all of the dilemmas surrounding nonprofits. The standard economic model 
does not apply well to the distinctive non-economic market environment nonprofits 
operate in and the sociological perspective fails to develop action plans for nonprofits 
(Helmig, Jegers, and Lapsley, 2004).   
 
One of the results of the increased demand for nonprofit services coupled with a decreased 
availability of resources for nonprofits is increased competition within the sector (Pallotta, 
2008). From these various literature streams, there appears to be a difference in the 
perception of competition between nonprofit and for-profit ventures.  However, is this 
difference purely perceptual or do real economic differences exist that can affect how each 
organization should consider their strategies?   
 
Recently, there have been a number of researchers specifically interested in whether social 
entrepreneurial strategies reflect those of their commercial counterparts (Austin, 
Stevenson, and Wei-Skillern, 2006). Even if a nonprofit is not new or in a start-up stage, it 
still may behave entrepreneurial in nature or take on entrepreneurial strategies.  An older 
firm can behave entrepreneurial via such actions as opening a new market or offering a 
new service (Schumpeter, 1934). In fact, a high-growth strategy may be considered 
entrepreneurial in nature and the topic of firm growth within entrepreneurship research has 
attracted considerable attention (Delmar, Davidsson, and Gartner, 2003; Gundry and 
Welsh, 2001; Welbourne, 1997, Ostgaard and Birley, 1995; Collings and Porras, 1994). 
 
2.2.4 Growth and Profit Strategies 
 
In looking at economic ventures and their behavior in the marketplace, growth and profit 
dimensions have often been used to analyze performance.  Researchers have suggested 
that firm growth is a requirement for ascertaining if indeed an enterprise is entrepreneurial 
in nature or whether it can attain a competitive position in the marketplace (Cole, 1949; 
Kor and Mahoney, 2004; Sexton and Smilor, 1997; Stevenson and Gumpert, 1991).  As 
Penrose (1959) originally suggested, firm growth is not simply a change in size, but a 
change in processes.  Therefore Penrose (1959) cautions about the many challenges 
involved in growth (i.e. managerial challenges, spreading of production, integration).   
 
Although entrepreneurship researchers tend to have more of an interest in growth than in 
profitability, performance is often assessed through indicators of profitability only 
(Davidsson, Steffens, and Fitzsimmons, 2008; Goerzen and Beamish 2005).  Certain 
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studies have used growth and profit jointly in research (e.g., Baum and Wally, 2003; 
Chandler and Jansen, 1992; Cho and Pucic, 2005; Garg, Walters and Priem, 2003; 
Markman and Gartner, 2002; Roper, 1999; Wiklund, 1999), but each of these studies have 
shown mixed results in regards to whether profit and growth are positively or negatively 
related, or show no relationship at all.   
 
Recent studies, see Davidsson, Steffens, and Fitzsimmons (2009) and Brännback, Carsrud, 
Renko, Östermark, Aaltonen and Kiviluoto (2009), have begun to further explore the 
question of which dimension is more important for long-term success, growth or profit, 
and if one type of strategy should be pursued prior to the other.  The collective results of 
these studies show that while profit and growth are important for the success of a 
commercial venture, normally the path to success is through profitability first, then 
growth.   
 
In wanting to shed light on the path to success in nonprofits, the next step forward is to 
ascertain what growth and profit dimensions look like in the nonprofit sector.  As 
previously stated, nonprofits have a different view of how profitability and other financial 
measures relate to how they view success.  They must deal with a dual-goal of running 
their organization in a sustainable way and create social value via methods that may not 
directly lead to an economic return.  To simply argue the importance of growth or 
profitability in nonprofits is a disjointed argument because it does not reflect the true 
reality they face.  
	
2.2.5 Nonprofit Strategy 
 
“There is no body of economic theory underpinning nonprofits’ strategic choices” 
(Helmig, Jegers and Lapsley, 2004, 103). Although there have been numerous 
contributions from economics, the majority of the research surrounds the definition of 
nonprofits, the demand for nonprofits or the supply of nonprofits (Helmig, Jegers, and 
Lapsley, 2004).  There do exist a number of notable descriptive contributions (Bryson, 
1991; Middleton and Greer, 1996; Moore, 2000).  However, theoretical contributions that 
tackle the general issues of nonprofit strategy have been scarce (Helmig, Jegers, and 
Lapsley, 2004) and nonprofit strategy has “ been treated like a black box” (Ortmann, 1996, 
471).   
 
There have been some studies from the strategy literature that deal with specific 
circumstances or comparisons regarding nonprofit strategy.  Two notable examples 
examine the difference between a nonprofit’s strategy and a for-profit firm’s strategy 
following mergers (Lynk, 1995; Vita and Sacher, 2001) and a comparison between 
governmental strategies and nonprofit strategies (Kapur and Weisbrod, 2000).  While the 
nonprofit strategy research field has “grown in significance over the last few decades, the 
literature is in the early stage of development” (Weerawardena and Mort, 2008, 104). 
Additionally, Kong and Prior (2008) describe a “growing need for research into the 
competitive activities of nonprofits” (119).     
 
Since the 1980s, commercialization strategies have become more common among 
nonprofits (Kong and Prior, 2008).  These strategies fall in line with a broader strategy of 
revenue diversification, a balanced mix of donations, grants and earned income.  While 
fundraising and grant writing are accepted and respected strategies for revenue generation, 
commercial activities (earned income practices) are accompanied by substantial 
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controversy (Froelich, 1999).  The essence of charity is to provide goods and services to 
those who cannot pay (Hodgkinson, 1989) and therefore, by selling goods and services 
directly to those who can pay, the fundamental attributes of nonprofits may be in danger 
(Bush, 1992).   
 
While commercial activities conducted by nonprofits might be frowned upon, it represents 
the single largest source of nonprofit revenue in the United States (Young, 1998; Froelich, 
1999).  Additionally, earned income strategies allow for protection from the negative 
effects of revenue volatility and goal displacement associated with traditional fundraising 
strategies (Froelich, 1999).  As commercial activities continue to increase in the nonprofit 
sector, naturally the strategies used by social become closer to those of commercial 
ventures.  	
	
2.2.6 Nonprofits and Entrepreneurship 
 
In any organization, the continuous cycling process of creating value and capturing value 
must occur if the organization is to survive.  The ability of an organization to grow in this 
manner must mean that it has internal practices or activities in place in order to capture 
some of the value that it creates.  Ideally, those internal operations should allow for the 
organization to capture more value than it is creating in order to them to achieve at least 
marginal growth in an organic way.  Organic growth is the process of gradual business 
expansion due to increased output, sales or both, as opposed to instant growth through 
mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers (Delmar, Davidsson, and Gartner, 2003).  
 
Nonprofits that achieve organic growth are able to leverage their own internal resources in 
order to generate recurring revenue streams, often time through strategies such as earned 
income or membership programs (i.e. commercial strategies).  Boschee and McClurg 
(2003) support commercial strategies in nonprofits and explain unless a nonprofit 
organization is generating earned revenue from its activities, it not is being 
entrepreneurial. Rather than relying on a few large income streams (i.e. grants, 
endowments) many organizations work to increase their funding diversity due to its 
proven dependence-reducing properties (Chang and Tuckman, 1991; Gronbjerg, 1993; 
Kramer, 1981; Powell and Friedkin, 1986; Froelich, 1999). Entrepreneurial and effective 
organizations recognize the need for their independence and respond to the criteria for 
continued resource acquisition (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Froelich, 1999). 
 
As the addition of commercial strategies has been shown to offer greater income stability 
resulting from revenue diversification (Froelich, 1999), a strategy based on organic growth 
could prove a more appropriate strategy for social ventures.  Those social ventures that are 
heavily resource consuming without strategies for diverse resource acquisition (value 
creation without value capture) may find themselves in a never-ending fight for funding.  
The goal of the social entrepreneur or venture would be to form an economic transaction 
engine by which operational processes are created and put in place that facilitate gathering 
economic resources in a way that increases the ability of the venture to predict its income 
and thereby, run more effective operations.   
 
2.2.7 Nonprofit Strategy and Sustainability 
 
There are many nonprofits that one would deem successful, or are considered leaders in 
their respective field and/or are perceived to consistently perform well.  Similarly, 
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traditional strategy researchers have evidence that some firms consistently outperform 
others (Rumelt, 1991; McGahan and Porter, 1997). Strategic management research’s 
central research question is ‘Why do some firms persistently outperform others?’(Barney 
and Clark, 2007).  
 
Early attempts to address this question focused on product-market position and the forces 
of power in the market (e.g. Bain, 1956, Porter, 1980).   While the analysis of market 
forces, power, or financial success are useful in traditional strategic management research, 
the majority of these frameworks are unsuitable to social ventures due to the distinctive 
nonmarket environment in which these ventures operate (Helmig, Jegers, and Lapsley, 
2004).  Nonprofits receive revenue from sources other than customer purchases and the 
value produced by nonprofits lies in the achievement of social-related purposes rather than 
only generating revenues (Moore, 2000).  The premise of social entrepreneurship is to 
disrupt the normal economic equilibrium and while commercial ventures can be judged 
strictly by financial terms, while social ventures are not so easily judged (Dorado, 2006). 
 
Performance and success for nonprofit organizations has typically been defined as the 
demonstrated ability to acquire resources necessary for organizational survival (Stone, 
Bigelow, and Crittenden, 1999; Kanter and Summers, 1987; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; 
Yuchtman and Seashore, 1967). The goal of any organization, for-profit or nonprofit, is to 
achieve, at the very least, a state of sustainability and ideally a state of sustainable growth.  
Relating to the concept of social ventures, it is recognized that the output motivations may 
be different.  In social ventures, there is an additional social component and social value 
and economic value are now both created and captured.  Social ventures choose to 
combine and blend the social and economic value strategies.  Whether a venture is heavily 
socially focused or only slightly so is not the question at hand.  The question rather centers 
on what organizations can do that chose to add the social value component into their 
strategy.  Sustainable growth is the hallmark of successful commercial entrepreneurial 
ventures as it is also with social entrepreneurial ventures. 
 
2.3 Resource-Based Theory 
 
Resource-Based Theory (RBT) inherently assumes that entrepreneurial firms combine and 
convert tangible and intangible resources to sustain a competitive advantage.  Studies have 
discussed differences in the markets and motivations regarding financial and human 
capital between social and commercial ventures, which implies distinct resource 
mobilization techniques for each of these types of ventures (Austin, Stevenson, and Wei-
Skillern, 2006).  However, RBT predicts that the combination of tangible and intangible 
resources involved in the value creating process leads to a sustained competitive advantage 
(Barney, 1991).  Entrepreneurs, regardless of their economic or social goals assemble 
resources that include financial, physical, human and organizational capital as well as 
intangible resources or capabilities such as knowledge management, partnerships and 
innovative methods.  Thus, business processes or intangible capabilities that enable firms 
to perform activities are an additional source of competitive advantage, not just tangible 
resources alone (Porter, 1991). As a result it might be more appropriate to adopt the 
effectiveness of business processes, activities and routines as the dependent variable in 
evaluating the role of resources in a firm (Ray, Barney, and Muhanna, 2004).   
 
As part of the entrepreneurial process, resources are acquired and converted into value 
creating activities for the firm. As part of this process, both social and commercial 
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entrepreneurs must implement innovation and growth strategies and manage a diverse 
range of relationships, partnerships, and resource flows to build organizations (Dorado, 
2006). Although the RBT literature has observed these RBT based operational behaviors 
and resource flows in commercial ventures (Alvarez and Barney, 2006) and in the strategic 
management literature, this theory has not been yet been thoroughly applied to social 
ventures.  
 
A recent set of exploratory studies used elements of resource-based theory (RBT) to 
attempt to explain why some social ventures seem to perform better than others 
(Meyskens, Robb-Post, Stamp, Carsrud and Reynolds, 2010; Meyskens and Post, 2008).  
This study found that increasing partnerships were correlated with funding sources, which 
could imply that the more partnerships a social venture creates, the more opportunities 
they have to monetize the social value they create.  This approach is helpful as it allows 
the unit of analysis to become the resource.  RBT states that it is the firm’s unique bundle 
of potentially valuable resources that is different from competitor firms that contribute to 
the firm’s competitive advantage (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001).  In fact, an RBT-based 
study demonstrated that the firm factors explained about twice as much variance in profit 
rates as economic factors (Hansen and Wernerfelt, 1989).  Whether or not this translates 
directly to social ventures is not yet clear. As the analysis of economic and social 
outcomes across social ventures is challenging, an analysis of the social venture’s 
resources and capabilities may be a more logical step toward understanding social 
ventures.   
 
 
2.3.1 Origins of Resource-Based Theory 
 
The origins of a resource-based view of the firm can be traced back to 1959 with Edith 
Penrose's contributions to strategic management. Penrose’s book, The Theory of the 
Growth of the Firm, is largely agreed upon as one of the most influential books of the 
second-half of the twentieth century, bridging strategic management and organizational 
economics (Kor and Mahoney, 2000; Pitelis, 2002).  Within that publication, Penrose 
(1959) argued: "a firm is more than an administrative unit; it is also a collection of 
productive resources the disposal of which between different users and over time is 
determined by administrative decision.” (13). The firm’s managers recombine the firm’s 
resources.  Penrose’s work largely concerned looking at the resources of a firm in order for 
the firm to achieve efficiency, economic profit, competitive advantage, and profitable 
growth (Kor and Mahoney, 2004).  Managing resources and capabilities are the keys to 
competitive advantage (Kor and Mahoney, 2000).   
 
Resource-based theory attributes superior firm performance to competitive advantage 
(Barney and Clark, 2007). Initially, the studies of competitive advantage were based on 
historical and qualitative research (Cockburn, Henderson, and Stern, 2000) that was 
interpreted as suggesting that competitive advantage was a complex phenomenon, which 
depended crucially on the active presence of superior leadership (Andrews, 1971; 
Selznick, 1957; Chandler, 1962).  The 60s and 70s gave rise to the importance of 
managers or ‘leaders’ and the belief became that firms with better leaders would make 
better decisions and ultimately perform better than their competitors (Cockburn, 
Henderson, and Stern, 2000). 
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Porter (1980) then brought ‘imperfect competition’ into the analysis of ‘competitive 
advantage’ began focusing outward toward the analysis of the firm’s microeconomic 
environment (Porter, 1980; Cockburn, Henderson and Stern, 2000).  According to Porter, a 
firm’s success is a function of two areas: the attractiveness of the industry (the five forces 
model) and the firm’s relative position in that industry (Porter, 1991).  Additionally, Porter 
(1991) separated competitive advantage into two types he described as cost leadership 
(lower cost than rivals) or differentiation (the ability to provide unique benefits that justify 
a higher price (1991).  This position suggests that a manager’s analysis of an industry will 
uncover a source of advantage.  However, there is no compelling quantitative evidence to 
support this.  Cockburn, Henderson and Stern (2000) note the lack of a “broad-based 
statistical study showing that firms in which senior management actively used analytical 
tools to understand industry structure outperformed those that did not” (1127). 
 
It was amongst these developing frameworks that the 'resource-based view' of the firm 
emerged (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). The actual term, “resource-
based view”, was not distinguished until 1984 by Wernerfelt (1984).  While Wernerfelt is 
credited with the terminology, the field widely recognizes Jay Barney as the father of the 
modern and now called, resource-based theory (Barney and Clark, 2007). 
 
2.3.2 Resources and Competitive Advantage 
 
Resource-based theory (RBT) posits that sustained competitive advantage derives from the 
resources and capabilities that a given firm controls (Barney and Clark, 2007).  In 
addition, RBT posits that unique combinations of these resources and capabilities held by 
the firm are then mobilized to produce products and services that enable the firm to 
achieve sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991).  However, 
contrary to what the name implies, resource-based theory proposes that resource selection 
and accumulation are a function of both internal decision-making along with external 
strategic factors (Oliver, 1997). RBT circles around the make up and utilization of 
resources and how the processes involved in mobilizing resources lead to better 
capabilities of the firm in the marketplace, but it also takes into account factor market 
imperfections, defined as barriers to acquisition, imitation, and substitution of key 
resources or inputs (Barney, 1986; Penrose, 1959; Schoemaker and Amit, 1994).   
 
According to RBT, each firm possesses unique resources that are different and 
distinguishable to those held by other firms (Peteraf, 1993). The theory suggests that firm-
level differences exist among firms and it is within those differences that sustained 
competitive advantage can be found (Barney, 2007). Therefore, RBT emphasizes the 
strategic decisions that the firm’s management make in regard to identifying, developing 
and mobilizing key resources to maximize returns.  Since its development, RBT has been 
widely used to better understand the processes and strategic orientations of entrepreneurial 
ventures (e.g. Borch, Huse and Senneseth, 1999; Ray, Barney, and Muhanna, 2004).  
 
Resource-based theory depends upon looking inward for competitive advantage, rather 
than outward at market forces and competition.  The goal of research work using RBT is 
to uncover the link between a firm’s internal characteristics and performance (Barney, 
1991). It is in within those distinctive firm resources and competencies that competitive 
advantage can be found.  This is not to imply that external forces do not play a factor in a 
firm’s success, but rather in order for a competitive advantage to be long lasting, it must be 
based on the firm’s capabilities rather than the environmental opportunities.   
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According to RBT, resources and capabilities are made up of “all assets, capabilities, 
organizational processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge, etc. controlled by the 
firm that enable the firm to conceive of and implement strategies that improve its 
efficiency and effectiveness” (Barney, 1991, 101). RBT also divides these resources two 
types: tangible resources and intangible resources.  
 
2.3.3 Types of Resources 
 
Barney (1991) found four main tangible categories of resources.  These include financial, 
physical, human capital and organizational resources.  According to Barney (1991), 
“physical capital resources include the physical technology used in a firm, a firm’s plan 
and equipment, its geographic location, and its access to raw materials.  Human capital 
resources include the training, experience, judgment, intelligence, relationships and insight 
of individual managers and workers in a firm.  Organizational capital resources include a 
firm’s formal reporting structure, its formal and informal planning, controlling, and 
coordinating systems, as well as informal relations among groups within a firm and 
between a firm and those in its environment” (101). Financial capital also includes a firm’s 
access to funding and/or financial opportunities.  These resources contribute to the 
efficiency and effectiveness of a firm (Barney, 1991).   
 
In addition, the definition of tangible resources has been expanded to include other factors 
like technology resources and reputation (Grant, 1991). How a venture utilizes these 
tangible resources is part of the value creation process of converting inputs to outputs.  
Intangible resources and capabilities become evident as tangible resources flow through a 
venture.  
 
Intangible resources include organizational styles, values, and leadership as well as 
intellectual property rights, contracts, reputation, trade secrets, knowledge and culture 
(Grant, 1991; Hall, 1992).  In addition, other RBT related intangible factors such as 
innovative methods, partnerships and knowledge management or transferability are 
interlinked and important to firm creation and sustaining a competitive advantage.  A 
business practice is essentially an intangible resource and can lead to valuable, rare and 
imperfectly imitable capabilities.  For example, unique business methods that can be 
applied as intangible resources include the ability of a firm to develop new products, 
services or processes.  “Partnerships for both commercial and social ventures serve as a 
conduit to assist organizations in acquiring resources and creating value” (Meyskens, 
Robb-Post, Stamp, Carsrud, and Reynolds, 2010, 664).  Similar to partnerships, a network 
of relationships can facilitate firm creation and building a competitive advantage.  The 
development of tacit knowledge unique to a firm can also lead to sustained competitive 
advantage (Mata, Fuerst, and Barney, 2005; Ray, Barney and Muhanna, 2004).    
 
2.3.4 Models for Sustainable Competitive Advantage 
 
Resource-based theory (RBT) attributes sustained competitive advantage on not only the 
management of the resources and capabilities, but also on the make up of those resources 
and capabilities.  Two models for sustainable competitive advantage will be reviewed.  
The first model that will be described is Barney’s (1991) Valuable Rare Inimitable 
Organization Framework and the second model is Peteraf’s (1993) Four Cornerstones of 
Competitive Advantage. 	
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2.3.4.1 Valuable Rare Inimitable Organization Framework for Sustainable Competitive 
Advantage 
 
According to Barney (1991), a firm resource must be “(a) valuable, in the sense that it 
exploits opportunities and/or neutralizes threats in a firm’s environment, (b) it must be rare 
among a firm’s current and potential competition, (c) it must be imperfectly imitable and 
(d) there cannot be strategically equivalent substitutes for this resources that are valuable 
but neither rare or imperfectly imitable” (105-106).  Firms that have valuable and rare 
resources generally have a first-mover advantage, but only firms that have imperfectly 
imitable resources that cannot be obtained by other firms due to unique historical 
conditions, causal ambiguity or social complexity have a sustained competitive advantage 
(Barney, 1991).  Barney’s attributes and model for sustainable competitive advantage are 
more commonly known as VRIO (valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, and organization) 
framework.   
 
According to Barney (1991) a firm has a sustained competitive advantage “when it is 
implementing a value creating strategy not simultaneously being implemented by any 
current or potential competitors and when these other firms are unable to duplicate the 
benefits of this strategy” (102).  RBT “takes into account both tangible and intangible 
resources as important sources of capabilities that reflect operational behaviors and 
resource flows in this value creating process” (Meyskens, Robb-Post, Stamp, Carsrud, and 
Reynolds, 2010, 664).  These tangible and intangible resources are often “bundled together 
to enable the execution of a particular business process” (Ray, Barney and Muhanna, 
2004, 26). Thus tangible and intangible resources and capabilities work together in order 
to achieve a sustainable competitive advantage.  
 
An important note of clarification is that an organization may be able to achieve a 
competitive advantage without all four qualities of the resource.  For example, if a 
resource is valuable, rare, and unable to imitate; the firm may enjoy a competitive 
advantage.  However, because other firms are able to substitute that resource by something 
else, the firm will not enjoy sustained competitive advantage.  Barney (1991) describes 
resources such as culture, trust, human resources, and information technology as types of 
resources that could be strong sources of a sustained competitive advantage for a firm.   
 
Perhaps the most basic assumption of resourced-based theory research is the concept of 
heterogeneity of resources across firms.  This basic assumption is that resources across 
firms can be different and that those differences can be long lasting (Barney, 2007). An 
additional concept that is key to understanding resource-based theory assumptions is that 
of Ricardian rents (or efficiency rents), which are defined as earnings above breakeven 
that do not induce more competition (Peteraf, 1993).  For example, more efficient firms 
are able to enjoy higher rents (profits) than competing firms because their operating costs 
are lower due to their highly efficient processes.  When the price for goods drops, the more 
efficient firm will be able to stay in the market and the non-efficient (non-rent-generating 
firm) will be forced out of the market because the price exceeds the cost for production 
(Alvarez and Barney, 2004). 
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2.3.4.2 Cornerstones of Sustainable Competitive Advantage 
 
A second model for sustainable competitive advantage in line with RBT developed by 
Peteraf (1993) describes four necessary conditions that underlie sustained competitive 
advantage (SCA) and is named the cornerstones of sustainable competitive advantage.  
Barney has applauded Peteraf’s (1993) contribution to RBT and describes the model as 
work that firmly grounds RBT within the field of microeconomics (Barney, 2007, 18). 
These four cornerstones are described as superior resources (heterogeneity within an 
industry), imperfect resource mobility, ex post limits to competition, and ex ante limits to 
competition. This model takes a firm-level view approach that is useful for practical 
applications so that managers can then take a resource-level view approach to their 
decisions (Peteraf, 1993).   
 
As previously mentioned, both Peteraf and Barney’s models of competitive advantage 
compliment and support an efficiency-based explanation of performance differences.  This 
efficiency-based explanation of performance differences fits well to the analysis of social 
ventures.  Peteraf’s model lends to the possibility that rents can be earned by an equal 
number of efficient producers, as long as efficiency is the differentiating factor (Peteraf, 
1993).  Although the basic premises for both models are the same, the primary difference 
between the two models rest on the language used, in which Peteraf’s language and 
framework lends itself more appropriately to the concept of social ventures.  For example, 
Petaraf’s (1993) model uses 'limited supply relative to demand' or 'scarcity’ versus 
Barney’s attribute on rarity (Peteraf and Barney 2003). See Figure 5 for a visual depiction 
of Peteraf’s (1993) model.    
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Figure 5: Cornerstones of Competitive Advantage (Peteraf, 1993) 
 
Heterogeneity	
Heterogeneity, the first of the cornerstones is an assumption widely accepted in RBT, 
which allows for firms with superior resources to earn rents (Peteraf, 1993).  This concept 
is directly applicable to social ventures – as resources across social ventures vary in a 
similar fashion to those in the for-profit realm.  The goal of maintaining the heterogeneity 
of the resources for commercial ventures is to create Ricardian or efficiency rents.  In the 
case of commercial ventures, those rents typically become profits which are a paid to 
stakeholders.   
	
Imperfect Mobility 
Imperfect mobility refers to the inability to transfer a resource from one firm to another 
with the expectation that the resource will enable either firm to generate rents.  In other 
words, the resource cannot be traded and keep the same value creating properties. Due to 
the imperfect mobility of the resource, that resource cannot be easily bid away from the 
firm as it creates more value to the employing firm than to any other firm that my employ 
it.  The highest value of the resource is to the employing firm.   
 
It is important to highlight here the concept of a Pareto rent, or quasi-rent, which refers to 
the difference between a resource’s value to the firm versus the resource’s salvageable 
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value (e.g. used manufacturing equipment) (Peteraf, 1993).  Pareto rents are not able to 
create competitive advantage by themselves; they must also be connected to the generation 
of efficiency rents (Peteraf, 1993). Once an imperfectly mobile resource becomes a rent 
reducer, it quickly can become an obstacle to the firm’s ability to respond to changes in 
the marketplace.  
 
Ex post limits to competition 
The third cornerstone Peteraf (1993) calls ex post limits to competition, which refers to the 
things firms do to preserve the heterogeneity of their resources after they have entered a 
market or established a position in a market.  Once a firm reaches a position of 
competitive advantage, in order for it to exist in the longer term, the ability of others to 
imitate or substitute resources must be kept at bay.   
 
Another way of stating ex post limits to competition is describing it as those isolating 
mechanisms that enable a firm to preserve its rent streams (Rumelt 1984; Peteraf 1993). 
Some “isolating mechanisms include producer learning, buyer switching costs, channel 
crowding, buyer search costs, and economies of scale when specialized assets are 
required” (Peteraf, 1993, 183).  Ideally, for competitive advantage purposes, these 
isolating mechanisms (resources) should be highly tacit in nature, path dependent for the 
firm, or causally ambiguous.  Causal ambiguity occurs when the source of a firm’s 
competitive advantage stems from something that is unknown (Peteraf, 1993; Lippman 
and Rumelt, 1982).  These characteristics of resources help to ensure that another firm 
cannot easily replicate them.   
 
Ex ante limits to competition 
The final condition Peteraf describes is ex ante limits to competition.  These are the those 
resources that are in place prior to firms establishing themselves as leaders in the market 
that will help to ensure their position in the market remains intact.  According to RBT, as a 
firm develops a strategy, it is important to keep in mind both the returns of the strategy as 
well as the costs of implementing the strategy (Barney, 1986).  Economic returns on 
strategies that are higher than the cost of implementation can be the result of timing, 
knowledge, or just plain luck (Ahuja, Coff, and Lee, 2005).  Ex ante limits to competition 
describe the firm’s ability to estimate the future value of a strategy in the hopes that the 
costs of implementing that strategy are much less that the future value.  “Unless there is a 
difference between the ex post value of a venture and the ex ante cost of acquiring the 
necessary resources, the entrepreneurial rents are zero” (Rumelt, 1987; Peteraf, 1993, 
185).   
 
The primary difference between the two models, Barney’s (1991) VRIO framework for 
SCA and Peteraf’s (1993) cornerstones for SCA, lies in the heterogeneity characteristics of 
resources across firms. In Barney, ‘resource heterogeneity’ is a basic assumption that in 
fact, precedes his VRIO framework (Barney, 1997, 2001).  In Peteraf's (1993) framework, 
‘resource heterogeneity' serves as one of the four 'cornerstones' of sustainable competitive 
advantage. Although “resource heterogeneity is the source of rents in her model, she 
employs this term to signify a great deal more than just input differentials across firms” 
(Peteraf and Barney, 2003, 317). 
 
These two models of competitive advantage, while differing slightly in terminology, both 
support an efficiency-based explanation of performance differences and a shared definition 
of competitive advantage (Peteraf and Barney, 2003). A resource-level and firm-level of 
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analysis and view of RBT is supported by both of these models (Peteraf and Barney, 
2003).   
 
2.3.5 Criticisms of Resource-Based Theory 
 
Since its development, RBT has been heavily criticized for being tautological, lacking 
managerial implications, having limited applicability, and defining resources in too broad 
terms (Kraaijenbrink, Spender and Groen, 2010; Priem and Butler, 2001).  The foundation 
for RBT is Barney’s (1991a, 2002) VRIO framework (valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-
substitutable resources, plus organization), which is stated as the requirements for SCA.  
This framework has been specifically criticized as neither necessary, nor sufficient for 
SCA (Kraaijenbrink, Spender and Groen, 2010).  In fact, Foss and Knudsen (2003) make 
the claim that only uncertainty and immobility are necessary for SCA.   
 
Further adding to the critique of RBT is the indefinite notion of value (Priem and Butler, 
2001b) and RBT’s lack of distinguishing between the value or uniqueness that needs to be 
explained (explanans) and that which contains the explanation (explanandum) 
(Kraaijenbrink, Spender and Groen, 2010).  This lack of separation is the basis for the 
tautological argument of RBT.  Additionally, RBT defines resource broadly, not making 
any distinction between inputs to the firm and the capabilities of a firm to select, deploy 
and organize such inputs (Kraaijenbrink, Spender and Groen, 2010).   
 
Suggestions for improving RBT have circled around distinguishing building and acquiring 
capacity versus deploying capacity as well as focusing more on process-based approaches 
that can be empirically researched.  Incorporating these suggestions into RBT becomes the 
path to better understanding SCA (Kraaijenbrink, Spender and Groen, 2010; Mahoney, 
1995).  Although RBT is the foundation for the theoretical development of this study, the 
arguments and criticisms presented and analyzed by Kraaijenbrink, Spender and Groen 
(2010) present views shared by this study.   
 
The following chapter examines social entrepreneurship and social ventures in various 
contexts such as dual frameworks, matrices, etc. and introduces a continuum approach for 
viewing social ventures, which provides the groundwork for the development of the model 
for sustainable contributive advantage within a resource-based theory domain.  The review 
of various lenses to view social ventures is helpful to illustrate why a continuum related 
view works well in order to apply existing theories to the resource acquisition and 
management behavior of social ventures.  Additionally, it helps to position social ventures 
in way where the resources become the unit of analysis, rather than the venture itself, 
which eases the definitional constraint and argument surrounding social entrepreneurship.  
A model for sustainable contributive advantage is then presented in detail in order to 
demonstrate how the model is applicable within the non-economic market environment 
described previously.  
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3 Sustainable Contributive Advantage: Model and Theory Development 
 
In attempting to fill the gaps in both practical understanding and theoretical approaches 
towards social ventures, a model called sustainable contributive advantage is posited as a 
way to apply existing economic and strategy theory in non-economic market conditions 
such as those social ventures face (Helmig, Jegers, and Lapsley, 2004).  It is proposed that 
a social value orientation of sustainable competitive advantage, called sustainable 
contributive advantage, provides a more realistic depiction of what is necessary in order 
for a social venture to perform better than its competitors over time.  As social ventures 
face different challenges of creating and capturing value from their commercial 
counterparts (Moore, 2000), sustainable competitive advantage must be adjusted to fit 
within this reality.  The concept of social rent helps to address these challenges within the 
proposed model for sustainable contributive advantage.   
 
As the model of sustainable contributive advantage using a resource-base theory approach 
is introduced, it is useful to begin reviewing some of the existing frameworks developed 
surrounding social ventures and social entrepreneurship.  Social ventures vary in nearly 
every way and are each different in terms of their activities, resources, missions, and 
outcomes.  The heterogeneity of the field coupled with the overlapping nature of 
commercial ventures provides researchers with interesting challenges.  “While resource 
based theory (RBT) has become a dominant paradigm for strategic management research; 
(Peteraf, 1993) early work has acknowledged that entrepreneurship is an intricate part of 
the resource-based framework (Connor, 1991; Rumelt, 1987; Alvarez and Busenitz, 
2001,755).  A review of the frameworks surrounding social ventures is discussed followed 
by a brief review of RBT and sustainable competitive advantage (see Chpt. 2 for full 
review).  The development of the concept of social rent and the model of sustainable 
contributive advantage are then presented.   
 
3.1 Social Entrepreneurship and Social Venture Frameworks 
 
Austin, Stevenson, and Wei-Skillern (2006) describe social entrepreneurship as an 
“innovative, social value creating activity that can occur within or across the non-profit, 
business, or government sectors” (2). An additional requirement for a social venture to be 
considered entrepreneurial, is taking part in a commercially oriented activity, such as 
creating an innovative approach to generate income (Austin, Stevenson, and Wei-Skillern, 
2006).  It would seem then, from definitions such as this one, that there are overlaps of 
social and commercial ventures.    
 
In the quest towards finding similarities or differences between social and commercial 
ventures, researchers have looked for commonalities among individual social and 
commercial entrepreneurs.  The majority of past social entrepreneurship studies have 
attempted to pinpoint similar characteristics of social entrepreneurs across the field 
(Elkington and Hartigan, 2008; Light, 2005; Vasakarla, 2008).  Zahra, Gedajlovic, 
Neubaum, and Shulman (2009) offer one notable contribution of defining three types of 
social entrepreneurs:  social bricoleur, social constructionist, and social engineer. While 
helpful in areas of research where the individual is the level of analysis, it does not assist 
in analysis at the resource or venture level.   
 
Social ventures themselves vary greatly in terms of how they are structured and how their 
resources are attained or utilized, yet the face similar resource-related challenges.  Framing 
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the environment around the social entrepreneurship discussion is an important step in the 
analysis of the social ventures themselves.  Several possible frameworks on social 
ventures are presented in order to bring a clear framework and environment for social 
entrepreneurship in general.   
 
3.2 Social Entrepreneurship and Social Ventures as a Dual Framework 
 
President of the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, Carl Schramm, supports one of the 
more controversial views on the definition of social entrepreneurship and social ventures.  
Schramm makes the claim that all entrepreneurs, driven by a social purpose or not, are 
social entrepreneurs.  “Entrepreneurs typically generate a surplus benefit above and 
beyond the profits they reap, finds the eminent Yale University economist William 
Nordhaus. Nordhaus has calculated that entrepreneurs capture only about 2 percent of this 
surplus, with the remainder passed on to society in the form of jobs, wages, and value. By 
creating so much value that does not accrue to themselves, regular entrepreneurs are also 
social entrepreneurs” (Schramm, 2010, 22). 
 
In Schramm’s view, the important question becomes whether social entrepreneurs can 
become commercial entrepreneurs (Wallace, 2007).  Commercial entrepreneurs are, 
according to this view, the true drivers of society and societal wealth.  A commercial 
entrepreneur creates a company, creates work for others to do toward the effort of 
establishing the company (hiring accountants, lawyers, designers, etc.), as well as creates 
jobs underneath the umbrella of this company, which then creates opportunity for others in 
society to contribute to the economic development of society.  The end result for the 
successful commercial entrepreneur is the creation of excess wealth, which then creates 
the opportunity for philanthropic acts, the financial assistance of efforts within social 
welfare, and general economic benefit.  One of the popularly touted social entrepreneurs in 
the United States media is Bill Gates, founder of Microsoft.  It can be argued that in order 
for Gates to become the philanthropist and social entrepreneur he is, his success as a 
commercial entrepreneur was a necessary first step toward that goal. 
 
A somewhat different view is proposed by Dees (1998), who proposes social 
entrepreneurs are actually a type of entrepreneur within the genus entrepreneur (Dees, 
1998).  Social entrepreneurs are a type of entrepreneur that differs by their mission, social 
mission vs. wealth creation.  Social entrepreneurs look at wealth creation as a way of 
accomplishing the mission of the organization while commercial entrepreneurs see wealth 
creation as the mission of the organization, as well as the way to measure success (Dees, 
1998).  The primary challenge for a social entrepreneur, according to Dees, is the markets 
they face.  Both social and commercial entrepreneurs operate within a market designed to 
allow those seeking a purely financial reward to rise to the top.  The markets are not 
designed to allow for social value to be measured and included in the economic 
transaction.  Dees (1998) adds that social entrepreneurship can exist within for-profit 
businesses that in some way mix for-profit and non-for-profit enterprise mechanisms.   
 
While Dees’ argument on the surface seems to drastically differ from Schramm’s, there 
are numerous examples that would complicate both positions. Figure 6 shows the two 
extreme views of the argument surrounding what qualifies as social entrepreneurship. The 
Inclusive Framework considers all entrepreneurship to be social and that economic 
entrepreneurship is a subset of all entrepreneurship.  The Exclusive Framework considers 
only certain types of ventures to be social entrepreneurship.   
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Figure 6: Inclusive and Exclusive Frameworks for Social and Commercial 
Entrepreneurship 
 
In order to demonstrate the complexity of these frameworks, an example will be used.  
The example is a for-profit shoe manufacturing and distributing company called TOMS 
Shoes, founded in 2006.  The company’s primary marketing strategy is based on a social 
mission and is deeply ingrained in their operations.  TOMS Shoes’s campaign is called 
“One for One” and it guarantees that for every pair of shoes the company sells, a pair of 
new shoes is given to a child in need.  The founder, Blake Mycoskie, has a public 
statement posted on the company website addressing the blended model of social and 
economic entrepreneurship that he uses:  
 
Through TOMS, Mycoskie shows that entrepreneurs no longer have to choose 
between earning money and making a difference in the world. Profitability is 
achievable with a giving-based business. TOMS proves that conscious capitalism 
is a viable business model for innovators worldwide, and entrepreneurs can focus 
on being ambassadors of humanity (www.toms.com/blakes-bio). 
 
Keeping both frameworks in mind, placing TOMS Shoes on both frameworks in Figure 7 
illustrates the challenge of clearly defining social entrepreneurship and therefore, a social 
venture. 
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Figure 7: Social venture example in Inclusive and Exclusive Frameworks 
 
Regardless of which framework is used to categorize the example of TOMS Shoes, both 
sets of frameworks consider the venture to be both commercial entrepreneurship and social 
entrepreneurship.  Thereby, the venture could also be described as a social venture or a 
commercial venture.  Polarizing these extreme views does provide the best context for 
researching and exploring the social venture as a phenomenon.    
 
3.3 Social Ventures as a Matrix 
 
In looking at social ventures is in terms of resources, both their resource acquisition 
processes as well as their resource allocation processes should be considered.  Although 
social ventures vary greatly in terms of how they are structured and how their resources 
are attained or utilized, they face similar resource related challenges.  Generally stated, 
some social ventures depend largely on donations (also known as ‘donative nonprofits’) 
while others may have developed earned income streams and have begun to function very 
much like a commercial venture would (Carroll and Stater, 2008).  Social ventures’ 
dependence on sources of income varies greatly across ventures.  This dependence could 
be externally focused – meaning that the organization depends on donations, grants, or 
government funding in order to function.  If the dependence was completely internal, the 
organization would be able to generate funds by managing an economic transaction of 
value in the marketplace.   
 
Highly externally reliant social ventures may simply not be able to successfully manage a 
value exchange.  Value can be separated into two parts: value creation and value capture 
(Bowman and Ambrosini, 2000).  It could be argued that nearly all social ventures create 
value, but not all social ventures are able to capture that value.  This is an important 
distinction and previous research has shown that equalizing reliance on funding sources, 
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such as earned revenue, investments, and contributions significantly and positively 
contributes to the success of a social venture (Carroll and Stater, 2008). 
 
Social value creation as a priority in a social venture presents an interesting challenge 
within the context of competition.  This priority shift leads to the social venture making 
decisions that may or may not directly or indirectly lead to economic returns.   
 
3.3.1 Social Value 
 
It is important to briefly note what social value creation is, and what it is not, in the 
context of a firm and for this discussion.  Social value is created by a firm when the firm 
has done some work to produce social value through programs, tasks, etc.  Donating 
money or other resources to another organization is not social value creation (some may 
call it philanthropy), the donation merely serves as a resource donated to the entity 
creating the value.  The value is not created until that resource or donation is utilized in 
some way.  Supporting this view, Porter and Kramer (1999) propose that “grant-giving 
foundations serve only as passive middlemen, as mere conduits for giving; they fall far 
short of their potential” (121-122).  
 
The classic economic terminology of use value and exchange value is applicable for this 
discussion (Postone, 1993; Marx, 1897, [1990]).  Use value relates to what the end user 
values in terms of the resources provided to them, which is admittedly a subjective view 
and results in value creation.  Comparatively, exchange value is referred to simply as the 
price, which results in value capture for the firm.  In many social ventures, this is where 
the disparity exists.  The value created is assumed to be valued by the end user; but in 
social ventures, there may not be a price paid for that value.  That price, the exchange 
value, is missing in the transaction between the venture and the end user.   
 
For example, a homeless shelter provides a meal to a resident of their shelter.  The meal 
has a use value, but there is no exchange value for this meal.  In other words, although 
there is value creation by the venture, there is no value capture by the venture.  To 
consider this example even further, there may be situations where there is no perceived use 
value by the resident and the resident may in fact feel entitled to the meal.  In that case, it 
is difficult to pinpoint the any value in the transaction. 
 
Social service types of organizations are often criticized for their dependence on external 
funding.  Earned income, as a strategy, has become a popular subject in the area of social 
entrepreneurship research.   An earned income strategy could also be described as 
capturing value.  Earned income strategies have proven to be quite beneficial as those 
social ventures that employ them tend to enjoy more financial stability (Jegers and 
Verschueren, 2006) even if they may be creating more value than they actually capture.   
 
Social ventures function in nearly every industry and are heterogeneous in nature, however 
social ventures all must create and capture value if they are to remain sustainable.  
Developing a method of categorizing types of social venture structures based on their 
financial and knowledge processes can homogenize the ventures into four distinct groups 
based on their ability to both create value and capture value (See Figure 8).   
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Figure 8: Social Venture Matrix 
 
I: High Value Creation / Low Value Capture  
These ventures create value in their social problem area and towards their mission in 
general.  However, these organizations rely heavily on the goodwill of others to support 
them – be it government, foundations, or individuals.  An example of an organization that 
may fit in this quadrant would be a government subsided community-based organization, 
such as a homeless shelter.  The homeless shelter creates high social value for its residents 
who pay nothing for the services they receive.  However, the shelter itself does very little 
value capturing activities, such as fundraising or earned income activities, due to funding 
from the government.  
 
II: Low Value Creation / Low Value Capture 
These organizations could be described as mostly government-required programs.  An 
example may be a poorly functioning Small Business Administration local office.  It is not 
fulfilling its mission and is not making a significant impact in their clients’ lives – as the 
majority of their advice and resources may be too general or simply unspecified towards a 
client’s needs.  They also do not capture any value from the clients they serve, as their 
programs are free and funded by government programs.   
 
III: Low Value Creation / High Value Capture 
These organizations are able to sustain themselves through earned income strategies – 
selling goods or services, which include membership programs.  However, they may not 
be creating much value towards mission.  These types of organizations may be 
organizations with very high administrative overheads, typically larger and more 
established nonprofits or foundations. An example of an organization that may fall in this 
quadrant may be an organization similar to the United Way.  The United Way implements 
aggressive fundraising tactics via relationships with corporations who then ask their 
employees to participate in fundraising drives.  United Way then parcels out the funds to 
various community charities.  The United Way does little actual value creation work; they 
serve as a middleman between funders and charities.  
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IV: High Value Creation / High Value Capture 
These organizations are the powerhouses of their industries.  They are able to make lasting 
systemic change, empower their clients, generate their own revenue through transactions, 
and are typically recognized as the most innovative players in the field.  An example of an 
organization that may fall into this quadrant is One Laptop Per Child (OLPC), an 
organization dedicated to providing low-cost laptops to children in developing countries.  
OLPC works directly with government agencies to sell these laptops to the agency and 
then provides the mechanisms to deploy these laptops to children in need.  The innovative 
and cost-effective laptops enable OLPC to make a small profit on each laptop sold, which 
then gets reinvested into OLPC’s efforts.   
 
The descriptions provided above are reflective of perhaps the extreme cases of each case.  
Additionally, firms may move from one box to another box depending on their financial 
situation, events (i.e. disease outbreaks, economic downturns, national disasters), or annual 
campaigns.  In fact, a firm may deploy several strategies at once that may fall in different 
boxes, which allows for this matrix to be used at a firm analysis as well.   
 
If a firm deploys several various strategies, it may be helpful to identify and diversify 
these strategies across various boxes to be sure they are pursuing a sustainable strategy.  If 
a venture at any given time is operating between the extremes of low value creation/low 
value capture and high value creation/high value capture, this presents a continuum of 
sorts within the context of this discussion.  This perspective brings the framework 
surrounding social ventures into a new light of a continuum. 
 
3.4 Social Ventures on a Continuum 
 
Research has demonstrated that social and commercial ventures are both similar and 
different when it comes to inputs, outputs, and resources mobilization techniques (Austin, 
Stevenson, and Wei-Skillern, 2006).  A venture, whether social or commercial in nature, 
produces several outputs, which may be those such as products, services, assets, loss, and 
value (Morris, Lewis, and Sexton, 1994).   Although these inputs and outputs are 
distinctive in many ways; the value creating processes, information flows, operational 
behaviors, and tangible and intangible resources involved in creating value may be more 
similar than different.   
 
While the missions for many ventures are in fact, socially focused, those social ventures 
are sustainable only through the revenues they generate (Dacin, Dacin, and Matear, 2010).  
Dacin, Dacin, and Matear (2010) suggest that categorizing a venture as distinctly social or 
distinctly economic is a misstep in trying to understand the resource utilization processes 
and strategies at play among these firms.  Firms often change their focus and may become 
more economic value driven (or social value driven) due to external or internal factors.  
Non-profit organizations may often times focus on profit-maximizing activities. Similarly, 
for-profit organizations may often time focus on social value-maximizing activities. Firms 
at any given time are in fact, somewhere among a continuum between economic value and 
social value creation.   
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Figure 9: Firm Value Creation Mix 
 
Figure 9 represents the decision landscape for all firms in terms of their value creating 
mix.  All firms, no matter what their value orientation, fall within this continuum; a view 
supported by Dees (1998) and Meyskens, Carsrud, and Cardoso (2010). The key point is 
not where a venture may lie on the continuum as a label or static piece of information, but 
where a venture’s strategy, decisions, and resource allocations lie between the continuums 
of economic and social at any given time.  If a venture lies closer to a socially focused 
firm, they deal with additional challenges and resource constraints that a more 
economically focused firm would not.  It is proposed that the unit of analysis is not the 
individual/founder, nor the organization itself, but rather the resources, processes and 
decisions of the organization, in line with resource-based theory. 
 
By separating ventures into their decisions, resources, and processes, a comparison across 
social ventures becomes a more manageable goal.  This goes beyond a typology or 
bifurcated approach in this paper to explore mechanisms at play within the social ventures. 
The primary focus is not to define or categorize social ventures, but to examine the 
processes and resources within and surrounding them. As ventures are examined via their 
decisions, resources, and processes, a comparison across social ventures becomes a more 
manageable goal.  There are degrees among social ventures with regard to the extent they 
design their resources around social value creation (see Peredo and McLean, 2006; Neck, 
Brush, and Allen, 2007).    
 
3.5 Resource-Based Theory Model Review 
 
As the examination and exploration of social ventures expands to include commercial 
ventures as on a continuum of value creation, in order to develop a theory of strategy for 
social ventures, it can be helpful to examine existing theories in strategy.  Resource-based 
theory (RBT) has been used to better understand the processes and strategic orientations of 
ventures (e.g. Borch, Huse and Senneseth, 1999; Ray, Barney, and Muhanna, 2004).  As 
RBT does not solely rely on external factors, but on the make up and utilization of 
resources and the processes involved in mobilizing resources (Barney, 1991), it becomes 
somewhat easier to apply to the social venture context.   
 
As previously mentioned, the VRIO framework proposed by Barney (1991) has been 
heavily criticized for being tautological in nature and lacking a distinction between the 
inputs and outputs of a firm.  The arguments previously presented by Kraaijenbrink, 
Spender, and Groen (2010) are also held into account in this study.  This is why the model 
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developed by Peteraf (1993) was used.  The development for sustainable contributive 
advantage is based on the previously described Peteraf (1993) model (see Chapter 2) for 
the four necessary conditions that underlie sustainable competitive advantage.  
 
3.6 Unique Challenges for Social Ventures 
 
“While most entrepreneurs operate under conditions of resource scarcity, social 
entrepreneurs face a specific set of challenges because they purposely locate their 
activities in areas where markets often function poorly.  Thus, while commercial 
entrepreneurs seek markets with sufficient carrying capacity to support growth, social 
entrepreneurs actually seek markets characterized by a paucity of resources” (Di 
Domenico, Haugh, and Tracey, 2010, 683). 
 
Simply stated, the two primary unique challenges faced by social ventures are that the 
value produced by social ventures lies in the achievement of social purposes rather than in 
generating revenues and social ventures receive revenues from sources other than 
customer purchases (Moore, 2000).  Social value creation as a priority in social ventures 
presents an interesting challenge within the context of competition.  This priority shift 
leads to the social ventures making decisions that may not directly or indirectly lead to 
economic returns.  In order to achieve their social purpose, social ventures typically 
compete and collaborate with others.  However, to compete effectively, they must make 
and create competitive advantages (Bryson, Gibbons, and Shaye, 2001; Oster, 1995). As 
social ventures must wrestle with both social and economic value, the concept of 
competitive advantage becomes highly problematic in this context.   
 
Sustained competitive advantage leads to extraordinary firm performance (Porter, 1980; 
Barney, 1991; Porter and Kramer, 2002). Since performance has typically been measured 
in terms of firm profitability (Winter, 1995) the concept has not received a great deal of 
attention from nonprofit researchers (Kong and Prior, 2008). For socially-focused 
ventures, financial profitability is not the sole measurement.  Additionally, “nonprofit 
leaders, focusing on the primary of their social (rather than economic) purpose, tend to 
eschew the idea of competition to emphasize instead a cooperative stance towards other 
organizations in their industry” (Phills, 2005, 49).  For example, if the social goal is to end 
world hunger, the presence of additional social ventures to help conquer world hunger can 
be viewed as a productive step forward in the context of the overall social mission.  The 
idea of capturing market share from competitors does not quite fit the reality of social 
ventures with respect to each other.   
 
Social ventures are on one hand, fighting a social problem, not each other, and 
collaboration is often a strategy these groups employ to tackle a larger social problem.  On 
the other hand, competition does, in fact, take place among these organizations as they 
compete for grants, sponsors and donor support.    
 
However, a social venture is not simply judged on the funding sources they retain, as a 
commercial venture might be judged on their sales, market share, etc.  Social ventures are 
judged primarily on their ability to contribute to the solution to a social problem.  
Commercial ventures are required to remain competitive, but social ventures are, in a 
sense, required to remain contributive.  Commercial ventures try to out compete one 
another in the marketplace. It could be stated that social ventures try to out-contribute one 
another to the solution to a social problem within the marketplace.  When a social venture 
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is able to consistently out-contribute other social ventures, they maintain an advantage 
over their competition in terms of grants, donors, and sponsors.  However, unlike 
commercial ventures, a social venture’s advantage is more than bottom-line performance 
based on revenue and profit.  While social ventures need to generate revenue, they also 
need to generate social value that may not lead to economic returns.  In other words, social 
ventures must be competitive and contributive.      
 
This dual-goal nature of the social venture allows for the concept of sustainable 
competitive advantage to be applied.  However, in addition to Peteraf’s (1993) four 
cornerstones, they must also take into consideration additional resource strategies to 
handle the added social value component of their strategies for the organization.  These 
additional resource strategies are reflected in their ability to create and convert what is 
introduced as a social rent.  
 
3.7 Social Rent 
 
Barney and Clark (2007) describe an economic rent as:   
“Value is expressed in terms of the difference between perceived benefits, or 
customer willingness-to-pay, on the one hand, and the economic costs on the other.  
This is, in essence, the same as the concept of total surplus, which equals the sum 
of the economic rents (producer surplus) and customers’ ‘value for the money’ or 
consumer surplus. (Barney and Clark, 2007, 25).”   
 
Figure 10 illustrates the exchange of economic value through the generation of a rent by 
comparing two ventures.  Venture A has sustainable competitive advantage while venture 
B maintains its status as a marginal contributor. In this example, it is assumed that venture 
A creates $180 of economic value (price paid) for each unit of output that it provides to 
the market, while venture B creates only $150. For each venture the costs they incur are 
the same ($100) and the value they provide to their customers are also the same ($100).  
However, venture A is able to create the perception of a higher value than venture B and 
venture A is able to create a higher residual value (margin) from the same unit of output.  
The positive differential in residual value ($30) represent’s venture A’s competitive 
advantage over venture B and provides a protective cushion for A against competition 
from B (Barney and Clark, 2007). 
 
Figure 10: The generation of rent (adapted from Barney and Clark, 2007) 
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The concept of a social rent (J.A. Stamp, personal communication, January 16, 2010) 
provides an economic treatment for social value as the transactable unit of exchange and 
takes into account that social ventures have chosen to serve an additional set of consumers 
that may not have the ability to pay, regardless of their willingness to pay, for perceived 
benefits.  It is important to note a distinction between a social venture’s customers versus a 
social venture’s consumers.   
 
For example, a California-based animal rights organization In Defense of Animals (IDA) 
provides low cost veterinary services and free humane education for the surrounding 
residents in Mumbai, India.  The residents are consumers of IDA’s services, but they are 
not customers.  While some of the residents may perceive the value of the services, they 
are not able to pay for that value. Regardless, organizations like IDA must wrestle with the 
economic costs of providing those services without a direct or immediate economic return. 
IDA must find customers to pay for the benefit the consumer is enjoying.  In this business 
model, the customer is not the consumer.  
 
This is where the concept of the ‘social rent’ becomes relevant.  In essence, a social rent is 
a perceived benefit or excess residual social value that can be converted into a realized 
monetized value (Robb-Post, Stamp, Brännback, and Carsrud, 2010). The concept of social 
rent was introduced by Robb-Post, Stamp, Brännback, and Carsrud, (2010) and has been 
further developed here.  Whereas, economic rents are the actual returns (profits) to a factor 
in excess of opportunity costs (Barney and Clark 2007, 28), social rents are the potential 
economic returns to a social factor in excess of opportunity costs.  In the case of IDA, the 
social rents created by their India program must be converted into a realized monetized 
value.  That monetized value can be thought of a ‘price’ that the customer then agrees to 
pay for.   The customer may be an outside donor who values the cause, a government grant 
interested in economic development, or a sponsor who can leverage the visibility. 
 
It is important to note that the creation of a social rent does not increase tangible assets for 
an organization. A social rent is in a sense “illiquid” until process and resources are used 
to convert the social rent into some economic form.   The social rent must be ‘priced’ and 
converted in order for the venture to experience monetary gains from the social rent. The 
monetary gains that serve as proof of the conversion could be represented by increased 
donations or grants.   
 
In the case of commercial ventures, the perceived benefit of a product or service is 
assessed, converted, and realized by the purchaser during the transaction.  The consumer 
and the customer are the same entity. For example, the perceived value of a Rolex watch is 
relatively high when compared to other watch companies due to the brand image of the 
company.  Rolex can thereby, enjoy larger profit margins than its competitors.  The 
economic rents for Rolex are realized when the consumer (who is also the customer) 
agrees that their perceived benefit meets the price set for the watch.  They purchase the 
watch for the agreed upon price and Rolex earns economic rents.  They have succeeded in 
the marketplace because their consumers (who are also their customers) prefer their brand 
to others and are willing to pay extra for their preferences. The consumer and the customer 
are the same entity and pay for and enjoy the perceived benefit directly. 
 
In the case of a social venture, the perceived benefit becomes a distorted concept.  For 
example, the perceived value of a free hot meal is not converted or realized when the 
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homeless person agrees to consume it, regardless of how valuable the homeless person 
perceives the value to be.  Therefore, the social venture has an additional step in their 
value creating and capturing process.  The perceived benefit must be converted and 
realized by a party not directly enjoying the benefit the social venture is creating. That is a 
donor may see a homeless feeding program as a valued contribution to a community.  That 
donor recognizes a particular social venture as being more effective and efficient than 
other similar social ventures and therefore provides that social venture with monies to 
carry out additional feeding programs.  
 
A social rent is the value the social venture has created that represents the potential 
economic returns to social factor in excess of opportunity costs.  Figure 11 illustrates the 
generation and conversion of social rent by comparing two social ventures dedicated to 
feeding the homeless.  Both ventures expend $200 towards the social value creation 
(feeding 200 people).  The decision to expend $200 represents an action that does not lead 
directly to an economic return.  Both ventures have created social rent from their social 
value creating activity.  However, that social rent is, in a sense, illiquid until mechanisms 
are put into place to convert it.   
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Figure 11: The generation and conversion of social rent 
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Both ventures also expend $100 in fundraising costs, which represent an action that is 
expected lead to an economic return (social rent conversion).  The fundraising effort 
represents the delivered value the customer (funder) receives.  This delivered value may be 
in the form of marketing materials, promotions, recognition, personal visits, etc.  The 
fundraising effort’s primary responsibility is to convert the social venture’s social rent.  
The fundraising efforts of both ventures resulted in Venture A having a positive 
differential of $500.  Venture A enjoys $500 of social rent conversion, which represents 
venture A’s sustainable contributive advantage over venture B.  
 
3.8 Social Value, Social Impact, and Social Rent 
Each social venture will undoubtedly have differences in how they ascertain the amount of 
social value and social impact they are creating, depending on their mission and industry.  
Each social venture faces the challenge of communicating to funding sources (foundations, 
governments, donors, etc.) the importance and amount of social value and social impact 
they create.  As the gauge of value creation is social impact, social entrepreneurs look for a 
long-term socially oriented return on economic investment as well as sustaining their 
impact (Dees, 1998).  This study posits that the processes surrounding social value, social 
impact and their potential benefits to the organization are the same, no matter what the 
mission of the venture.  This framework allows for social ventures to utilize a resource-
based perspective in their strategic development.  Additionally, using this framework may 
also reduce the risk of a more emotionally driven development process. 
 
A critical component to this strategic development process is the concept of social rent, 
which represents the potential economic return to a venture that results from those social 
value-creating activities in which the venture participates.  In any strategic discussion 
among leaders of a social venture about their social value creation processes, a key 
question is: how can we ensure this social value and social impact will create social rent 
for the organization?  A visual representation of the relationships between social value, 
social impact, and social rent is shown in Figure 12.  
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Figure 12: Relationship between social value, social impact, and social rent 
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Social value, in this context, represents the value created for the individual (or related 
group of individuals).  Social impact, in this context, represents the benefit to society and 
refers more to longer-term results.  Social rent is the value that the organization is able to 
claim as a result of the social value and social impact it created.  To refer back to the 
homeless shelter example, venture A’s created social value may be the feeding, fulfillment 
and happiness of the homeless people it serves.  The social impact may be reduced health 
costs for society as whole due to the homeless population not suffering from malnutrition.  
The social rent in this example is venture A’s claim to both of these results, which they 
can then, in turn, demonstrate to potential funders, which results in increased contributed 
revenue or other economic resources.   
 
The term ‘social rent’ may seem audacious to use in this setting, as economic rent is a 
highly utilized tool of both economic and strategy research and has been for centuries 
beginning with Ricardo (1821).  However, in the context in which social ventures 
function, it seems appropriate, if not necessary to translate existing market-based 
economic terms into social market and social value-based terminology so that both 
researchers and practitioners may begin to utilize the strategic thinking that frames both 
realms.   
 
From this view, it is the social venture’s responsibility to initiate and follow through on the 
conversion process of any social rents they generate.  The probability of converting the 
social rent could be increased through a number of tactics such as publicizing the event 
(giving donor recognition), partnering with another organization (increasing the social 
impact), or perhaps collecting data from the population (for research purposes in grant 
proposals).  These tactics enhance the social rents (perceived value) of the social venture 
so that a party not enjoying the benefit directly will be more inclined to assess and convert 
those social rents into a realized monetary value for the social venture. 
 
3.9 Model Construct for Sustainable Contributive Advantage 
 
Integrating the concepts from resource-based theory, social rent, and the unique 
environment facing social ventures leads to this proposed model for sustainable 
contributive advantage, which also includes sustainable competitive advantage.  All four 
cornerstones of sustainable competitive advantage are also included in the model, as social 
ventures compete for resources similar to their commercial counterparts.  However, 
because the social value creation and capture processes have additional steps, two new 
factors are included to address this unique challenge.  The left side of Peteraf’s (1993) (see 
Figure 5) model includes heterogeneity and imperfect mobility and it is important to note 
why the right side of the model, ex post and ex ante limits to competition, were the focus 
for these additional factors.   
 
Heterogeneity, in this context, represents an underlying assumption and imperfect mobility 
represents those factors that allow heterogeneity of resources to persist (Peteraf, 1993).  
These both represent static factors that all organizations theoretically can enjoy the 
benefits of.  The right side of the model represents a dynamic environment in that it 
represents interactions and transactions occurring in the marketplace.  As social ventures 
have additional steps in their social value creating and social value capturing processes 
(Moore, 2000), referred to here as social rent generation and conversion, adjustments to 
the model of sustainable competitive advantage are necessary on the market-oriented side 
of the model.  It is the conversion process that makes the right side of the model or SCA 
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realized.  The dotted lines in the model represent the impact the social value related 
mechanisms have on the competitive forces at work.  Below each factor is discussed and is 
presented in here Figure 13. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Sustainable contributive advantage model 
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In order to achieve a level of sustainable contributive advantage social ventures must 
utilize all six conditions. The two additional conditions that present a social venture-
orientated and expanded description for SCA are limits to scarcity and abilities to scale 
(Figure 13). In other words, SCA in a social venture context includes SConA.  
 
3.9.1 Limits to Scarcity 
 
While ex post limits to competition refer to those isolating mechanisms that preserve rents 
over a longer term (Peteraf, 1993) limits to scarcity are those isolating mechanisms that 
preserve social rents over a longer term.  Scarcity, a common economic term, “is the 
fundamental economic problem of having seemingly unlimited human needs in a world of 
limited resources” and a lack of supply (Robbins, 1932, 16). Similarly to Peteraf’s (1993) 
concept of limits to competition, limits to scarcity refer to resources that provide a 
protection from or a limit to the scarceness of resources.  In other words, as external 
resources become more and more scarce, limits to scarcity are the social venture’s internal 
resources that ensure the external resources go to the social venture, rather than a 
competitor.  It also refers to resources and processes that ensure the venture can create 
social value even in the face of an economic downturn where resources supplied (i.e. 
grants, donations) to social causes decrease.  This is not meant to imply that limits to 
scarcity are represented only by assets or working capital (although these may be 
indicators), but also represented by the processes that ensure continued support from 
stakeholders regardless of the economic condition of the market.  
 
In other words, limits to scarcity are unique, tacit, socially complex, and path dependent 
resources that help to ensure the social value creation is superior to other organizations are 
and that the superior venture is capable of communicating that fact.  When social value 
creation is sufficiently valuable enough to translate to an outside funding party, a 
conversion of the social rent occurs resulting in an economic return, which then 
contributes to the social venture’s ex post limits to competition.   
 
Using the homeless shelter for illustration, an example of limits to scarcity resource 
conditions may be a historical and trusting relationship with the homeless population and 
the local police force.  Say the local shelter is intimately familiar with the local homeless 
individuals as well as crime reports and local police officers.  The shelter works closely 
with the police force to inform them if any of their residents show unusual behavior, 
perhaps relating to drugs, fights, or theft.   
 
Proposing a specific hypothetical example, numerous times the shelter received word that 
cellular phones were stolen from people walking down the streets.  The homeless shelter 
notices several of their residents with new cellular phones and works directly with the 
police force to return property and actively manage the offender’s crime-related 
rehabilitation.  The police force returns phones to their owners, crediting the homeless 
shelter to the owners, which may motivate the owners of the phones to support the 
homeless shelter.  The shelter is actively working with their local government agencies 
through the crime rehabilitation, which makes them the preferred recipient of government 
funding programs.  The shelter also demonstrates their strong relationships and social 
impact to its supporters, which increases the supporters’ levels of loyalty and continued 
support.  Potential supporters will then turn to this social venture as it has demonstrated a 
more effective and efficient process for creating social value, which is superior to similar 
organizations’ efforts.  
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When the homeless shelter leverages its relationship with the homeless community, the 
local police force and local government and demonstrates the value of that relationship to 
a donor, they are also demonstrating their contributive advantage over other organizations 
in accomplishing their social mission.  The social rents generated in this process are then 
more easily generated and converted into revenue for the organization and contributes 
directly to the homeless shelter’s ex post limits to competition.  
 
3.9.2 Abilities to Scale 
 
Abilities to scale are investments, or strategies, designed to increase the social venture’s 
ability to create social value by having the capacity to meet demand.  An important 
distinction of the resource conditions is they contribute to a social venture’s value creating 
capacity. Whereas ex ante limits to competition are investments made prior to 
performance with the expectation of increasing economic profits, abilities to scale are 
investments made prior to performance with the expectation of increasing social value 
creation without an immediate direct economic profit return.   
 
The ability to scale also may refer to the capability to respond to demand in the face of a 
crises or economic downturn.  In other words, it is those resources that allow an 
organization to generate consistent social rents in the face of a high demand for services or 
products.  Often, the high demand for a social venture’s service comes at a time of an 
economic downturn, where costs for the social venture are increasing as the demand for 
free/low-cost services are also increasing.  A social venture with resources positioned for 
scaling up operations will be able to increase its social impact and social value creation 
during times of increased demand.   
 
Consider the homeless shelter example once more.  The shelter with contributive 
advantage may have an emergency response plan in place and resources on standby at all 
times ready to deploy.  It may be an agreement with a nearby facility for space, media 
outlets for emergency communication, or an on-call staff of dedicated volunteers.  Another 
organization without resources positions for abilities to scale may be forced to limit its 
services, increase their prices, or ultimately close their doors when a demand for services 
increases.   
 
3.10 Discussion and Further Exploration 
 
As previously stated, an enterprise has SCA if it is able to consistently create more 
economic value than the marginal competitor in its product market (Peteraf et al. 2003).  
An enterprise has SConA if it is able to consistently create more social value than the 
marginal contributor in its social problem area.  Commercial ventures are expected to 
remain competitive, but social ventures are expected to remain contributive.  Commercial 
ventures attempt to out-compete one another in order to obtain market share while social 
ventures attempt to out-contribute one another in order to obtain more donations, grants, 
etc. 
 
In viewing this model for SConA, social and commercial ventures should not be 
considered so distinct from each other; they are in fact similar in the majority of their 
challenges, decisions, and resource management.  Regardless, when an organization 
designs its value creating strategies around the creation of social value, it must then deal 
with an additional step in the value creating and capturing process (social rent conversion).  
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As previously demonstrated, the differences between social and commercial ventures can 
be viewed on a continuum.  At one end, the commercial venture deals strictly with 
competition-based economic and market forces.  At the other end, the social venture deals 
additional economic and market forces that behave quite different in the social value area.   
 
In a sense, the more focused a venture is on creating social value, the more critical social 
rent conversion becomes.  As economic conditions in the market go down, social and 
commercial ventures face somewhat opposite challenges.  In poor economic conditions, 
social ventures typically face a higher demand for services and commercial ventures 
typically face a lower demand for services.  A commercial venture is not expected to lower 
prices to help the community they serve (although some may choose to do so as a strategy 
in line with social responsibility or to capture market share from competitors).  A social 
venture, however, is typically expected to lower their prices (or continue serving for free) 
in the face of increased demand and increased costs.  This unique dynamic facing social 
ventures is why the additional two conditions of SConA become essential for long term 
viability.  It is equally important that the original four cornerstones of SCA not be ignored, 
as the ability to scale directly contributes, through social rent conversion, to the social 
venture’s ex ante limits to competition as the limits to scarcity contribute, through social 
rent conversion, to the social venture’s ex post limits to competition.   
 
The next step in the process is to determine whether indications of sustainable contributive 
advantage exist within the realm of social ventures.  If they do indeed exist, how might 
these indications be observed or categorized?  As with many strategic theories, including 
resource-based theory and sustainable competitive advantage, direct measurement is 
challenging (Barney and Clark, 2007) and only indications or effects of such a 
phenomenon can be observed.  Another question is whether overall indications or effects 
on performance be measured or observed within the context of sustainable contributive 
advantage?   Using variables as proxies for possible indicators of sustainable contributive 
advantage within the relative environment of a single industry is the following step in 
sustainable contributive advantage’s development.  
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4 An Exploratory Quantitative Analysis of Sustainable Contributive 
Advantage Using of Growth and ‘Profitability’ in Nonprofit 
Organizations 
 
In looking at differences and similarities among nonprofit and for-profit ventures, the 
definition and outcomes of success in each of these firms are slightly different.  
Additionally, the challenges faced by each type of venture are distinctly different.  
Nonprofits must deal with not only the sustainability of their organization, but also the 
creation of social value, frequently in lieu of direct economic profits.  While non-profit 
organizations do not record “profit,” they do record metrics that allow for an efficiency 
measure.  In looking at the growth and efficiency of nonprofit organization as proxies for 
comparative performance measures, it can be determined whether factors such as growth 
and efficiency contribute to the overall success of the organization.  Growth and efficiency 
may be indicators of sustainable contributive advantage in that the better performing 
organizations contribute resources of abilities to scale (growth) and limits to scarcity 
(efficiency).  This exploratory quantitative analysis was conducted using a data set 
composed of financial variables from 147 nonprofits in the United States operating within 
a single industrial sector, the animal welfare industry.   
 
4.1 Overview 
 
The study of social ventures is considered to be a broad field as it includes co-operatives, 
mutuals (an organization whose purpose is raising funds from its members, which can then 
be used to provide common services to all members of the organization or society), 
community business, and voluntary or nonprofit organizations (Spear, 2006). This 
exploratory analysis takes on a specific sector of within social ventures, the nonprofit.  The 
analysis further specifies within that sector to a specific industry, animal welfare nonprofit 
organizations in the United States.   Utilizing the theoretical lens of resource-based theory 
(RBT) and the analysis tool of Markov chain analysis, the model and theoretical 
development of sustainable contributive advantage is further explored within this specific 
industry. 
 
Previous studies examining for-profit ventures utilizing RBT have examined a narrow 
sample of firms, typically a sample of firms drawn from a single industry (Henderson and 
Cockburn, 1994; Ray, Barney, and Muhanna, 2004).  This enabled the researchers to 
clearly identify any links between the resources and the strategies in question and is 
advised as the proper way to compare ventures using RBT (Barney and Clark, 2007).  As 
this is the general accepted practice in RBT studies, this analysis takes on a single industry 
sample as well.  
 
4.2 Comparing For-Profit and Nonprofit Ventures 
 
In wanting to shed light on the path to success in nonprofits, the logical step forward is to 
ascertain what growth and profit dimensions look like in the nonprofit sector and whether 
they behave in similar or distinct ways.  Nonprofit organizations have a different view of 
profitability and other financial measures in determining success.  They must deal with a 
dual-goal of running their ventures in a sustainable way as well as creating social value via 
methods that may not have a direct economic return.   
	56	
Sustainable competitive advantage from a resource-based theory (RBT) perspective in 
commercial ventures reflects the assumption in order to grow profitably, firms should 
pursue growth opportunities that match their resource advantages (Sirmon, Hitt, and 
Ireland, 2007).  Therefore, in the framework used by Davidsson, Steffens, and 
Fitzsimmons et al, 2009 and Brännback, Carsrud, Renko, Östermark, Aaltonen and 
Kiviluoto, 2009, sustainable competitive advantage (SCA) stems from high-growth and 
high-profitability.  They propose those firms operating at this level have been able to 
achieve SCA.  
 
In taking from these two previously conducted studies, it is proposed that nonprofits 
operating at high-growth and high-efficiency have been able to achieve sustainable 
contributive advantage.  The development of the measures for these two conditions will be 
explained in detail.  At this point, it is appropriate to discuss the unique type of nonprofit 
examined within this study, which lends well to the observation of sustainable contributive 
advantage.  
 
4.3 The Donative Nonprofit 
 
This study focuses on the donative nonprofit, Hansmann (1980) defines a donative 
nonprofit as one in which a substantial portion of the nonprofit’s income are in the form of 
donations.  These donations “involve payments that, though usually intended to be used 
for specific purposes, are not made with the expectation that they will be used simply to 
finance public goods for the donor” (Hansman, 1980, 35).  In other words, the nonprofit 
has dedicated their business model, in whole or in part, to a transactional process of 
providing a product or service to a non-paying consumer, which makes it unprofitable at 
the time of the transaction.     
 
This is somewhat of a departure from the legal definition of a donative nonprofit, which 
may include such entities as opera houses, certain hospitals, or universities that may 
operate on a profitable transactional basis.  Those nonprofits that rely on profitable 
transactional business models to survive are termed commercial nonprofits, rather than 
donative nonprofits (Hansmann, 1980).  “Some nonprofit organizations derive all their 
resources from commercial operations, and in this sense are just as much “for profits” as 
any for-profit firm” (Steinberg, 2006, 118).  “Subsequent literature has focused on the 
differences between donative and commercial nonprofits”; some are donative in that they 
rely mostly on donations and others on commercial activity (Steinberg, 2006, 118).  
 
In the case of the donative nonprofit, the concept of “perceived benefit” becomes 
distorted.  For example, the perceived value of a hot meal is not converted or realized 
when the homeless person agrees to consume it, regardless of how valuable the homeless 
person perceives the value to be.  Therefore, the donative nonprofit has an additional step 
in their value creating and capturing process.  The perceived benefit must be converted 
and realized by a party not directly enjoying the benefit the donative nonprofit is creating.  
This additional step describes, in part, the nonmarket conditions surrounding sustainable 
contributive advantage and lends well to the examination of whether high-growth and/or 
high-efficiency donative nonprofits have been able to achieve it.  An indication of this 
would be a donative nonprofit with strong limits to scarcity, such as a substantial pool of 
individual donors who consistently contribute the largest portion of their philanthropic 
giving to that donative nonprofit.   
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4.4 Exploring Sustainable Contributive Advantage 
 
The proposed model of sustainable contributive advantage (SConA) previously discussed 
helps to explain the social value creation mechanism beyond a simple economic profit. 
This view becomes important as the concepts of “profit” and “growth” are applied from a 
nonprofit perspective.  Based in resource-based theory and the cornerstones of competitive 
advantage offered by Peteraf (1993), SConA offers a way at looking at the competitive 
environment while taking social value creation into consideration.   
 
If an organization is able to achieve SConA, it is able to utilize value-creating and 
capturing strategies. These strategies enable the organization to grow from within and 
through its economic and social resources it is able to generate transactions of creating 
both social and economic rents.  It then captures value by monetizing social rents into new 
economic equivalents.  The accumulation of social rents do not equate to profit directly, it 
is in fact the accumulation of social rents, which needs to be converted into economic 
returns.   
 
Thus, the accumulation of social rents, through transactions of creating social value, need 
to be converted into economic profit for the organization.  Because it is a two-step process, 
a nonprofit wishing to have SConA must deal with ex post limits to competition but it 
must ALSO deal with a cornerstone termed limits to scarcity in order to sustain social 
rents.  Limits to scarcity is demonstrated by the nonprofit’s ability to create social value in 
a more efficient or preferred manner.  Therefore, the organization is able to create the 
same social value that another nonprofit is, but with less effort, lower expenses or with 
more effectiveness.  Limits to scarcity contribute to ex post limits to competition, the 
result of which will be shown via economic profit.  However, the nonprofit must focus on 
both the conversion of the social rents and the creation of social rents via limits to scarcity.   
 
A nonprofit wishing to have SConA must deal with ex post limits to competition but it 
must also deal with abilities to scale in order to have the ability to significantly grow 
social rents, especially in the case of an economic downturn where demand for services 
increases and the price for services is expected to decrease.  Abilities to scale contributes 
to ex ante limits to competition primarily because the decisions to invest resources in 
creating more social value are made without knowing if the investment will directly 
contribute to SConA.  The nonprofit that is able to increase its capacity and abilities to 
scale will in turn grow in terms of social rents.  If those growing social rents are converted 
and the contribution to ex ante limits to competition is successful, the result will be 
growth, either in terms of revenue, assets, program services, etc.  
 
As previously stated, SCA from a RBT perspective reflects the assumption that in order to 
grow profitably, commercial ventures should pursue growth opportunities matching their 
resource advantages (Sirmon, Hitt, and Ireland, 2007).  The concept of growth in a social 
venture relates directly to their capacity to contribute or “growth” (related to abilities to 
scale).  As the goal of a social venture is to create value, the concept of growth relates 
directly to the ability to create social value on a larger scale. Similarly, the concept of 
profit in a social venture relates directly to their efficiency (related to limits to scarcity).  
Profitability becomes the contributive efficiency of the venture in its ability to run and 
manage operations.   
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In times of scarcity when an economic downturn occurs, nonprofits experience increased 
demand and decreased revenue coupled with the public expectation to persevere.  They are 
expected to serve more when the time of need is greatest and when the general public 
domain of resources (i.e. donations, grants, government subsidies) are at its lowest.  This 
departure from the normal market demand behaviors and their impact on “growth” and 
“profit” in social ventures create compelling questions as to what strategies may be best 
for social ventures.  The social value creation requirement and non-market orientation 
behavior create the need to examine these questions using RBT and SConA as research 
lenses.   
 
As previously discussed, the economic flow within donative nonprofits creates a time lag 
in the transactional processes within the nonprofit business model.  This time lag, as 
previously discussed, creates a state of high volatility and risk for donative nonprofits.  
The conversion process of a social rent to an economic rent requires additional steps in the 
nonprofit business model. The additional resource conditions of limits to scarcity and 
abilities to scale are essential to the success and sustainability (sustainable contributive 
advantage) of nonprofits and become important to frame the discussion and methodology 
of the study at hand.  
 
4.4.1 Limits to Scarcity – Quantitative View 
 
While ex post limits to competition refer to those isolating mechanisms that preserve rents 
over a longer term (Peteraf, 1993) limits to scarcity are those isolating mechanisms that 
preserve social rents over a longer term.  It refers to resources and processes that ensure 
the venture can create social value even in the face of an economic downturn where 
resources supplied (i.e. grants, donations) to social causes decrease.  This is not to imply 
that limits to scarcity are represented only by assets or working capital (although these 
may be indicators).  Limits to scarcity are also represented by things the nonprofit does to 
ensure continued support from stakeholders regardless of the economic condition of the 
market.  
 
In other words, limits to scarcity are unique, tacit, socially complex, and path dependent 
resources that help to ensure their social value creation is better than any other in that 
industry and that the organization is able to communicate that.  When that social value 
creation is uniquely valuable enough to translate to an outside funding party, a conversion 
of the social rent into an economic rent occurs (i.e. revenue to the social venture or 
strategic partnerships), which then contributes to the social venture’s ex post limits to 
competition.  Indicators of abilities to scale may be represented by financial metrics such 
as fundraising efficiency, program expenses, revenue growth or program services 
profitability. 
 
4.4.2 Abilities to scale – Quantitative View 
 
Abilities to scale are investments, or strategies, designed to scale the social venture’s 
ability to create social value by having the capacity to meet demand.  An important 
distinction of the resource conditions is they contribute to a social venture’s social value 
creating capacity. Whereas ex ante limits to competition are investments made prior to 
performance with the expectation of increasing economic profits, abilities to scale are 
investments made prior to performance with the expectation of increasing social value 
creation without an immediate direct economic profit return.  The ability to scale refers to 
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the capability to respond to demand in the face of a crises or economic downturn.  In other 
words, it is those resources that allow an organization to generate consistent social rents (if 
not growing social rents) in the face of a high demand for services or products.   
 
Often, the high demand for a social venture’s service comes at a time of an economic 
downturn, where costs for the social venture are increasing as the demand for free/low-
cost services are also increasing.  A social venture with resources positioned for abilities to 
scale will be able to increase its social impact and social value creation during times of 
increased demand, where another organization without resources positions for abilities to 
scale may be forced to limit its services, increase their prices, or ultimately close their 
doors.  Indicators of abilities to scale may be represented by such financial variables as 
working capital ratio, asset growth, or retained earnings.  
 
4.5 Methodology and Data 
 
In order to begin to explore what factors may be involved in the consistently superior 
performance of donative nonprofits relative to other donative nonprofits in their industry, 
comparisons must be made within the industry and among those donative nonprofits 
competing for resources.  In looking at the growth and efficiency of nonprofit 
organizations as proxies for comparative performance measures, it can be determined 
whether factors such as growth and efficiency contribute to the overall success of the 
organization.  Growth and efficiency may be indicators of sustainable contributive 
advantage in that the better performing organizations contribute resources of abilities to 
scale (growth) and limits to scarcity (efficiency).   
 
As mentioned previously, Davidsson, Steffens, and Fitzsimmons (2009), Brännback, et al. 
(2009), and Kiviluoto (2011) conducted similar studies examining profit versus growth.  
While both were searching for paths to high growth and high profitability, this study 
explores whether the proxies chosen for profit and growth in a nonprofit context produce 
similar results.  This study takes the approach closer to that of the study by Brännback, et 
al. (2009) and Kiviluoto (2011). Each will be described briefly in turn.   
 
The study by Davidsson, Steffens, and Fitzsimmons (2009) was conducted on Swedish 
and Australian financial data across multiple industries and multiple years in order to 
examine how the firms moved in the growth-profit space over time.  This particular study 
used sales growth for the growth factor and return on assets (ROA) for the profit factor.  
The hypotheses for their study were as follows:  
 
H1. Firms that show high profitability at low growth (Profit Firms) are more likely to 
reach a state of high growth and high profitability (become Star Firms) in subsequent 
periods than are firms that first show high growth at low profitability (Growth Firms). 
 
H2. Firms that show high growth and low profitability (Growth Firms) are more likely to 
reach a state of low profitability and low growth (become Poor Firms) in subsequent 
periods than firms that first show high profitability and low growth (Profit Firms).  
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Figure 14: Categorization schema of ventures by growth and efficiency (adapted from 
Davidsson, Steffens, and Fitzsimmons, 2009; Brännback, et al., 2009) 
 
Figure 14 is a graphical representation of the movement between categories by the firms 
being analyzed.  In order to analyze firms in the sample, percentage changes are used 
between each year.  It is not the actual revenue and ‘profit’ figures being analyzed, but the 
percentage change from year to year.  The minimum and maximum percentage changes 
are used as boundaries for the figure and the mean percentages are used to determine 
whether firms are growing at a faster rate than other firms in the sample or being more 
efficient than other firms.  This movement between states of growth and efficiency (low or 
high) are then teased out.  
 
The results of the Davidsson, Steffens, and Fitzsimmons (2009) study suggested “that high 
profitability, low growth firms are more likely to become high profitability, high growth 
firms compared with firms that start from a position of high growth and low profitability” 
(388).  In other words, a Profit Firm is more likely than a Growth Firm to become a Star 
Firm.  Additionally, the study suggested that low profitability, high growth firms are more 
likely to become low profitability, low growth firms.  In other words, a Growth Firm is 
more likely than a Profit Firm to become a Poor Firm.   
 
Although the hypotheses for both studies were the same, the study by Brännback, et al. 
(2009) used a slightly different method.  Davidsson, Steffens, and Fitzsimmons (2009) and 
Kivilouto (2011) studied the proportion of firms moving from one state to another state.  
In the study by Brännback, et al. (2009) and Kiviluoto (2011), Markov chain analysis was 
used in order to estimate the transition probabilities between the states over consecutive 
time periods.   
 
The study by Brännback, et al. (2009) examined a particular industry, the biotechnology 
industry (an industry considered high growth), while Davidsson, Steffens, and 
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Fitzsimmons (2009) examined multiple industries.  Brännback, et al.  (2009) used the 
Davidsson, Steffens, and Fitzsimmons (2009) study as a starting point for testing the same 
hypothesis in a narrow sample, similarly as this study does.   
 
The study by Brännback, et al. (2009) used growth in sales as the growth measure and 
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) as the profitability measure.  Their data set was 
comprised of 90 privately held firms in the Finnish life science cluster, founded after 1990 
and with less than 250 employees.   
 
In general, they found that a firm in one category is most likely to stay in ‘its’ category 
and should a transition occur, the results agree with Davidsson, Steffens, and Fitzsimmons 
(2009) (Brännback, et al., 2009).  Using both Brännback, et al. (2009) and Davidsson, 
Steffens, Fitzsimmons et al. (2009) as starting points, this study utilizes a similar approach 
in that the analysis lends well to examine how ventures perform relative to each other over 
time and what factors may be moving these ventures between various states.   
 
Further, this study examines a specific industry within the nonprofit sector, animal 
welfare.  The reason for this specificity is two-fold.  The first lends to resource-base theory 
(RBT), which was used as a theoretical lens to both design the study and interpret the 
results.  Most of this type of work is best carried out on a limited sample of firms within a 
single industry.  This helps establish the link between the resources and strategies in 
question (Barney and Clark, 2007, 223).   
 
The second lends to the similarity in business models across the industry.  All of the 
animal welfare organizations in the sample work in the process of adopting animals, and 
the adoption model is a self-depleting model.  In other words, the fee that is charged for 
their primary service (adoption fees) does not cover the costs involved in providing that 
service (i.e. veterinary care, food, shelter).  Unlike a sector such as arts or human services 
where the services offered vary greatly across organizations, animal welfare organizations 
in this sample all serve the mission of finding homes for unwanted animals and utilize 
similar models in doing so.  Organizations such as wildlife conservation organizations, 
zoos and aquariums were not included in the sample.     
 
4.5.1 Data Set  
 
A data set was compiled of 147 animal shelters in the United States that contains historical 
financial and organizational data (3-7 years), as reported on the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) Form 990 entitled “Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax.” This 
publicly available form must be filed each year by U.S. organizations exempt from Federal 
income taxes under section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code, and whose annual receipts 
are "normally" more than $25,000 a year.  While the industry was the same, a recognized 
limitation to this initial analysis was the size and age of the firms being widespread across 
the sample. As the size and age were quite diverse in the sample, an enhancement of the 
data set towards a more homogeneous sample will be included in future research plans, as 
this was a preliminary study and exploration. 
 
The average age of a firm in this sample was 67.7 years with the minimum age as 10 years 
old and the maximum age was 143 years.  In terms of revenue, the average annual revenue 
for the firms in this sample was $5.6M with the minimum revenue at $421K and the 
maximum at $49.5M. A categorization of the number of firms in each bracket in terms of 
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age and size are presented in Table 2.  In regards to each firm’s scope of work, the sample 
was primarily comprised of firms operating at a regional level (78.1%), while 15.1% 
operate nationally and only 6.8% operate internationally.  In order to control for factors of 
scale and size, percentage changes were used in the calculations, rather than actual figures.  
A spreadsheet detailing this process is included in Appendix A. 
 
Table 1 
Categorization of age and revenue size of sample firms 
AGE   REVENUE  
 Cases   Cases 
Less than 25 20  Less than $1M 14 
25 – 50 42  $1M - $3M 62 
51 – 99 50  $3M - $10M 52 
Over 100 35  $10M - $30M 14 
   Over $30M 5 
Total 147  Total 147 
	
 
 
Davidsson, Steffens, and Fitzsimmons (2009) used sales growth as a growth measure and 
return on assets (ROA) as a profitability measure.  Brännback, et al. (2009) used sales 
growth as a growth measure and earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) as a profit 
measure.  For this study, revenue growth was used as the growth measure.  In line with the 
IRS 990 Form, revenues were detailed among different sources as shown in Table 3 
below.  
 
Table 2 
Internal Revenue Service 990 Form Statement of Revenue Categories 
Contributions, gifts, grants, and other similar amounts 
 Federated campaigns 
 Membership dues 
 Fundraising events 
 Related organizations 
 Government rants 
 All other contributions 
Program Service Revenue 
 Type A 
 Type B 
 Type C 
 Type D 
 Type E 
 All other program service revenue 
Other Revenue 
 Investment income 
 Tax-exempt bond proceeds 
 Royalties 
 Gross rents 
 Sales of assets other than inventory 
 Gross income from fundraising events (not reported above) 
 Gross income from gaming activities 
 Gross sales of inventory 
 Miscellaneous revenue 
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The sum of these lines were reported as total revenue, which is the figure used in this 
analysis.  The ‘profit’ measure was calculated by dividing total revenue by total expenses.  
Within the 990 Form, expenses are separated into three categories: program, management 
and fundraising expenses.  Table 3 provides a detailed categorization of expense 
categories. 
 
Table 3 
Internal Revenue Service 990 Form Statement of Expense Categories 
Grants and similar amounts paid 
 Assistance to U.S. governments and organizations  
 Assistance to U.S. individuals 
 Assistance to all others outside the U.S. 
Benefits paid to or for members 
Salaries, other compensation, employee benefits 
 Compensation 
 Other salaries and wages 
 Pension plan contributions 
 Other employee benefits 
 Payroll taxes 
Professional fundraising fees 
Total fundraising expenses 
Other expenses 
 Fees for services (non-employee) 
 Advertising and promotion 
 Office expenses 
 Information technology 
 Royalties 
 Occupancy 
 Travel 
 
Travel or entertainment for any Federal, state or local public 
official 
 Conferences, conventions and meetings 
 Interest 
 Payment to affiliates 
 Depreciation, depletion, or amortization 
 Insurance 
 Other 
	
 
While dividing total revenue by total expenses does not reflect the true ‘profit’ or 
effectiveness of the organization, it does provide a baseline comparison across the 
organizations for determining the efficiency of their operations and ability to leverage 
resources.  As this study was largely exploratory, it was decided that these two measures 
were the best to closely resemble the measures used in the two studies mentioned 
previously.  For purposes of clarity, the profit measure is renamed ‘efficiency.' 
 
4.5.2 Analysis 
 
As previously stated, the Markov chain analysis lends well to the exploration of 
sustainable contributive advantage (SConA).  As performance indicators are somewhat 
nebulous within the nonprofit sector, using an analytical tool that compares ventures to 
each other while teasing out the factors contributing to those performance differences 
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helps to uncover what may be contributing to comparatively superior performance.  In 
taking the efficiency and growth factors of the nonprofits in the sample and plotting them 
out in a comparative way, superior nonprofits will become apparent.   
 
The analysis also examines how these nonprofits perform over a 4-year time horizon, 
which makes it more powerful than a factor analysis alone.  As a key factor in SConA is 
the ability to sustainably contribute. The Markov analysis helps to pinpoint those 
nonprofits that are out performing others over time.  In this preliminary evaluation, the 
easiest way to view whether factors such as growth and efficiency contribute to overall 
performance is to segment the data into large categorical levels of comparative success. 
Following the method used by Brännback, et al. (2009), the current study plotted each 
firm in a 2 x 2 matrix where firms were categorized as above or below industry average on 
each dimension.  The four state categories created were: 
 
-high efficiency, high growth (STAR FIRM) 
-high efficiency, low growth (EFFICIENCY FIRM) 
-low efficiency, high growth (GROWTH FIRM) 
-low efficiency, low growth (POOR FIRM) 
 
In the analysis for this study of 147 nonprofit organizations, a Markov chain analysis was 
used in order to judge their position and demonstrate SConA within a time-based 
relationship.  It was expected that some nonprofits would move from category to category 
and it was also expected that some nonprofits would stay in their position. Markov chain 
analysis is ideal in that it looks at the probability of movement from state to state.  The 
analysis estimated the transition probabilities between the four state categories (Star, 
Growth, Efficiency, Star) over a three-year period, following previous work that analyzed 
the relationship between growth and profitability in economic firms (Brännback, et al., 
2009).  Markov chain analysis makes statements about transitions from one point in time 
to another. The analysis does not describe the process of change between statese, as 
continuous time models do, but merely the probability of movement between states 
(Langeheine, 1988; Aaltonen and Östermark, 1998).  Aaltonen and Östermark (1998) have 
shown that Markov models can be useful in predicting profitability changes among firms. 
 
Markov analysis belongs to a family of mathematical models that are stochastic and time 
dependent. These models provide a useful method for analyzing the behavior of a system 
in a dynamic situation where describing and predicting the movement of the system under 
study among different system states over time is desired. Markov analysis therefore should 
not be viewed as an optimization tool like regression or other linear models, but rather a 
descriptive tool that can provide information useful for decision-making. A Markov chain 
analysis of systems that are analyzed as a first-order Markov process can be applied to any 
study that seeks to determine, in a sequential manner, the probability of certain states of 
events either happening or not happening.  In this study, the Markov models used to 
explore the SConA conditions within the firms under analysis in the data set met the 
following three assumptions: 1.) the system under study has a finite number of discrete 
states or conditions (4 in our model); 2.) the transition probabilities of a state moving from 
one state to another remain constant over time; 3.) and the probability of being in one 
particular state after a specified period of time is dependent only on the current state and 
the transition probabilities, and not on any earlier conditions.  
 
Therefore, in order to construct a Markov model of the system, it is necessary to determine 
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the initial states of the system and the transition probabilities. Since the number of possible 
states is finite such that by definition an nth-order Markov chain process is determined by 
a set of n states {S1, S2,. . ., Sn}, it is possible to construct a square matrix, P, made up of 
all the probabilities of possible movements from state to state, denoted as pij. That is, pij 
denotes the probability of going from one state, i = 1,2,...,n,  to another state, j = 1,2,...,n, 
 in one time period. The process can be in only one state at any time instant. If at time t the 
process is in state Si, then at time t + 1 it will be in state Sj with probability pij (Hamilton, 
1989). 
 
Testing for stationarity within the transition probability matrix is essential in Markov chain 
analyses as unlike other tests of random behavior, Markov chains can be used to detect 
behavioral patterns over time (Tan and Yilmaz, 2002). If the transition probability matrix 
is not stationary over time, the Markov chain will have no predictive power (Tan and 
Yilmaz, 2002). Given the transition probabilities and the current condition of a nonprofit, 
the analysis process computes the probability of the nonprofit to follow a given path over 
multiple time periods.  
 
In order to estimate the transition probabilities, the observed transition path was first 
defined for each organization. There were four potential outcomes of {efficiency (e), 
growth (g)}: Low–Low (Poor), Low–High (Growth), High–Low (Efficiency), High–High 
(Star).  These outcomes were assigned to an organization at time period t and –, given a 
fixed outcome at t – and again for the same four potential outcomes at time t + 1. For 
example, an organization indicating below median growth and above median efficiency in 
2006–2007 and above median in both dimensions in 2008 was defined to have followed 
the path: Efficiency–Efficiency–Star.  An organization showing below median values in 
both dimensions for all three years was defined to follow the path: Poor–Poor–Poor. The 
transition probabilities were estimated applying the Panmark software of Van de Pol, 
Langeheine, and De Jong (1991). The calculations were based of the frequency 
distribution of the observed 147 cases over the potential transitions (4 possible paths in 
each of the three periods, i.e. 43 = 64 combinations). 
 
It is important to note that it is possible for any venture to be a ‘Star’ venture, regardless of 
their size.  If the venture’s revenue growth between years is higher than the mean 
percentage revenue growth of the sample and the venture’s efficiency/profit growth is also 
higher than the mean efficiency/profit growth of the sample, the firm will be categorized 
as a ‘Star’ venture.  
 
In this analysis, the Growth factor was calculated based on the nonprofit’s total annual 
percentage change in revenue and the Efficiency factor was calculated by dividing total 
revenue by total expenses.  Therefore:  
 Poor Venture: low or negative revenue change coupled with a low or negative 
‘profit’  
 Efficiency Venture: low or negative revenue change coupled with a high ‘profit’ 
 Growth Venture: high and positive revenue growth coupled with a low or negative 
‘profit’ 
 Star Venture: high and positive revenue growth coupled with a high ‘profit’ 
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4.6 Results 
 
Results of the time homogeneous transitions from 2006-2008 are presented in Table 5.  
The significance level was calculated by the software Panmark using the estimates of 
transition coefficients.  The standard errors were therefore determined by the data.  The 
probability levels for the Likelihood Ratio and Pearson Chi square test were respectively, 
48% and 43%, indicating an adequate model. However, the results indicated that 68% of 
the movement could be attributed to random chance. 
 
In general, results showed a more volatile environment for social enterprises than for 
commercial enterprises.  The results by Davidsson, Steffens, and Fitzsimmons (2009) and 
Brännback, et al. (2009) found that a firm in one category was most likely to remain in 
‘its’ category.  However, these results show that only Star firms show a high probability of 
remaining a Star firm.  Efficiency firms have an equal probability of moving to Star or 
staying an Efficiency firm.  Growth firms show the highest probability of moving to a 
Poor firm while Poor firms show the highest probability of moving to a Growth Firm.   
 
Table 4 
Time homogeneous transition mix - Transition probabilities with standard errors in parentheses 
Efficiency: Total Revenue/Total Expenses 
Growth: Total Percentage Change in Revenue 
Indicator t Indicator t+1    
 STAR EFFICIENCY GROWTH POOR TOTAL 
STAR (St. error) 0.343 (.048) 0.323 (.047) 0.010 (.010) 0.323 (.047) 1.000 
EFFICIENCY 0.404 (.072) 0.404 (.072) 0.021 (.021) 0.170 (.055) 1.000 
GROWTH  0.277 (.065) 0.021 (.021) 0.298 (.067) 0.404 (.072) 1.000 
POOR 0.257 (.044) 0.020 (.014) 0.376 (.048) 0.347 (.047) 1.000 
N=147; Degrees of freedom = 48; Likelihood Ratio = 48.22; Model Level = .46; Pearson Chi Square = 42.84; Probability = .68 
	
 
4.7 Discussion 
 
In comparing the growth and profit analysis of commercial ventures with the growth and 
efficiency analysis of this subset of nonprofits within the same industry, the path to 
success was different.  While both of the for-profit studies mentioned previously and the 
results of this analysis show that Profit/Efficiency firms were more likely to become Star 
firms than Growth firms, it was the only similarity the results shared.     
 
The overall low probabilities in the results suggest a state of higher volatility for 
nonprofits than for-profits.  Interestingly, the highest probability for a Poor firm to move 
out of the Poor state was through the path of Growth.  While the probability for a Growth 
firm to move to a Poor firm was the highest, there was a probability for Growth firms to 
move to a Star firm, which closely matched the probability of staying a Growth firm.  
However, the somewhat high probability of movement being attributed to random chance 
indicated that further analysis is needed.  
 
Another indication taken from these results was that a two-step approach was required for 
Poor firms moving to a Star firm.  It may be inferred that nonprofits should focus on 
growth until a point where efficiency must enter the strategic focus.  It may also be 
inferred that nonprofits should consider efficiency in their growth related strategies 
allowing for the efficiency of a strategy to become the primary focus after a certain scale 
has been achieved.  Efficiency firms had the highest probability of moving to Star, but the 
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path to an Efficiency firm was shown to be highly improbable.  Equally daunting were the 
results showing that once becoming a Star firm, the probability of moving to either a Profit 
firm or a Poor firm were equal.  Not only was Star firm status unlikely to be obtained for 
Poor or Growth firms, but also Star firm status was also likely to be lost.   
 
A limitation of this study that will be explored in greater detail later was in regards to the 
data itself.  Revenue reported on the IRS 990 form could be misleading.  Within a single 
year, an organization may have received income that was not attributable to that specific 
year due to such issues as funding cycles or endowment plans.  Thus, in many cases 
considering its total expenses for the year may better reflect the dimension of an 
organization’s activities.  This is an area of opportunity for future analysis that may 
provide better insight into the true growth of these nonprofits. 
 
4.8 Implications for Sustainable Contributive Advantage 
 
The initial results display similarities and differences when compared to the results of 
similar studies conducted with for-profit firms (Davidsson, Steffens, Fitzsimmons, 2009; 
Brännback, et al., 2009; Kiviluoto, 2011) indicating that differences may exist between 
successful strategies for social ventures and successful strategies for commercial ventures.  
These results help to confirm the growing argument that the applications of findings from 
research on commercial ventures may not be appropriate to apply directly to social 
ventures (Eckhardt and Shane, 2003; Dorado 2006).  The results indicate that this is indeed 
the case with nonprofit firms in this particular sector.     
 
In the model for sustainable contributive advantage (SConA), abilities to scale resource 
conditions contribute directly to a venture’s ex-ante limits to competition (prior to 
performance) and can be demonstrated by decreasing costs and increasing capacity.  Limits 
to scarcity contribute directly to a venture’s ex post limits to competition (after performance) 
and can be demonstrated by increasing revenue and increasing efficiency.  Decreasing costs 
and increasing capacity resulted in a phenomenon known in the commercial venture 
literature as growth.  Similarly, increasing revenue and increasing efficiency resulted in a 
phenomenon known in the commercial venture literature as profit.  While these nonprofit 
metrics were not exactly similar to their commercial venture counterparts, they represent this 
first exploratory attempt at and empirical examination of SConA. 
 
SConA combines the essence of social value creation and social value capture with the 
ability to compete and remain sustainable.  SConA builds on Peteraf’s (1993) four 
cornerstones of entrepreneurship: heterogeneity of resources, perfectly immobile 
resources, ex post limits to competition and ex ante limits to competition.  SConA 
connects two additional sets of conditions for resources in regard specifically to social 
enterprises: limits to scarcity (leading to ex post limits to competition) and ability to scale 
(leading to ex ante limits to competition).  These additional conditions contribute directly 
to the translated measures of growth and profit in a social context.  
 
The concept of growth in a nonprofit relates directly to their capacity to contribute (ability 
to scale).  As the goal of a social venture is to create value, the concept of growth relates 
directly to the ability to create social value on a larger scale. Similarly, the concept of 
profit in a social venture relates directly to their efficiency of contribution (limits to 
scarcity).  Profitability becomes the contributive efficiency of the firm in its ability to run 
and manage operations.   
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The results provide support the notion that for-profit and non-profit ventures must examine 
and develop their strategy in a similar fashion when it comes to maintaining resource 
advantages to remain sustainable.  However, as previously stated, those advantages must 
then be leveraged in a way for commercial ventures to become competitive, while social 
ventures must remain contributive.  It could be inferred that the primary challenge for 
social enterprises is the efficiency and revenue generation of their organization.  In fact, 
being able to generate revenue and maintain efficiency is suggested to be of higher 
importance for social ventures than for commercial ventures.  The results may also suggest 
that this is also the toughest challenge for social ventures.    
 
The next phase of analysis is to examine various and differing metrics for growth and 
‘profit’ in a social venture context in order to determine whether various types of 
performance indicators lead to overall impact for the venture.  In attempting to observe 
factors surrounding ventures that have achieved sustainable competitive advantage, there 
are many types of resources that may contribute to it and many financial indicators that 
may be used as proxies for those resource conditions.  Examining growth and profit-
related measures as factors that might contribute to overall performance may give stronger 
insight and support to the concept of sustainable contributive advantage.   
 
Admittedly, these are not exact measures of a social venture’s effectiveness of fulfillment 
of social mission, but the growth and efficiency metrics give some indications as to the 
relative success of the venture.  As with many strategic theories, including resource-based 
theory and sustainable competitive advantage, direct measurement is challenging (Barney 
and Clark, 2007) and only indications or effects of such a phenomenon can be observed.  
Similar to a factor analysis, the following study using Markov chain analysis will begin to 
tease out which factors drive other factors over time and if in fact these factors of growth 
and efficiency play a significant role in a venture’s ability to remain sustainably 
contributive.  Additionally, limitations and paths of future research for both studies will be 
reviewed. 
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5 Additional/Further Empirical Examination of Sustainable 
Contributive Advantage Using Five Constructs of Growth and ‘Profit’ of 
an Industry in the Nonprofit Sector 
 
Similar to the methodology used in the previous exploratory analysis, this expanded 
analysis examines the concepts of growth and profit in the context of social ventures by 
using several variables that serve as proxies for “growth” and “efficiency” measures.  The 
purpose of which is to explore their relationships and their contribution to the venture’s 
overall performance.  The exploratory analysis proved robust with a single construct 
tested.  However, it is worthwhile to explore additional measures of financial performance 
in order to ascertain if similar measures of growth and efficiency show similar results.  
These measures have been expanded to include asset growth, fundraising efficiency, 
working capital, and program related financial results.  As achieving SConA is dependent 
upon both achieving efficiency and scale, additional measures are needed to further 
explore SConA from an empirical standpoint.  
 
This analysis expands the methodology to explore five additional constructs of ‘profit’ and 
growth.  These constructs represent resource conditions (abilities to scale and limits to 
scarcity) required for sustainable contributive advantage.  Specifically this analysis 
explores whether the variables contained within the constructs contribute to overall 
performance and therefore, provide support for the sustainable contributive model.    
 
5.1 Overview 
 
This analysis uses several variables to define and analyze the “growth” and “efficiency” 
measures within nonprofits in order to examine factors that may contribute to sustainable 
contributive advantage (SConA). The initial exploratory analysis utilized revenue growth 
(growth) and a ratio of revenue versus expenses (efficiency) as measures.  These measures 
have been expanded to provide several different lenses for analysis such as asset growth, 
fundraising efficiency, working capital, program efficiency, program expenses, etc.  As 
achieving SConA is comprised of many different contributing factors, scenarios were 
designed to examine to further explore SConA from an empirical standpoint.  
 
The focus of this expanded analysis is not necessarily to compare results to similar studies 
conducted in commercial venture arenas, although the results of comparison are interesting 
to note.  The analysis focuses on whether selecting different performance measures will 
produce similar and statistically significant results.  The Markov chain analysis lends itself 
well to the exploration of sustainable contributive advantage in that it represents 
categorical movement over a period of four years and examines sustained performance 
above marginal contributors.  As sustainable contributive advantage is demonstrated when 
a venture is able to consistently create more social value than the marginal contributor in 
its social problem area over time, Markov chain analysis will identify those superior firms.   
 
5.2 Expanding Financial Indicators of Sustainable Contributive Advantage 
 
As previously discussed, the economic flow within donative nonprofits creates a time lag 
in the transactional processes within the nonprofit business model.  This time lag, as this 
study demonstrates, creates a state of high volatility and risk for donative nonprofits.  The 
conversion process of a social rent to an economic rent requires additional steps in the 
nonprofit business model. The indicators of high levels of performance, as they relate to 
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the sustainable contributive advantage of donative nonprofits, becomes important in 
framing the discussion and methodology of the study at hand.  
 
The financial variables that may be inferred as indicators of limits to scarcity are those 
variables that demonstrate the organization’s level of efficiency in creating social value 
and thereby, social rents.  Evidence of this efficiency is also demonstrated in the efficiency 
of the organization in converting social rents, as external parties recognize the contributive 
advantage the organization has in their specific area of social impact.   
 
The financial variables that may be inferred as indicators of abilities to scale are those that 
demonstrate the capacity of the organization to create social value. While financial 
variables do not directly measure the capacity of an organization to create social value, an 
inference can be made from some of the variables.  A combination of revenue growth, 
program expense growth, and working capital are variables relating to the capacity of an 
organization to create social value.   
 
While financial variables do not directly measure the social value, social impact or social 
rents of an organization; an inference can be made from financial variables.  A 
combination of program, administrative, and fundraising expenses indicate the efficiency 
of an organization in their value creation and value capturing process.  Fundraising 
efficiency indicates the organization’s ability to convert social value.  For some donors 
and grantors, the levels of expenses may indeed be a motivating factor for support.  These 
relationships and levels of trust between the parties and the organizations contribute 
directly to the organization’s ability to increase their revenue.  This revenue increase is 
expected to be over and above other competing organizations that may be competing for 
the same dollar.   
 
In the previous exploratory analysis, metrics of revenue growth and overall efficiency 
were examined.  Results indicated that revenue growth and overall efficiency were 
significant in indicating which firms were able to demonstrate consistent, above-average 
performance over time.  The next step in this analysis is two-fold.  The first is to ascertain 
whether a combined group of financial metrics, or composite measures, will also show 
significant and similar results.  The second is to examine selections of financial indicators 
within the composite score separately.  
 
Because no universal growth indicator dominates firm growth research (Delmar, 
Davidsson, and Gartner (2006), some scholars suggest the use of composite measures in 
order to use multiple indicators (Davidsson, 1989).  Other scholars advocate the use of 
multiple growth measures analyzed by the same tool (Delmar, 1997).  “The use of multiple 
measures of firm growth would likely provide a more complete picture of any empirical 
relationships as well as provide a way to test the robustness of any theoretical model” 
(Delmar, Davidsson, and Gartner, 2006, 185).  
 
The analysis that follows satisfies both single-measure and composite measure suggestions 
for growth analysis.  Additionally, due to the lack of consensus on how efficiency-related 
measures can be universally applied to nonprofit organizations (Mook, Richmond, and 
Quarter, 2003), various efficiency measures were also analyzed.  Justification for this 
approach as well as expectations of results will be explained in detail.   
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5.3 Data and Method 
 
It is worth repeating that in research on commercial venture success measures were 
modeled using the independent variables of growth and profit to evaluate the nature of 
high performing ventures, i.e., those ventures that reach the desirable state of high growth 
and high profitability.  By contrast, social ventures, such as the nonprofits contained in this 
data set, do not report the same comparable profitability measures due to regulatory 
limitations. Therefore, in this analysis, it was necessary to construct scenarios that contain 
variables expressing profit from internal measures that alternatively measure firm 
efficiency.  In this resource-based context then, efficiency of a social venture is a 
comparable desired success criteria as profitability is of the commercial venture. 
 
The data set compiled for the exploratory analysis as well as the method of analysis used 
will be utilized in this analysis (see Chapter 4 for a review).  As social ventures have the 
added need to provide social value, this study explored several different measures of 
financial health as variables in exploring the relationship between growth and efficiency. 
As it relates to those measures that correlate with the concept of growth within the 990 
Form, revenue is separated into thirteen different types (e.g., contributions, fees for 
services, membership dues).  Additionally, within the 990 Form, expenses are separated 
into three categories: program, management and fundraising expenses that can be used to 
develop approximations of profit measures. 
 
5.3.1 Composite Score Analysis 
 
As demonstrated in the previous exploratory analysis, using financial indicators within 
Markov chain analysis helps to ascertain whether these factors do in fact, have a role in the 
overall movement of the organization’s state of status (Star, Growth, Efficiency, Star).  
The compiling of these measures into a composite measure in line with limits to scarcity 
and abilities to scale help to magnify the expected effect of these factors on the 
organization’s movement.    
 
While some of the underlying causes of firm growth are assumed to be the same, there are 
many situational and idiosyncratic factors, which cannot be included in research models 
(Delmar, Davidsson, and Gartner, 2006).  A multiple-indicator, or composite measure “can 
help to capture this variety of responses to common, underlying causes of growth (Delmar, 
Davidsson, and Gartner, 2006, 185).   
 
The composite measures used in this analysis were based on a leading charity-rating 
organization’s rating methodology (this organization has requested to remain anonymous 
in this research).  The rating system is based on two aspects of a nonprofit’s financial 
health: efficiency and capacity.  These will be described in detail. Additionally, 
spreadsheets detailing the calculations behind each measure are included in Appendices B-
F.  
 
5.3.1.1 Efficiency Composite Performance Measure 
 
The composite efficiency performance measure was constructed using four financial 
performance metrics:  
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 Program Expenses: To evaluate a nonprofit’s program expenses, the actual 
program expenses were divided by the nonprofit’s total functional expenses in 
order to calculate the percentage of funds spent directly on programs.  For 
example, Charity X spends $1.5M on program expenses and $2.5M represents their 
total functional expenses.  The program expense performance metric would be 
60%.  This metric was then compared to the industry average and assigned a 
numerical score between 0 and 10.  
 Administrative Expenses: To evaluate a nonprofit’s administrative expenses, the 
actual administrative expenses were divided by the nonprofit’s total functional 
expenses in order to calculate the percentage of funds spent on administration.  For 
example, Nonprofit X spends $600K on program expenses and $2.5M represents 
their total functional expenses.  The administrative expense performance metric 
would be 24%.  This metric was then compared to the industry average and 
assigned a numerical score between 0 and 10.  
 Fundraising Expenses: To evaluate a nonprofit’s fundraising expenses, the actual 
fundraising expenses were divided by the nonprofit’s total functional expenses in 
order to calculate the percentage of funds spent on fundraising.  For example, 
Nonprofit A spends $750K on fundraising expenses and $2.5M represents their 
total functional expenses.  The fundraising expense performance metric would be 
28%.  This metric was then compared to the industry average and assigned a 
numerical score between 0 and 10.  
 Fundraising Efficiency: To evaluate a nonprofit’s fundraising efficiency, the goal 
is to determine how much the nonprofit spends in order to generate $1 in charitable 
contributions. In order to determine it, divide a nonprofit’s fundraising expense 
total by the annual total contributions. For example, Nonprofit X, with fundraising 
expenses of $750K and total contributions of $2M, has a fundraising efficiency of 
$0.375, indicating that it spends 37.5¢ in raising $1.  This metric was then 
compared to the industry average and assigned a numerical score between 0 and 
10.  
 
5.3.1.2 Efficiency Composite Score 
 
In order to calculate the overall efficiency composite score, the four scores described 
above were added together in order to create a score between 0 and 40.   
 
5.3.1.3 Efficiency Composite Rating 
 
In order to calculate an overall efficiency rating, the scores were divided into five 
numerical categories between 0 and 5, when compared to each other within the data set.  
The ratings were assigned with 0 being the lowest rating and 5 being the highest rating.   
 
5.3.1.4 Capacity Composite Performance Measure 
 
The composite capacity performance measure was constructed using three financial 
performance metrics: 
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 Primary Revenue Growth: Growth in this metric represents the nonprofit’s overall 
increase in their primary revenue, which includes all contributions the nonprofit 
receives. Annual growth of primary revenue over its four most recent fiscal years 
was analyzed using the standard formula for computing annualized growth.  This 
metric was then compared to the industry average and assigned a numerical score 
between 0 and 10. 
 Program Expenses Growth: Growth in this metric represents the nonprofit’s overall 
increase in the amount spent directly on programs.  Annual growth of program 
expenses over its four most recent fiscal years were analyzed using the standard 
formula for computing annualized growth.  This metric was then compared to the 
industry average and assigned a numerical score between 0 and 10. 
 Working Capital Ratio: The nonprofit’s working capital ratio was computed by 
analyzing how long it could sustain its current operations without the generation of 
any new revenue. To obtain this ratio, a nonprofit’s working capital was divided by 
its total expenses.  For example, Nonprofit X reported $6M in working capital and 
its total expenses were $3M.  Nonprofit A, therefore, was assigned a working 
capital ratio of 2 years.  This metric was then compared to the industry average and 
assigned a numerical score between 0 and 10. 
	
5.3.1.5 Capacity Composite Score 
 
In order to calculate the overall capacity composite score, the three scores described above 
were added together in order to create a score between 0 and 30.   
 
5.3.1.6 Capacity Composite Rating 
 
In order to calculate an overall capacity rating, the scores were divided into five numerical 
categories between 0 and 5, when compared to each other within the data set.  The ratings 
were assigned with 0 being the lowest rating and 5 being the highest rating.  
 
Each of these measures were used to create two scenarios for analysis which are described 
below.  
 
Scenario 1: Composite Growth Capacity Score versus Composite Efficiency Score 
In order to capture a greater contribution of the factors within a nonprofit that may 
contribute to growth or efficiency a composite model employing both social value capture 
and economic value measures was analyzed. McKelvie and Wiklund (2010) advocate the 
use of hybrid models of various contributing modes of growth to enhance the 
understanding of theoretical underpinnings of growth as it applies to venture success.  Two 
composite measures were created (described previously).   
 
Organizational capacity was determined on a 0-30 scale (following the scoring system of 
the charity watchdog organization described previously) and represents a combination 
measure of primary revenue growth, program expenses growth, and working capital ratio.  
It serves as the growth measure, similarly used in Brännback, et al. (2009).  Organizational 
efficiency was determined on a 0-40 scale (following the scoring system of the charity 
watchdog organization described previously) and represents a combination measure of 
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program expenses, administrative expenses, fundraising expenses, and fundraising 
efficiency.  It serves as the profitability measure similarly used in Davidson, Steffens, and 
Fitzsimmons (2009) and Brännback, et al. (2009).   
 
Scenario 2: Composite Growth Capacity Rating versus Composite Efficiency Rating - 
Categories 
The growth variable was formed as a scaled combination measure of both economic and 
social value creation consisting of revenue growth, program expenses growth (evidence of 
social services growth), and working capital ratio.  The efficiency variable was formed as 
a scaled combination measure of program expenses, administrative expenses, fundraising 
expenses and fundraising efficiency.  The numerical data from Scenario 1 was converted 
to performance categories corresponding to a 0 to 4 rating based on a quintile split.  It was 
also cross-referenced with the ratings used by the charity watchdog organization’s ratings. 
It is not a pure quintile, but rather a quartile over a minimum value, which is the fifth.  In 
other words, according to the leading nonprofit rating firm mentioned earlier, a score 
under a certain value is a non-functioning organization.  For the capacity variable, this 
minimum is 2.5 and for the efficiency variable, it is 22.5.  Therefore, instead of a median 
value, this coding procedure involved 0-2 ratings as below and 3-4 ratings as above.   
 
It is expected that both composite measures representing growth (capacity) and efficiency 
will be significant in regards to the probability of moving a firm towards ‘Star.’ As in for-
profit studies (Brännback, et al., 2009; Davidsson, Steffens, Fitzsimmons, 2009) measures 
of growth and profit were significant in regards to the probability of moving a firm 
towards ‘Star.’ In line with Resource-Based Theory, Davidsson, Steffens, and 
Fitzsimmons (2009) define a ‘Star’ firm as one that has been able to establish a resource-
based advantage to create superior value for their customers (Peteraf and Barney, 2003; 
Sirmon, Hitt, and Irand, 2007).  In other words, ‘Star’ firms are those firms that have 
sustainable competitive advantage (Davidsson, Steffens, and Fitzsimmons, 2009).  
 
In regards to nonprofit firms, the measures used in the analysis act as equivalents to for-
profit measures used in similar studies (i.e. EBIT, Sales Growth, Employee Growth).  
These equivalent measures have been constructed around the two additional resource 
conditions in the sustainable contributive advantage model: limits to scarcity (efficiency) 
and abilities to scale (capacity).  Therefore, if the results of the composite measures show 
significant predictive power in a firm’s ability to achieve consistent, above average 
performance, there is evidence for the model of sustainable contributive advantage.  
Therefore, the following hypotheses were developed:  
 
H1: Both the Capacity Composite Score and the Efficiency Composite Score (Scenario 1) 
will be significant in their predictive power of a firm moving towards “Star.” 
 
H2: Both the Capacity Composite Rating and the Efficiency Composite Rating (Scenario 
2) will be significant in their predictive power of a firm moving towards “Star.” 
 
Beyond composite measures, which are used mainly in the industry by charity watchdog 
agencies, it is worth ‘unpacking’ these scenarios into their individual variables in order to 
ascertain the robustness of the composite measure results.  For example, if a particular 
financial measure does not show significant predictive power in overall firm movement 
towards ‘Star,’ the makes up of the composite measures may need to be revisited.    
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5.3.2 Additional Financial Metrics 
 
In order to explore the data from numerous perspectives, the composite scores and scales 
were analyzed.  However, four additional analyses (described below), referred to as 
scenarios from this point on, were developed in order to tease out the various 
combinations of growth and efficiency in order to determine if there were any specific or 
variables that did or did not contribute to the results of the analyses of the composite 
scores and ratings analyses (Scenarios 1 and 2 described below).    If limits to scarcity 
(efficiency) and abilities to scale (capacity) were contributors to sustainable contributive 
advantage, it was expected that when comparing composite measures of each that the 
results of the analysis would show movement and similar results to the exploratory study 
described previously.    
Scenario 3: Total Revenue Growth vs. Fundraising Efficiency 
In translating the variables to sustainable contributive advantage (SConA), fundraising 
efficiency represents the venture’s strength and ability of converting social rent.  Social 
rent conversion represents an essential part of the SConA model and the ease, speed, or 
agility at which an organization is able to convert social rents contributes greatly to their 
SConA.  It is expected that both revenue growth and fundraising efficiency will contribute 
significantly to the overall firm movement towards ‘Star.’ 
 
One of the strategies employed by nonprofits to communicate to the public their own 
assessment of success is through fundraising efficiency (Keating and Frumkin, 2003). As 
nonprofits spend money to raise money, fundraising efficiency is calculated by dividing 
fundraising expenses by the total contributions received. In other words, fundraising 
efficiency is a measure of how much a nonprofit spends to generate $1 in charitable 
revenue. In order to evaluate the strategic power of this approach, fundraising efficiency 
was placed as the ‘profit’ variable.  The sum of all reported sources of revenue on the 990 
Form were used as total revenue for the growth measure.  
 
H3: Both Total Revenue Growth and Fundraising Efficiency (Scenario 3) will be 
significant in their predictive power of a firm moving towards “Star.” 
 
Scenario 4: Total Revenue Growth vs. Program Services Profitability 
As nonprofits also generate revenue from sales transactions in order to diversify their 
revenue streams, it makes sense to analyze the financial metrics associated with their 
program services revenue (also known as earned income).  In the case of this particular set 
of nonprofits functioning in the animal welfare industry, their program service revenue 
consists of variations of adoption fees, spay and neuter services, pet cemeteries, etc.  
However, not all of the nonprofits in this dataset reported program service revenue, only 
114 of the 147 reported program service revenue on their 990 forms and therefore only 
114 were analyzed.  The ‘profit’ measure was calculated by dividing total revenue by 
administrative and program expenses only.  The sum of all reported sources of revenue on 
the 990 Form were used as total revenue for the growth measure. 
 
In translating the variables to sustainable contributive advantage (SConA), program 
efficiency represents the nonprofit’s efficiency in creating social value.  The efficiency of 
creating social value largely depends on the venture’s resources and processes dedicated to 
abilities to scale and limits to scarcity.  It speaks directly to the venture’s ability to perform 
when demand is high, while also being able to hold limited liabilities during times of low 
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demand.  Therefore, in order for an organization to grow in terms of revenue, it must first 
be very efficient in creating social value.  If the processes and resources are not in place to 
create efficient social value and a large influx of resources come into the organization 
(perhaps through a grant or bequest), the organization will tend to dedicate the new 
resources to the process without considering how those resources will be replaced (through 
revenue) and ultimately become resource poor.   
 
H4: Both Total Revenue Growth and Program Services Profitability (Scenario 4) will be 
significant in their predictive power of a firm moving towards “Star.” 
 
Scenario 5: Total Asset Growth vs. Total Efficiency Ratio 
The growth of total assets from one year to the next reported on the 990 Form was used for 
the growth measure.  The ‘profit’ measure was calculated by dividing total revenue by 
total expenses for the corresponding year.  While dividing total revenue by total expenses 
does not reflect the true ‘profit’ or effectiveness of the organization, it does provide a 
baseline comparison across the organizations for determining the efficiency of their 
operations and ability to leverage resources. For purposes of clarity, the profit measure 
was renamed ‘efficiency.’ 
 
In terms of SConA, asset growth is indicative of capacity building and also could be 
indicative of resources dedicated to abilities to scale, although it could also represent a 
building of liquid assets for purposes of building capacity at a later date (i.e. capital 
campaign).  As overall assets could be a diverse collection of assets, this particular 
scenario should be considered with caution.   
 
H5: Both Total Asset Growth and Total Efficiency Ratio (Scenario 5) will be significant in 
their predictive power of a firm moving towards “Star.” 
 
5.4 Analysis 
 
Markov chain analysis is an ideal methodological approach to view the behavior of the 
presence of these success sub-populations within the data set for these donative nonprofits.  
The robustness of the Markov chain analysis is in determining if these observed 
movements are due to the current state of the process influences where each venture goes 
next or if the movements are attributed to random chance (Hu and Yue, 2008).  The 
selection of each set of variable does not indicate a causal awareness by a venture’s 
management to accomplish Star success but rather highlights how viewing venture 
movements to Star are indicative of these resource-minded processes. Therefore, the five 
defined scenarios can be viewed as comparable lenses by which to evaluate growth and 
efficiency (profitability).  
 
A Markov chain analysis was used to estimate the transition probabilities between these 
states over a three-year period, following work that analyzed the relationship between 
growth and profitability in entrepreneurial economic ventures (Brännback, et al., 2009).  
Markov models create probabilities in regard to transitions from one point in time to 
another. In order to estimate the transition probabilities, the observed transition path is first 
defined for each organization. As in the previously described exploratory study (see 
Chapter 4) there were four potential outcomes of {efficiency (e), growth (g)}: {Low–Low 
(Poor), Low–High (Growth), High–Low (Efficiency), High–High (Star)} for an 
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organization at time period t and – given a fixed outcome at t – again the same four 
potential outcomes at time t + 1.  
 
 
5.5 Results  
 
A summary of the Markov chain analysis statistics is presented in Table 5 along with 
whether each hypothesis was supported.  The critical values for the Chi Square test, based 
on 48 degrees of freedom, were 65.17, (.05) 60.90 (.10), 55.99 (.20), and 52.62 (.30).  
Given the heterogeneity of the sample and nature of the secondary data, a probability level 
of .30 indicates that the movement of the firms was not due to random chance. The 
number of firms in each scenario is different due to the 990 financial data available in four 
consecutive years.  The exception is Scenario 4, where only 114 out of 150 reported 
program service revenue.   
   
Table 5 
Hypothesis Related Results for Five Scenarios 
Sc. Description N Chi 
Square 
Probability Hypothesis Supported 
Sc. 1 Comp. Capacity vs. Comp. 
Efficiency  (Scores) 
150 52.81 .29 H1 YES 
Sc. 2 Comp. Capacity vs. Comp. 
Efficiency  (Categories) 
150 60.72 .10 H2 YES 
Sc. 3 Revenue Growth vs. Fundraising 
Efficiency 
147 57.03 .18 H3 YES 
Sc. 4 Revenue Growth vs. Program 
Services Profitability 
114 29.14 .98 H4 NO 
Sc. 5 Total Asset Growth vs. Total 
Efficiency Ratio 
147 48.04 .42 H5 YES 
	
 
 
5.5.1 Results for Scenarios 1 and 2 
 
Scenario 2 demonstrated the highest Chi Square and the lowest probability level for 
randomness, which indicates that both H1 and H2 were supported.  Both H1 and H2 are 
supported as Scenario 2 was constructed from the data in Scenario 1.  The significance 
level of the Likelihood and Chi Square statistic indicated that a category a particular 
venture is found in a particular time step is clearly not random and is strongest for two 
composite variable models, Scenario 2, which was expected.  It is not surprising that 
Scenario 2 showed stronger ability to predict movement towards ‘Star’ as the quartiles 
were pre-determined in the data, which lends well to Markov chain analysis.  As Markov 
analysis predicts the movement between discrete buckets and determines state-to-state 
predictions, one category to another, the pairing of the four categories within the data 
lends well to the analysis process and more robust results can be expected.   
 
5.5.2 Scenario 3 – Revenue Growth vs. Fundraising Efficiency 
 
Scenario 3 demonstrated a high Chi Square and a low probability for randomness, which 
indicates that H3 was supported.  This result was highly encouraging towards supporting 
the model for sustainable contributive advantage.  As there is no financial measure for the 
creation of social value, fundraising efficiency acts as a proxy for social value.  
Fundraising efficiency becomes a proxy because it indicates the external recognition of the 
creation of social value by its stakeholders.  In other words, fundraising efficiency 
represents an indicator of the social rent conversion process for nonprofit organizations.  
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The strong results of this particular scenario indicate that the ability to convert social rents 
is a key factor in firms moving towards ‘Star.’ 
 
5.5.3 Scenario 4 – Total Revenue Growth vs. Program Services Profitability 
 
Scenario 4 demonstrated a low Chi Square and a high probability for randomness, which 
indicates that H4 was not supported.  These results could be interpreted as an inappropriate 
match of data points.  This is primarily due to the fact that Revenue Growth and Program 
Services Profitability are collinear in nature.  In other words, as Program Services 
Profitability grows, so does Revenue Growth. Due to the nature of a Markov analysis, 
collinear data points will not produce significant results.  While taking collinear data 
characteristics into consideration, the high randomness of movement may also be an 
indicator that profit derived from program services may not contribute to a nonprofit’s 
overall success.    
 
5.5.4 Scenario 5 – Total Asset Growth vs. Total Efficiency Ratio 
 
Scenario 5 demonstrated a relatively high Chi Square and relatively low probability for 
randomness, which indicates that H5 was supported.  This result was highly encouraging 
towards supporting sustainable contributive advantage in regards to the two factors of 
abilities to scale and limits to scarcity.   
 
Those nonprofits that are ability to build their capacity to contribute (abilities to scale) can 
be identified through their continued growth in assets.  A sufficient level of assets allows 
the nonprofit to grow organically in fulfilling their social mission without relying heavily 
on large outside funders.  Reliance on outside funders, such as government entities or 
foundations, may require the nonprofit to adjust its mission somewhat in order to fulfill the 
stipulations of the granting entity (Carroll and Stater, 2008).  This may lead to ‘mission 
drift’ where the nonprofit loses focus on its primary mission in order to meet the needs of 
stakeholders (Moore, 2000).   
 
As the nonprofit builds its assets, it is equally important for the operation to remain 
efficient in it’s financing of those operations, which is representative of their limits to 
scarcity.  Those organizations that are able to succeed in capacity building while 
simultaneously remaining efficient move to ‘Star’ and are considered to have sustainable 
contributive advantage.   
 
5.5.5 Transition Probability Results 
 
While the results described above provide supporting evidence for sustainable contributive 
advantage, equally supporting of sustainable contributive advantage are the results within 
each scenario in regards to their movement between states.  Results of the Markov chain 
analysis time homogeneous transitions from 2006-2008 are presented for the five data 
scenarios in Tables 6-10.   
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  Table 6 
Scenario 1: Composite Growth Capacity v. Composite Efficiency - Scores 
 
Indicator t Indicator t+1    
 STAR EFFICIENCY GROWTH POOR TOTAL 
      
STAR (St. error) 0.778 (.048) 0.098 (.047) 0.098 (.010) 0.026 (.047) 1.000 
EFFICIENCY 0.361 (.072) 0.389 (.072) 0.083 (.021) 0.167 (.055) 1.000 
GROWTH  0.263 (.065) 0.013 (.021) 0.645 (.067) 0.079 (.072) 1.000 
POOR 0.143 (.044) 0.143 (.014) 0.314 (.048) 0.400 (.047) 1.000 
N = 150; degrees of freedom = 48; Likelihood Ratio = 54.936; Model Probability Level = 0.229; Pearson 
Chi Square (c2) = 52.811; Probability = 0.294 
 
Table 7 
Scenario 2: Composite Growth Capacity v. Composite Efficiency – Ratings (Categories) 
 
Indicator t Indicator t+1    
 STAR EFFICIENCY GROWTH POOR TOTAL 
      
STAR (St. error) 0.529 (.054) 0.230 (.045) 0.138 (.037) 0.103 (.033) 1.000 
EFFICIENCY 0.246 (.053) 0.585 (.061) 0.015 (.015) 0.154 (.045) 1.000 
GROWTH  0.190 (.049) 0.032 (.022) 0.540 (.063) 0.238 (.054) 1.000 
POOR 0.118 (.035) 0.082 (.030) 0.235 (.046) 0.565 (.054) 1.000 
N = 150; degrees of freedom = 48; Likelihood Ratio = 63.665; Model Probability Level = 0.064; Pearson 
Chi Square (c2) = 60.720; Probability = 0.103 
 
Table 8 
Scenario 3: Total Revenue Growth v. Fundraising Efficiency 
 
Indicator t Indicator t+1    
 STAR EFFICIENCY GROWTH POOR TOTAL 
      
STAR (St. error) 0.396 (.067) 0.453 (.068) 0.151 (.049) 0.000 (bounded) 1.000 
EFFICIENCY 0.371 (.051) 0.303 (.049) 0.281 (048) 0.045 (.022) 1.000 
GROWTH  0.043 (.021) 0.234 (.044) 0.309 (.048) 0.415 (.051) 1.000 
POOR 0.017 (.017) 0.172 (.050) 0.431 (.065) 0.379 (.064) 1.000 
N = 147; degrees of freedom = 48; Likelihood Ratio = 64.059; Model Probability Level = 0.060; Pearson 
Chi Square (c2) = 57.029; Probability = 0.175 
 
Table 9 
Scenario 4: Total Revenue Growth v. Program Services Profitability 
 
Indicator t Indicator t+1    
 STAR EFFICIENCY GROWTH POOR TOTAL 
      
STAR (St. error) 0.351 (.063) 0.632 (.064) 0.018 (.017) 0.000 (bounded) 1.000 
EFFICIENCY 0.456 (.066) 0.368 (.064) 0.123 (043) 0.053 (.030) 1.000 
GROWTH  0.053 (.030) 0.088 (.037) 0.368 (.064) 0.491 (.066) 1.000 
POOR 0.035 (.024) 0.018 (.017) 0.596 (.065) 0.351 (.063) 1.000 
N = 114; degrees of freedom = 48; Likelihood Ratio = 28.820; Model Probability Level = 0.987; Pearson 
Chi Square (c2) = 29.140; Probability = 0.986 
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Table 10 
Scenario 5: Total Asset Growth v. Total Efficiency Ratio 
 
Indicator t Indicator t+1    
 STAR EFFICIENCY GROWTH POOR TOTAL 
      
STAR (St. error) 0.618 (.044) 0.122 (.030) 0.041 (.018) 0.220 (.037) 1.000 
EFFICIENCY 0.458 (.102) 0.083 (.056) 0.000 (bounded) 0.458 (.102) 1.000 
GROWTH  0.360 (.096) 0.040 (.039) 0.160 (.073) 0.440 (.099) 1.000 
POOR 0.205 (.037) 0.057 (.021) 0.148 (.032) 0.590 (.045) 1.000 
N = 147; degrees of freedom = 48; Likelihood Ratio = 51.241; Model Probability Level = 0.347; Pearson 
Chi Square (c2) = 48.044; Probability = 0.417 
 
 
Interestingly, nearly all five scenarios showed similar patterns to those observed for 
commercial ventures by both studies described previously (see Chapter 4) Davidsson, 
Steffens, and Fitzsimmons (2009) and Brännback, et al. (2009).  In general, a venture in 
one category is most likely to stay in its category. This can be seen as the probability 
values in the diagonal of the Markov transition matrix.  As Scenario 4 was not an adequate 
model, the results from Scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 5 will be reviewed. 
5.5.5.1 Scenarios 1 and 2 – Path Results  
 
As previously explained, Scenarios 1 and 2 are based on the same data, but Scenario 2 
used the scores in Scenario 1 to create discrete buckets or categories.  As a result, Scenario 
2 provides data more suited to Markov Chain analysis.  As expected, the results of 
Scenario 2 were more robust and will be used for the path results discussion.   
 
The strongest results of the probability of movement between states in Scenario 2 were 
that the nonprofits were most likely to stay in their category (Star: 52.9%, Efficiency: 
58.5%, Growth: 54%, Poor: 56.5%).  In regards to the probability of nonprofits moving 
out of the Poor category, the strongest probable path was to Growth (23.5%).  However, 
the strongest probable path out of the Growth category was back to Poor (23.8%).  These 
results provide some indication that focusing on a growth-oriented strategy (or abilities to 
scale resources) without also incorporating an efficiency-oriented strategy (or limits to 
scarcity resources) may prove detrimental to the nonprofit’s overall performance.  The 
results provide support that both resource conditions in the model for sustainable 
contributive advantage are required.   
5.5.5.2 Scenario 3 
 
Most noticeably is the difference seen in Scenario 3 that reveals an 8x difference in 
movement to Star between an Efficiency oriented nonprofit (37.1%) and a Growth venture 
(4.3%).  This large difference supports the logic of sustainable contributive advantage 
(SConA) as fundraising is a form of social rent conversion and when achieved, provides a 
path to enhanced contributive advantage enjoyed by a Star nonprofit.  When viewed from 
the critical SConA need to manage fundraising efficiency, a Growth nonprofit has a 9x 
greater risk (41.5%) of slipping to a Poor nonprofit than an Efficiency nonprofit (4.5%).  
Thus, for nonprofits pursuing a Growth strategy, the path to either Star or Poor may be 
problematic, as also shown in the results for Scenario 2.  Note that in Scenario 3 the 
Markov chain analysis returned a 0% probability of a Star nonprofit moving to a Poor 
	 81	
nonprofit.  This result should be viewed with care as it indicates only within this particular 
sample population; there were no observed transitions of this type. This does not mean 
they are precluded from occurring, but given the significant n (147) of the model it is 
interesting to note this transition absence.  
5.5.5.3 Scenario 5 
 
Scenario 5 provides somewhat different results. In addition to Efficiency nonprofits being 
more likely to fall to Poor status than Growth nonprofits, Efficiency nonprofits also have 
an equal probability to reach Star status (45.8%).  In Scenario, 5 Poor nonprofits show the 
strongest possibility of staying Poor ventures than in any other Scenario (59%).  As this 
scenario analyzes only total asset growth and not revenue growth, this may be indicative 
of nonprofits simply storing their excess revenues and not pursuing any kind of growth 
strategy in order to move out of a Poor status position.  When considering the results in 
Scenario 5 are based on assets versus efficiency, it demonstrates the challenging 
environment many nonprofits face.  As shown in other Scenarios, the most probable path 
out of a Growth status is a Poor status (44%). If assets are growing and an organization is 
building its capacity (abilities to scale) without simultaneously managing its overall 
efficiency (limits to scarcity) the nonprofit has a high probability of falling to a Poor 
status.  This may be indicative of a nonprofit focusing on building internal resources 
(buildings, land, vehicles, equipment) without either managing public perception or 
controlling costs.    
 
5.6 Limitations of this Extended Analysis 
 
The first limitation of this study focuses on the definition of growth in the social sector.  
While some indications of growth cross both profit and non-profit sectors (employees, 
locations, customers, etc.), some growth measurements are unique to the nonprofit sector.  
One example of such a measurement is program expense growth.  If a nonprofit is growing 
its services to meet demand, it may indicate that a social problem is growing, rather than 
shrinking.  If this is indeed the case, the effectiveness of the organization in achieving its 
social mission may come into question.  Future research efforts would involve studying 
multiple industries in the nonprofit sector and examining whether the trends of movement 
are similar regardless of the state of growth for the social problem.   
 
The heterogeneity of the sample can also be considered a limitation in this analysis, in 
particular with regards to the age and size of the nonprofits in the sample.  Numerous 
studies have found that growth rates diminish with increasing size (Dunne and Hughes, 
1996; Sutton, 1997; Wagner, 1992) and others have found that firm growth tends to also 
decline with the age of the firm (Barron, West, and Hannan, 1994; Sutton, 1997). The 
sample used in this study contained firms from 7-100+ years in age and sizes of revenue 
ranged from $500K to over $30M.  While the robustness of the results indicate supporting 
results of SConA, future research efforts should separate the nonprofits by age and size in 
order to determine whether similar patterns exist.  An additional area of future research in 
regards to the size of nonprofits would be to explore if certain growth strategies are more 
or less successful once a nonprofit reaches a certain size.   
 
An additional limitation in this analysis is the source of the data itself.  This analysis 
examined measures of efficiency (fundraising, program, overall) and used these measures 
as proxies for what is known as profit in the for-profit domain.  In the public view of 
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nonprofits, efficiency indicates that that the majority of donations are going to the ‘cause’ 
and not to administration, overhead or fundraising expenses.  Watchdog organizations 
such as Charity Navigator and Guidestar recommend that no more than 35% of total 
revenue be spent on administration and fundraising costs.  The limitation of this analysis 
relates to examining only the financial metrics reported to the IRS, as there are no clear 
procedures for classifying expenses and no two nonprofits report their expenses in the 
same way (Keating and Frumkin, 2001).  This limitation of the empirical work leads to the 
need to explore these organizations in more detail from a qualitative standpoint.   
 
At the time of this writing and to the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first 
economic and strategy-related quantitative study that has focused specifically on animal 
welfare organizations.  The specific nature of the animal welfare industry lends well to the 
examination of economics and strategy and there remains a rich ground for future research 
in this particular sector.  Unlike some missions of nonprofit organizations that are difficult 
to quantify impacts and outcomes, missions such as education, health, religion and certain 
social services, the animal welfare industry has developed specific metrics for impact 
related to the number of animals’ lived saved and/or spayed and neutered.  While this 
lends well to analysis, as RBT suggests studies on ventures remain within in a single 
industry (Barney and Clark, 2007), the results of this study may be limited and unique to 
this particular sector.    
 
As Markov chain analysis alone does not take into account any causality of movement, 
just the movement itself, a further inquiry is needed in order to make actual observations 
about the environment and resources surrounding these nonprofit organizations.  Future 
research efforts should take a qualitative approach in order to examine how the leaders of 
nonprofits view efficiency and growth within the context of their organization, especially 
in regard to certain resources.   As these empirical examinations lead to indicators of 
SConA, the next step would be to delve deeper into these nonprofit organizations in order 
to ascertain if indicators of SConA exist and if leaders of organizations are in fact, aware 
of theme.  The exploration of leaders’ strategies as it applies to different resources may 
lead to the extrapolation of both successful and unsuccessful strategies, in line with both 
resource-based theory and SConA.   
 
Future research efforts should also include stakeholders outside the organization. In 
looking at existing research, most of the focus on the private funding of the nonprofit 
sector has tended to be on donor motivations (Frumkin and Kim, 2000).  Frumkin and Kim 
(2000) present the question of what determines the fundraising success of nonprofit.  Their 
study of 2,359 nonprofits across numerous industries found that those organizations that 
spend more marketing themselves to the donating public do better at raising contributed 
income.  Additionally, Frumkin and Kim (2000) found that those nonprofits reporting 
more efficient ratios fared no better over time than less efficient appearing organizations.  
Implications of the results from Frumkin and Kim (2000) study may indicate that financial 
metrics related to efficiency may not contribute significantly to the conversion of social 
rent.  Future research efforts should look outside the organization in order to determine 
additional mechanisms at play in the ease of social rent conversion.  
   
 
 
 
 
	 83	
5.7 Discussion of Extended Analysis Results 
 
As all but one of the scenarios constructed in this expanded analysis demonstrate that they 
contribute to overall venture performance, it is highly encouraging in terms of indications 
of sustainable contributive advantage (SCona).  As with many strategy-related theories, 
including resource-based theory and sustainable competitive advantage, direct 
measurement is challenging (Barney and Clark, 2007) and only indications or effects of 
such a phenomenon can be observed.  While SConA cannot be directly observed, 
indications of SConA can be observed and a more qualitative approach would be needed 
in order to ascertain possible causes or processes leading to SConA.  A key point of 
SConA is the venture’s ability to have an advantage over time.  As this analysis examined 
a four-year time period the results are encouraging in that each of the scenarios showed 
significance over multiple time periods.   
 
While not the focus of this study, it is worth noting that all of the hypotheses from the 
exploratory study were supported in the scenarios constructed for the expanded study.  
From the context of a resource-based advantage, Davidsson, Steffens, and Fitzsimmons 
(2009) forwarded that Profit (Efficiency) ventures would have the edge in underlying 
competitive advantage over Growth ventures.  Davidsson, Steffens, and Fitzsimmons 
(2009) attributed this to the resource sparing behavior of Profit ventures and posited that 
Growth ventures are relatively unlikely to build resource advantages in achieving superior 
performance. The results of this study concurred with the results of Davidsson, Steffens, 
and Fitzsimmons (2009) in that Efficiency nonprofits were more likely to be resilient to 
economic distress than Growth nonprofits.  Additionally, Efficiency nonprofits were less 
likely to fall to a Poor status due to their resource acquiring behavior.   
 
Due to the additional requirements of SConA, any nonprofit that finds itself in the Poor 
category may be tempted to employ a rapid growth scenario in order to rapidly capture 
more social value than other competitors in their category. This resource consuming 
process is doubly tempting to the nonprofit because the lag of social rent conversion that is 
delayed to the next fundraising cycle is promoted by the need to appear contributive in 
addressing the social need as a desirable outcome rather than efficiency.  However, the 
results of this study provide caution to nonprofits in using this strategy.   
 
As the results of this study indicate, when a nonprofit is in a state of growth, perhaps 
through the receipt of a large influx of money from a grant or donor, they then need to 
quickly achieve a state of profitability in order to remain sustainable.  If a nonprofit 
expands its capacity using the influx of resources, it must also then quickly replace their 
resources with new resources (i.e. revenue).  The unfortunate reality is that many nonprofit 
managers respond to an increase in income with an equal increase in social value creation 
efforts.  The results of this study lend support towards the notion that nonprofits should 
focus on the efficiency or profitability of their social value creation efforts simultaneously, 
if not first and foremost.   
 
This study provides encouragement that resources directed towards limits to scarcity, 
(resources that allow a venture to keep scarce resources away from others) and abilities to 
scale (resources that allow the venture to grow its capacity to create social value) 
contribute significantly to overall performance.  While the conditions are highly linked, a 
nonprofit cannot grow sustainably without efficiency and a nonprofit cannot differentiate 
itself without growing to meet demands.  
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6 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This thesis attempts to fill gaps in both a theoretical basis and an operational and strategic 
understanding in the areas of social ventures, social entrepreneurship and nonprofit 
business models.  This thesis also attempts to bridge the gap in economic theory and 
strategy between commercial and social ventures.  More specifically, this thesis explores 
sustainable competitive advantage from a resource-based theory basis and explores how it 
may be applied to the non-economic market environment of nonprofit organizations and 
social ventures.  From these known frameworks, a new model was proposed that a social 
value-orientation of sustainable competitive advantage, called sustainable contributive 
advantage, provides a more realistic depiction of what is necessary in order for a social 
venture to perform better than its competitors over time.  What follows is a discussion of 
the theoretical contributions as well as the research questions posed in this study.  The 
discussion concludes with implications for the nonprofit industry derived from the results 
of the study as well as future research paths that should be taken in order to further explore 
and develop the theory of sustainable contributive advantage.    
  
6.1 Theoretical Contributions  
 
This thesis examined the existing theory of RBT and several concepts in economics within 
the context of social ventures.  A new model and new concepts were developed, based on 
existing models and concepts, and were explored and tested within a social venture 
context.  This model, called sustainable contributive advantage (SConA), proposed an 
explanation of a social venture’s ability to demonstrate consistently superior performance.  
This model included the new concepts of limits to scarcity, abilities to scale, and social 
rent.   Limits to scarcity and abilities to scale were presented as resource conditions that 
were required for consistently superior performance by a social venture.  Social rent, based 
on the existing concept of economic rent, was explored as mechanism that functioned 
within the SConA model. 
 
The theoretical contributions provided in this thesis fill several gaps in economic, strategy, 
entrepreneurship, and social venture related fields of research.  As this thesis borrowed 
from and built upon existing theory in each of these fields, the theoretical contribution 
contributes to each field as well.  What makes these contributions particularly unique is 
the simultaneous use of concepts from each of these fields in constructing SConA.  
 
From an economic standpoint, it was previously reviewed that the standard, profit-driven 
economic model does not apply well to the distinctive nonmarket environment of 
nonprofit organizations (Helmig, Jegers, and Lapsley, 2004).  There are several reasons for 
this disconnection, which were reviewed in detail (see Section 2.2.2).  These reasons 
included the nondistribution constraint, the source of revenues nonprofits received as 
being other than customers, and the value created by nonprofits as being beyond financial 
value.  Due to these factors, nonprofits could not be analyzed from the same starting point 
as for-profits (Steinberg, 2006). However, this study demonstrated that concepts based in 
economic theory were applicable if adjustments were made and new concepts introduced.   
 
Ventures, both social and commercial in nature, produce several outputs such as products, 
services, assets, failure, loss, benefit and value (Morris, Lewis, and Sexton, 1994).  The 
resources within a venture, whether the venture be socially oriented or not, serve its 
purpose similarly regardless of the context; resources are used to turn inputs into outputs.  
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It can be assumed that all ventures work to increase the efficiency of its processes.  This 
process was described in this study as the process of creating and capturing value. As the 
essence of a social mission is to provide services to those who cannot pay, the economic 
process was demonstrated as distorted in social ventures, in particular.   
 
Utilizing the concept of social rent, an economic view of creating and capturing social 
value became a logical economic discussion within the social venture framework.  The 
study demonstrated that resources contributing to the process of social value creation and 
capture must be considered separately from those resources contributing to the process of 
economic value creation and capture.  While the end result of social value capture is 
economic value, social rent was shown as the bridge within a distorted economic process.  
The social rent was shown as “illiquid” until resources were used to convert the social rent 
into some economic form.  The social rent must be “priced” and converted.  This concept 
was demonstrated as a mechanism within the overall sustainable contributive advantage 
model.   
 
From a strategy related perspective, this concept of social rent provided a critical 
operational link to the model of SConA that allowed the model to work.  It represented the 
conversion process of resources that were strictly social in nature to be converted into 
those that were economic.  The model for sustainable contributive advantage (SConA) 
also included the concept of sustainable competitive advantage (SCA).  It was proposed 
that commercial ventures are required to remain competitive, but social ventures are 
required to remain contributive.  Using the established Peteraf (1993) model for SCA, the 
additional resource conditions required for SConA allowed concepts from strategy, 
specifically within the realm of RBT, to be applied in a social realm. As with many 
strategic theories, including resource-based theory and sustainable competitive advantage, 
direct measurement is challenging (Barney and Clark, 2007) and only indications or 
effects of such a phenomenon can be observed.   
 
This application of RBT to a social venture context has been attempted before (see 
Meyskens, Robb-Post, Stamp, Carsrud, Reynold, 2010). However, this study limited itself 
to identifying correlated relationships among resource conditions and failed to connect 
these relationships to overall venture performance.  The study presented here 
accomplished the connection of resource conditions and identified which conditions 
significantly contributed to overall venture performance.  
 
This study examined several individual economic factors and a dimension-less index as 
independent variables to test this new proposed model for SConA. The choice of these 
independent variables were posited to reveal if the additional resource conditions of 
abilities to scale and limits to scarcity contribute to dependent measures of overall, above-
average and consistent performance. These independent variables were all found to 
provide various levels of support to the model and suggested that the addition of SConA to 
the foundational frameworks of resource-based theory has validity as an appropriate way 
to view resource strategy in a non-profit environment.  This support is important to the 
overall theoretical framework of resource-base theory as SConA was derived as a purely 
economic model that included a strategy that may or may not lead to direct economic 
returns; i.e. social value creation. Thus, the development of SConA developed in this study 
contributes to the field and helps to expand the useful domain that resource-based theory 
can be applied.  
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The model for SConA also contributed to the field of entrepreneurship research as the 
model provides a path for both researchers and social entrepreneurs to consider their 
resource conditions from an overall framework.  The goal of the social entrepreneur or 
venture would be to form an economic transaction by which operational processes are 
created and put in place.  These processes, when considered using an SConA framework, 
facilitate and promote the gathering of economic resources in a way that increases the 
ability of the entrepreneur to predict its income and thereby, run more effective operations.  
The SConA model also promotes a continuous cycling of value capture and value creation 
in a sustainable way.  The SConA model suggests that internal operations should allow for 
the organization to capture more value than it is creating in order for the venture to achieve 
at least marginal growth when compared to competitors.         
  
Although the research agenda regarding social ventures has expanded significantly over 
the last decade, the theoretical challenges remain quite severe and no single theory has 
come to dominate the field (Anheier and Salamon, 2006).  This study presented a model 
that encompassed the resource-based challenges of social ventures when pursuing a social 
and economic strategy.  In viewing the SConA model, social and commercial ventures 
were shown to be more similar than different in their management of resources, as shown 
in the Markov Chain analyses comparisons to similar for-profit studies.  However, it was 
also found that the more focused a venture’s strategy becomes on the creation of social 
value, the more critical the conditions of SConA and the social rent process become.   
 
This thesis also provided an understanding about the resource conditions surrounding the 
consistently superior performance of a social venture.  The development of the SConA 
model began with broad questions but the model and the new concepts were developed in 
such a way as to be empirically tested.  The results of the empirical tests provided strong 
support for the model for sustainable contributive advantage however; further testing 
suggestions will be developed along with possible paths for determining the predictive 
power of the model.   
 
6.2 Research Questions 
 
When the thesis was introduced (see Chapter 1) three research questions were posed as the 
focus of the thesis.  Each of these three research questions will be reviewed.   
 
1. Can (and should) resource-based theory be applied to social ventures?  
 
The results of the thesis found that resource-based theory (RBT) can be applied to social 
ventures; however, adjustments to the existing model of competitive advantage within 
resource-based theory are necessary.  These adjustments are necessary due to the non-
economic market environment in which social ventures operate.  While social ventures 
deviate from the standard economic model of the firm, resource-based theory allows for 
examination of the internal resources of the nonprofit, as shown in this study.  
 
In using RBT as a framework for this thesis, it was demonstrated that social and 
commercial ventures are not so distinct from each other, but are in fact similar in many of 
their challenges, decisions, and resource management.  Social ventures must deal with the 
same challenges of competition that a commercial venture would.  However, when an 
organization designs its value creating strategies around the creation of social value (rather 
than economic), it must then deal with an additional step in the value creating and 
	 87	
capturing process.  As mentioned earlier, the differences between social and commercial 
ventures are on a continuum.  At one end, the commercial venture deals strictly with 
competition-based economic and market forces.  At the other end, the social venture deals 
with social value oriented forces that behave quite differently.   
 
“It is generally acknowledged that nonprofits lack direct control over resource flows are in 
an especially resource-dependent position relative to other types of organizations” 
(Gronbjerg, 1991; Stone and Brush, 1996; Stone, Bigelow and Crittenden, 408). The 
unique resource-depending environment facing social ventures requires the consideration 
in the development of a new social venture-related model using RBT as a theory lens.  
This thesis provides support that a resource-based theory approach is indeed appropriate 
across the continuum of social and commercial ventures, but adjustments must be made.    
 
2. Does sustainable competitive advantage exist for social ventures and what could an 
adjusted model, taking the nonmarket effects within the nonprofit sector into account, tell 
researchers about what is happening in and around social ventures?   
 
Sustainable competitive advantage exists for social ventures, but it requires the 
consideration of the social venture’s ability to contribute to its social mission and its 
ability to translate the impact on the venture’s social mission into resources back to the 
venture.  Social ventures must remain competitive and be in control of the four 
cornerstones of sustainable competitive advantage (Peteraf, 1997; see Chapter 3), but they 
must also account for the resource conditions that are directly related to the social mission 
and nonmarket/social environment.  
 
The flow of resources to a social venture depends on the quality and relevance of their 
mission and the capacity to deliver value coupled with their ability to convince potential 
donors of the same (Keating and Frumpkin, 2001).  This ability was presented in this study 
as ‘social rent conversion.’  Social rent enables researchers to view social ventures in a 
way that connects the venture’s ability to create and capture value.  It also provides a 
pathway towards examining the specific strategies a social venture may use to create 
social rents versus their strategy for converting social rents.  In particular, it allows the 
examination of the whether the strategy considers these strategies separately in terms of 
the resources it allocates towards each process.   
 
The more socially focused the venture is, the more critical social rent conversion becomes 
in order to maintain a leadership status in their industry.  As economic conditions in the 
market go down, social and commercial ventures face somewhat opposite challenges.  In 
poor economic conditions, social ventures typically face a higher demand for services and 
commercial ventures typically face a lower demand for services.  A commercial venture is 
able to respond to economic change by choosing the strategy to lower prices and/or 
lowering expenses.  A commercial venture is not expected to lower prices to help the 
community they serve (although some may choose to do so as a strategy in line with social 
responsibility or to capture market share from competitors).  A social venture, however, is 
typically expected to lower their prices (or continue serving for free) in the face of 
increased demand and increased costs. This nonmarket reality makes the social rent 
conversion process a critical addition to maintaining an advantage in their industry.  
 
3. What does a sustainable competitive advantage model look like for social ventures?  
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The model for sustainable competitive advantage (SCA) is included within the model 
proposed in this study, which is sustainable contributive advantage (SConA).  While a 
social venture must achieve SCA, it must also achieve the two additional resource 
conditions of abilities to scale and limits to scarcity.  These two additional conditions 
create the model of sustainable contributive advantage.  A venture has sustainable 
contributive advantage (SConA) if it is able to consistently create more social value than 
the marginal contributor in its social problem area.  A social venture is not simply judged 
on the funding sources they retain (although that may be an indicator of SConA), they are 
judged primarily on their ability to contribute to the solution of a social problem.   
 
This thesis developed and empirically tested the model for sustainable contributive 
advantage.  As the concept of social rent and social conversion build on top of existing 
economic theories, SConA also builds on existing strategy theory in order to provide 
recommendations and action plans for nonprofits to consider.   
 
The empirical examination and exploration of SConA employed the use of Markov chain 
analysis.  The Markov chain analysis lends itself well to the exploration of sustainable 
contributive advantage in that it represents categorical movement over a period of four 
years and examines relative performance compared to the marginal contributor.  
Sustainable contributive advantage is defined as a venture that is able to consistently create 
more social value than the marginal contributor in its social problem area.  The analysis of 
nearly 150 ventures over a four-year time period helped to target various performance 
measures that contribute to an organization’s overall ability to achieve SConA. 
 
In considering the data set used for analysis, the specific nature of the animal welfare 
industry lends well to the examination of economics and strategy due to the animal welfare 
industry’s specific metrics for impact.  While this lends well to the analysis process, as 
RBT suggests studies on ventures remain within in a single industry (Barney and Clark, 
2007), the results of this thesis may be limited and unique to this particular sector.   This 
will be further discussed in the future research paths.  
	
6.3 Implications for the Nonprofit Industry from a Sustainable Contributive 
Advantage Framework 
 
Most nonprofits are required to file the IRS 990 form on an annual basis.  This reported 
information was used for the data in this study.  Those not required to file are religious 
organizations and those nonprofits with less than $25,000 in annual revenue.  The 
challenges facing nonprofits in regards to these forms are numerous, specifically in 
regards to how nonprofits categorize expenses.  In response to stakeholder concerns 
surrounding efficiency, the field of nonprofit management has become pressured to tighten 
financial control and operations (Bryson, 1996; Kearns, 1996; Pappas, 1995; Letts, Ryan, 
and Grossman, 1999; Frumkin and Kim, 2000).   
 
Commonly in the industry, similar nonprofits compete by touting a better efficiency ratio 
highlighting low administrative and fundraising costs (Frumkin and Kim, 2000).  
However, research has shown that many nonprofits lack the tools or knowledge to 
correctly report their cost types and little practical guidance exists (Wilson, Hay and 
Kattelus, 1999).  The IRS only has a small enforcement office that has struggled to keep 
up with the explosive growth of nonprofits (Gaul and Borowski, 1993; Greene and 
Williams, 1995).  As previously described as a limitation of this study, the reported 
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financial measures and the pressure to report highly efficient numbers has effects on 
research efforts as well as on the industry itself.  
 
As nonprofits position themselves as leaner and more efficient, there are growing concerns 
about the effects of the ‘less is more’ approach to nonprofit management.  A dominant 
challenge facing nonprofits is the need to move from amateur administration to 
professional management and is particularly significant in areas of fundraising (Helmig, 
Jegers, and Lapsley, 2004).  Capacity building and transactional engine building, key 
requirements for SConA, can occur simultaneously.  However, many nonprofits chose not 
to engage in both simultaneously, either due to the high probability of public retribution or 
a simple lack of business skills by the nonprofit leaders.   
 
This lack of business skills is somewhat due to a public policy flaw that discourages 
salaries that meet the market value of a similar position in the for-profit market.  The 
median 2006 compensation for the leaders of the United States’ largest nonprofits was 
$315,969, about seven times less than the $2.4M median salary for CEOs of the 500 
largest United States companies (Pallotta, 2008). As a result, highly talented leaders often 
find themselves transitioning into the for-profit market as it is far less expensive for them 
earn seven times more money and simply donate that difference back to the charity of their 
choice (Pallotta, 2008).  
 
The IRS penalizes nonprofits by demanding that training costs for staff members of 
nonprofit organizations fall under the administration line item for expenses.  This 
challenge coupled with substantially lower salaries for those who work in nonprofits when 
compared to their for-profit counter parts (Pallotta, 2008) cripple the industry from both 
sides.  Nonprofit organizations hesitate to educate and train their staff and the salary 
standards prevent nonprofits from bringing in qualified and professional staff.  It was 
found from a sample of large and medium sized nonprofits in the United States that about 
one third of nonprofits do not employ staff with an accounting education (Froelich, 
Knoepfle, and Pollack, 2000, 245).  If nonprofits are to succeed in meeting the demands of 
society where markets and governments fail, examining the issues of training and salary 
standards may be an area of future consideration by the industry.   
 
An additional concern of growing attention is recent research that demonstrates that due to 
personal values and considerations, many individuals do not consider a nonprofit’s 
financial condition and performance in making their contribution decisions (Keating and 
Frumpkin, 2001; Gordon and Khumawala, 1999). In fact, Keating and Frumpkin’s (2001) 
study revealed that nonprofits with the most efficiency, as reported to the IRS, 
demonstrated no better success than those with less efficiency.  Further, they found 
nonprofits that spend more on fundraising or marketing tend to have more success at 
raising contributed income than those nonprofits that spend less.  These findings support 
the model for sustainable contributive advantage (SConA) as one of the keys to SCA is the 
conversion of social rent.  It encourages researchers to explore mechanisms relating to 
donor motivations in order to further explore nonprofits’ processes to dedicating resources 
to the conversion process of social rent. 
 
If nonprofits are to survive and grow, they need to be not only able to, but also encouraged 
to attract as well as retain more capital.  Nonprofit managers are constantly pressured by 
stakeholders to increase the scope of their social impact.  However, they should also be 
pressured to increase its profitability.  Nonprofits, in general, are extremely under 
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capitalized and often struggle to provide such services (Calabrese, forthcoming).  
According to the Nonprofit Finance Fund, in 2009 over 60% of nonprofits in the United 
States lacked reserves in excess of three months of operating expenses (Calabrese, 
forthcoming).   
 
If the nonprofit fails to replace its new revenue and simply expend every dollar as it comes 
in to expand capacity or programs or services without keeping profit in mind, they will 
find themselves unable to sustain operations.  This result was also supported by the results 
in this study that demonstrated Growth ventures demonstrated a highly probable path to 
Poor status. This result may be due to the public view on nonprofit funding, from a policy 
standpoint as well as public opinion.  When a dollar is donated to a cause, the donor 
largely expects that dollar to go to work towards the cause immediately, as demonstrated 
in the American Red Cross 9/11 example described previously.   
 
Retained earnings and operating margins are, in a sense, frowned upon in the majority of 
nonprofits.  However, nonprofits must invest in building transactional engines that bring in 
revenue in order to remain sustainable.  Unfortunately, if the capacity for programs is 
expanded and they are not able to fill in the costs of those new programs with new 
revenue, they will not be able to sustain operations.  As it relates to this study, results 
confirmed that the ability of a social venture to remain an Efficiency venture decreased the 
probability of reaching a Poor status. 
 
The regulations, public perceptions, and watchdog recommendations implied on 
nonprofits are, in a sense, limiting the potential of the donative nonprofit model.  
Stakeholders must be educated on the true economic models driving nonprofit success 
(sustainable contributive advantage) and not only support, but also publically defend the 
strategic decisions to focus on profitability and retained earnings.   
 
Future research in the framework presented here suggests examining the working capital 
and the fundraising efficiency ratios of a nonprofit to determine if they are truly a Star 
venture.  As the working capital ratio indicates the ability to grow in the face of an 
economic downturn (abilities to scale) and the fundraising efficiency ratio would shed 
some light as to how effectively they are able to convert their social rents (limits to 
scarcity); it would be interesting to explore how these measures would be able to predict 
social venture performance.     
	
6.4 Future Research Paths  
 
Previous research has determined that executive directors of social ventures have a strong 
impact on the activities and strategies of the organization and stress the critical roles of 
executive directors (Heimovics, Herman, and Jurkiewicz, 1995).  Additionally, the role of 
executive directors was found to be especially critical in terms of the implementation of 
strategy (Nutt, 1986, 1987, 1989).  An exploration of how executive directors make 
strategic decisions from a qualitative standpoint would be a logical next step in the 
exploration of sustainable contributive advantage (SConA).  It would additionally be 
worthwhile to explore whether social ventures with both donative and commercial 
business models considered the strategies separately or together in terms of the 
organization’s resource allocation process.  
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In addition to executive directors, governance plays an important role in social ventures, 
particularly boards of directors (Coombes, Morris, Allen, and Webb, 2011) and there have 
been many studies surrounding the characteristics of board members, board activities, 
formal planning practices of board members, and the affect of boards on nonprofit 
performance (Cornforth, 2001; Brown, 2005; Callen, Klein, Tinkelman, 2010; Coombes, 
Morris, Allen, and Webb, 2011).  In Fletcher’s (1992) study, a survey of 318 nonprofit 
executive directors, found that one of the key characteristics executive directors 
considered in a good board member is participation in all strategic planning.  The level of 
board involvement in strategic planning and its affect on the social venture’s ability to 
maintain contributive advantage is an area worth exploring. 
 
Previous research has shown the limitations of incremental budgeting (Behn, 1985; Elmer 
and Morrill, 2010) and yet, it remains the primary way many nonprofits set budgets every 
year due to its ease, political fairness to departments in organizations, and its appearance 
of being ethical (Behn, 1985).  Incremental budgeting is the simplest method and takes the 
least intellectual effort to manage (Behn, 1985) and creates the least strife in the 
organization, as it becomes a routine process.  Institutional theory has been used to explain 
many practices such as this in regards to nonprofits (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; 
Christensen and Molin, 1995).  The basic finding is that nonprofits tend to do things the 
way they do things because they have always done them that way.    
 
However, as nonprofits take on more commercial activities and face increased 
competition, incremental budgeting procedures do not take market effects into account and 
may in fact, limit these organizations from opportunities to grow or bring in more revenue.  
“Organizations must be responsive to external demands and expectations in order to 
survive” (Helmig, Jegers, and Lapsley, 2004, 107), which would include their 
development of strategic plans and budgets.   
 
Exploring how decisions regarding resources are made as it relates to SConA would shed 
light on the model’s ability to guide strategy.  Decisions could be targeted at either gaining 
from the economic market conditions (left-hand side of sustainable contributive advantage 
model) or gaining from the social market conditions (right-hand side of contributive 
advantage model).  A dynamic budget procedure would allow the organization to consider 
which programs, departments, services or products are aligned closest to achieving the 
resource conditions required for sustainable contributive advantage and how to allocate 
existing resources into building those conditions (i.e. reputation, inimitability, culture, 
response to demand, social rent conversion).   
 
Research in the area of social ventures purports that cooperative strategies are associated 
with financial stability as well as associated with increases in inter-organizational power 
(Stone, Bigelow, and Crittenden, 1999).  Research has also shown that partnerships in the 
nonprofit sector are correlated with high levels of innovation (Meyskens, Robb-Post, 
Stamp, Carsrud, and Reynolds, 2010), however the effect of partnerships on long term 
superior performance was not explored in this thesis.  Cooperative strategies of nonprofits 
are often involved with issues that cannot be solved by a single organization (Alter, 2006). 
Further research should explore how partnerships impact SConA, specifically in terms of 
the venture’s ability to scale.   
 
Future research efforts may also center on examining and comparing product or service 
offerings in commercial and social ventures during both good and bad economic 
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conditions.  Examining whether the commercial strategies of nonprofit ventures 
experience the same supply and demand effects as their for-profit counterparts would be a 
study worth exploring.  This thesis analyzed trends of financial reports between the years 
2005 and 2008. The United States suffered a severe economic recession between late 2008 
and 2010, which offers an opportunity to explore responses to these economic changes.  
Based on the research conducted in this thesis, it is posited that the effects would be 
different between both types of ventures even if they both employed a commercial 
strategy.  Along that same line of research, it would be worthwhile to explore nonprofits’ 
socially related service supply and demand effects and compare that to services provided 
by the for-profit sector.  Here, it is posited that the differences would be much more 
extreme and lend further support towards the model for sustainable contributive advantage 
as well as inform practioners of the most successful resource-based strategies.   
 
Some possible additional explorations may include comparing for-profit and nonprofit 
hospitals or schools, as these types of organizations have shown a recent increase in 
converting from nonprofit to for-profit status (Dees and Anderson, 2003). Suggested 
metrics may include changes in program or service related revenue, human resource 
related costs, customer service satisfaction (or donor satisfaction), working capital or 
scope of services. Examining how each type of venture responds to economic conditions 
and how those responses affect the overall stability of the venture may provide insights as 
to how each type of venture may benefit from different resource related strategies in line 
with SCA and SConA.  It is equally important that the original four cornerstones of SCA 
by Peteraf (1993) are not ignored. The ability to scale directly contributes, through social 
rent conversion, to the social venture’s ex ante limits to competition as the limits to 
scarcity contribute, through social rent conversion, to the social venture’s ex post limits to 
competition.   
 
It is with the generation and conversion of social rents that the true nature of a social 
venture can presents itself.  Using the SConA model, relationships between such factors as 
a venture’s capacity (or efficiency) for creating social value versus their fundraising 
efficiency may be explored.  Additionally to be explored could be the degree of integration 
between program and fundraising departments and the effect of the level of integration on 
fundraising efficiency.  An additional area of research is the relationship between donor 
satisfaction, donor awareness, and either program or fundraising efficiency.  SConA would 
suggest that when social rent conversion is high (i.e. efficient fundraising), the donor 
awareness would also be high as well as the integration of program related departments 
and fundraising departments.   
 
The model for SConA presents a research framework for analyzing social ventures from 
an external perspective that circumnavigates the financial performance analysis challenges 
stated previously.  While this approach does not rely strictly on financial metrics for 
analysis, future research efforts should make connections between the model presented 
and the financial stability and service growth of social ventures. The concept of growth in 
a social venture relates directly to their capacity to contribute (ability to scale).  As the 
goal of a social venture is to create value, the concept of growth relates directly to the 
ability to create more social value and greater social impact. Similarly, the concept of 
profit in a social venture relates directly to their efficiency of contribution (limits to 
scarcity).  Profitability becomes the contributive efficiency of the venture in its ability to 
run and manage operations.  An analysis linking various metrics that indicate a social 
venture’s capacity versus efficiency would be a first step towards an empirical test of 
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SConA.  This may include testing the propositions listed previously or examining 
relationships between an organization’s working capital, contributed revenue growth, 
fundraising efficiency ratios, assets, or program expense growth.   
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
In attempting to fill the gaps in and theoretical approaches to studying social ventures and 
what factors contribute to social venture success, a model for sustainable contributive 
advantage was posited as a way to apply existing theories in the non-economic market 
environments social ventures operate in.  Social ventures are distinct from commercial 
ventures in that they face a non-distribution constraint (Hannsman, 1980) as well as the 
reality that their revenues come from sources other than direct consumers (Moore, 2000).  
 
Using a resource-based theory approach allowed the development of a way of examining 
social ventures within their unique context and beyond financial measures.  It allowed for 
an exclusive examination of internal processes used in social ventures.  Due to the fact that 
social ventures face unique challenges, as they are not simply judged on the economic 
resources they retain, additional resources strategies must be developed.  These additional 
resource strategies are reflected in their ability to create and convert social value into 
economic value. 
 
In looking at how social ventures translate their social value into economic value, the 
concept of social rent was reviewed and defined as a perceived benefit or excess residual 
social value that can be converted into a realized monetized value (Robb-Post, Stamp, 
Carsrud, and Reynolds 2010).  Social rent was presented as distinct from social value or 
social impact in that it reflects the potential economic value the social venture can transact.  
A social rent is in some sense illiquid, in that processes and resources must be used in 
order to convert the social rent into some economic form. 
 
Integrating the concepts from resource-based theory and economics along side the unique 
environment social ventures operate in led to the proposed model for sustainable 
contributive advantage, which includes Peteraf’s (1997) existing model for sustainable 
competitive advantage.  Sustainable contributive advantage was defined as a venture’s 
ability to consistently create more social value than the marginal contributor in its social 
problem area.  A model for sustainable contributive advantage was presented along with 
two additional resource conditions social ventures must pursue in order to maintain 
advantage.  These were presented as limits to scarcity and abilities to scale.    
 
Within sustainable contributive advantage is the resource condition of limits to scarcity. 
Resources that contribute to limits to scarcity, in a sense, are those resources that compel 
donors to contribute to the organization over all other similar organizations.  It is those 
resources that cause the donor to choose an organization first, out of all of their charitable 
giving activities.   
 
Similar to the concept of ex post limits to competition, where resources are focused on 
creating isolating mechanisms or those things that preserve economic rents for an 
organization, limits to scarcity are those isolating mechanisms that preserve social rents 
for an organization.  These social rents are operationalized from those resources dedicated 
to differentiating the social value created by an organization.  From an overall standpoint, 
organizations should focus their resources towards building a protection from scarcity, or a 
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protection from other organizations also providing similar social value by differentiating 
itself from its competition.  
 
Within sustainable contributive advantage is also the resource condition of abilities to 
scale. Resources that contribute to abilities to scale, in a sense, are those resources that 
allow the organization to consistently contribute more to a social mission than other 
similar organizations.  It is those resources that fulfill the conditions of SConA that enable 
consistent growth and the ability of the organization to meet growing demand for social 
value creation.   
 
Similar to the concept of ex ante limits to competition, where resources are focused on 
investments made for future economic gain; abilities to scale are those resources that are 
investments made for future social value creation.   
 
Each of the additional resources conditions in sustainable contributive advantage, limits to 
scarcity and abilities to scale, can be considered as a venture’s ability to be efficient and 
build capacity, respectively.  While non-profit social ventures do not record profit, they do 
report metrics to the IRS that allow for various constructions of efficiency measures.  
These metrics can also provide various constructions of growth, or capacity building.  
Various combinations of metrics were constructed into scenarios representing a venture’s 
level of efficiency and capacity, as these may be indicators of sustainable contributive 
advantage.   
 
It was first explored as to whether independent variables specified from the index 
measures for efficiency and capacity contributed significantly to dependent variables for 
overall venture performance.  The results were encouraging and various additional 
combinations representing efficiency and capacity were developed and tested using 
Markov chain analysis.  The expanded analysis results were equally encouraging and 
provided indication that the model for sustainable contributive advantage is a valid model 
worthy of continued examination.   
 
Additional results from the expanded analysis provided some insight as to the various 
tendencies of ventures to move from states defined as Poor, Efficiency, Growth and Star.  
The most significant finding matched the findings of similar studies conducted on 
commercial ventures (Davidsson, Steffens, Fitzimmons, 2009; Brännback, Carsrud, 
Renko, Östermark, Aaltonen and Kiviluoto, 2009). The results of the study presented here 
found that ventures that primarily demonstrated efficiency were less likely to fall to a Poor 
status than ventures that primarily demonstrated growth.  These results were additionally 
supportive of the model for sustainable contributive advantage as they suggest that social 
ventures must develop resource conditions of both efficiency (limits to scarcity) and 
capacity (abilities to scale).    
 
Studying the presence (or lack of presence) of the resource conditions proposed in this 
study required for social venture success provides a model for sustainable contributive 
advantage that holds not only predictive power, but managerial power as well. The model 
provides a practical framework to guide leaders of social ventures toward best practices, 
better systems, and newly framed objectives that ultimately lead the organization to 
sustainable contributive advantage.  It can also represent a decision framework that allows 
leaders of social ventures to look at the impact of their resource acquisition strategies from 
both a resource level and a firm level.  Additionally, sustainable contributive advantage 
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provides a framework within which to view social ventures differently, yet still utilizing 
existing economics and strategy, specifically stemming from resource-based theory.  
 
Similar to the model for sustainable competitive advantage (SCA), the model for 
sustainable contributive advantage (SConA) can be used as a tool to empower social 
ventures and the leaders of social ventures to run more efficient and powerful ventures in 
order to address social issues.  As a social venture considers its value creation strategy and 
how to solve a social problem, it must equally consider a transactional framework to 
capture back the resources it expends to create it.  This has been presented here within the 
model of SConA while also exploring the concept of social rent. The responsibility of the 
venture to ensure their social rents are convertible is a shift in perspective for some social 
ventures, but it is a healthy and necessary shift to assure long-term sustainability of such 
ventures.   
 
It is through creating and managing transactions in the marketplace that allows for the 
venture to create more value than they capture from the market.  This is the case whether 
the venture be socially oriented or not, as demonstrated with a continuum-based approach 
to looking at ventures.  Examining powerful and struggling social ventures, whether they 
be nascent or established social ventures, in the context of the sustainable contributive 
advantage model can uncover tools, strategies, and practices that can further enable the 
social entrepreneur and leaders of social ventures.  
 
In line with creating abilities to scale, social ventures should be encouraged to bring in 
more revenue than they need to operate, not just what they need to operate.  Society has 
placed the world’s most demanding and toughest problems in the laps on social ventures to 
solve.  Social ventures should be encouraged to raise enough revenue to invest in 
infrastructure such as cutting edge technology, highly talented and educated staff, and 
effective marketing campaigns.  In a sense, efficiency (or profit) levels should be 
encouraged, not by cutting costs, but by bringing in more revenue.  If social ventures are 
expected to solve the world’s most complex problems, they should also be expected to be 
able to garner the best resources to support that.   
 
From a sustainable contributive advantage research standpoint, new ways to examine 
limits to scarcity other than efficiency ratios need to be explored.  Additionally, the public 
and government expectations of nonprofits needs to shift in order for nonprofits to 
dedicate more of their resources towards abilities to scale. From a sustainable contributive 
advantage practitioner standpoint, social rent provides a way for both the mission-driven 
and the profit-driven individual to have a bottom-line discussion on strategy.  Focusing on 
the potential for social rent conversion within the development of any social value creating 
activity should also increase overall donor satisfaction.  Future studies on this aspect of 
nonprofits are an area worthy of exploration.  This model for sustainable contributive 
advantage frames the social venture in a new light from all perspectives.  It provides a path 
to further research, higher quality management, more engaged donors, greater resource 
utilization, more effective organizations, and ultimately providing solutions to society’s 
greatest needs.   
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  Equine	  Rescue 1997 0.4611 0.225 0.1641 1.181 1.145 1.2909 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Greater	  Androscoggin	  Humane	  Society 1885 -­‐0.4683 0.3014 -­‐0.4919 1.7016 1.8205 0.7382 Profit Star Poor 2 1 4 214
Greenhill	  Humane	  Society,	  SPCA 1944 0.4557 -­‐0.1989 0.3171 1.2445 0.9031 1.1138 Star Poor Star 1 4 1 141
Guide	  Dog	  Founda@on	  for	  the	  Blind 1946 0.1408 -­‐0.0805 0.1225 1.1625 1.1453 1.1836 Star Profit Star 1 2 1 121
Guide	  Dogs	  for	  the	  Blind 1942 0.2558 -­‐0.0364 0.0225 1.7245 1.5174 1.476 Star Profit Profit 1 2 2 122
Guide	  Dogs	  of	  America 1948 0.0889 0.0523 0.2119 1.3484 1.3709 1.5509 Star Profit Star 1 2 1 121
Guide	  Dogs	  of	  the	  Desert 1972 1.078 0.7008 -­‐0.5102 1.6234 2.061 0.6264 Star Star Poor 1 1 4 114
Guiding	  Eyes	  for	  the	  Blind 1956 0.0538 0.2528 -­‐0.0287 1.2499 1.3853 1.2684 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
Hawaiian	  Humane	  Society 1897 0.0081 0.1351 0.116 1.0487 1.1442 1.2305 Poor Star Star 4 1 1 411
Heartland	  Humane	  Society 1966 -­‐0.0788 0.0251 0.151 0.9268 0.9262 1.0066 Poor Poor Growth 4 4 3 443
Hooved	  Animal	  Humane	  Society 1971 -­‐0.323 0.1523 -­‐0.3399 0.8068 0.9705 0.6026 Poor Growth Poor 4 3 4 434
Humane	  Farming	  Associa@on 1985 0.1713 0.0115 -­‐0.0148 1.1989 1.2106 1.2298 Star Profit Profit 1 2 2 122
Humane	  League	  of	  Lancaster	  County 1917 -­‐0.4945 0.6371 0.6239 0.6826 1.0484 1.4828 Poor Growth Star 4 3 1 431
Humane	  Society	  at	  Lollypop	  Farm 1873 0.0854 0.0794 0.012 1.0871 1.132 1.08 Growth Profit Profit 3 2 2 322
Humane	  Society	  for	  Seaele/King	  County	  (The) 1897 -­‐0.0039 0.0739 0.3013 1.067 1.0662 1.2029 Poor Poor Star 4 4 1 441
Humane	  Society	  for	  Southwest	  Washington 1897 -­‐0.0858 1.0509 -­‐0.4586 1.4654 3.2043 1.4787 Profit Star Profit 2 1 2 212
Humane	  Society	  of	  Bal@more	  County 1927 -­‐0.0842 0.3139 -­‐0.2567 1.036 1.1657 0.793 Poor Star Poor 4 1 4 414
Humane	  Society	  of	  Broward	  County 1944 -­‐0.3691 0.1007 -­‐0.2007 0.9982 1.0912 0.8128 Poor Growth Poor 4 3 4 434
Humane	  Society	  of	  Charloee 1978 -­‐0.6841 0.3801 0.0163 0.6886 0.943 0.7404 Poor Growth Poor 4 3 4 434
Humane	  Society	  of	  El	  Paso 1947 -­‐0.4557 -­‐0.3214 1.5925 1.292 1.1973 2.6105 Profit Profit Star 2 2 1 221
Humane	  Society	  of	  Greater	  Kansas	  City 1912 0.1327 0.2004 0.1602 0.9296 1.0023 1.0142 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
Humane	  Society	  of	  Greater	  Miami	  Adopt-­‐A-­‐Pet 1936 -­‐0.4563 0.1547 0.6833 0.6823 0.919 1.3596 Poor Growth Star 4 3 1 431
Humane	  Society	  of	  Kent	  County	  (The) 1883 0.0247 0.0396 0.1183 0.8125 0.7934 0.8796 Poor Poor Growth 4 4 3 443
Humane	  Society	  of	  Missouri 1870 0.5739 -­‐0.241 0.0439 1.3817 0.9917 0.9393 Star Poor Growth 1 4 3 143
Humane	  Society	  of	  San	  Antonio 1952 0.5115 -­‐0.3015 0.1238 1.3701 0.9113 0.9209 Star Poor Growth 1 4 3 143
Humane	  Society	  of	  South	  Mississippi 1952 2.2043 -­‐0.6384 0.3089 2.6051 0.7277 0.8297 Star Poor Growth 1 4 3 143
Humane	  Society	  of	  Southern	  Arizona 1967 -­‐0.015 0.4757 -­‐0.1976 1.0624 1.4087 1.087 Poor Star Profit 4 1 2 412
Humane	  Society	  of	  Tampa	  Bay 1912 -­‐0.0329 0.3727 0.2073 0.9448 1.0887 1.069 Poor Growth Star 4 3 1 431
Humane	  Society	  of	  the	  Pikes	  Peak	  Region 1949 0.1069 0.1075 0.1581 0.9996 1.0788 1.1578 Growth Growth Star 3 3 1 331
Humane	  Society	  of	  the	  Treasure	  Coast,	  Inc. 1955 0.1903 -­‐0.1216 -­‐0.0483 1.062 0.9204 0.8087 Growth Poor Poor 3 4 4 344
Humane	  Society	  of	  Vero	  Beach	  and	  Indian	  River	  County 1953 -­‐0.1351 0.5236 -­‐0.1381 0.8786 1.2084 1.06 Poor Star Profit 4 1 2 412
Humane	  Society	  Silicon	  Valley 1929 -­‐0.0212 0.3256 1.2646 1.0174 1.3337 2.6877 Poor Star Star 4 1 1 411
In	  Defense	  of	  Animals 1983 -­‐0.2233 0.3684 -­‐0.2371 0.9929 1.1892 0.9313 Poor Star Poor 4 1 4 414
Interna@onal	  Fund	  for	  Animal	  Welfare 1969 0.0217 0.7065 -­‐0.2723 1.1484 1.4721 1.0063 Profit Star Poor 2 1 4 214
Jacksonville	  Humane	  Society 1885 2.5246 0.317 -­‐0.7627 2.5932 3.7236 0.7635 Star Star Poor 1 1 4 114
Kentucky	  Horse	  Park	  Founda@on 1985 0.2648 0.2905 1.1542 1.3181 1.5154 2.4124 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Kentucky	  Humane	  Society 1884 0.0102 0.2002 0.0852 1.0819 1.2077 1.1532 Poor Star Star 4 1 1 411
Leader	  Dogs	  for	  the	  Blind 1939 -­‐0.1459 0.0879 -­‐0.0088 1.1934 1.2472 1.1274 Profit Profit Profit 2 2 2 222
League	  for	  Animal	  Welfare 1964 0.0563 -­‐0.303 0.824 1.4847 0.7754 1.2771 Star Poor Star 1 4 1 141
Lexington	  Humane	  Society 1944 -­‐0.0462 -­‐0.0923 0.0101 1.3693 1.1733 1.0434 Profit Profit Profit 2 2 2 222
Marin	  Humane	  Society	  (The) 1907 0.2615 -­‐0.2931 0.1216 1.2921 0.872 1.0104 Star Poor Growth 1 4 3 143
Maryland	  SPCA	  (The) 1869 -­‐0.045 0.613 -­‐0.4316 1.291 1.7818 0.8729 Profit Star Poor 2 1 4 214
Michigan	  An@-­‐Cruelty	  Society 1935 1.3045 -­‐0.1362 0.6822 1.7068 1.1981 1.625 Star Profit Star 1 2 1 121
Michigan	  Humane	  Society 1877 0.1174 -­‐0.0891 0.0013 1.1285 0.9918 0.9924 Star Poor Poor 1 4 4 144
Monmouth	  County	  SPCA 1955 0.1363 -­‐0.0721 -­‐0.5438 1.6726 1.4196 0.5925 Star Profit Poor 1 2 4 124
Montgomery	  County	  SPCA 1909 -­‐0.5697 0.1116 -­‐0.0438 0.9795 1.0115 0.8949 Poor Growth Poor 4 3 4 434
Morris	  Animal	  Founda@on 1948 0.8163 0.6575 -­‐0.1218 1.1529 1.4846 1.1526 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
MSPCA-­‐Angell 1868 0.0217 0.0314 -­‐0.0951 0.9708 1.0257 0.8053 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Nashville	  Humane	  Associa@on 1887 0.0423 0.0445 0.2316 1.1381 1.048 1.2972 Profit Poor Star 2 4 1 241
Na@onal	  An@-­‐Vivisec@on	  Society 1929 0.2808 0.3699 -­‐0.3395 1.2402 1.5308 0.9866 Star Star Poor 1 1 4 114
Na@onal	  Disaster	  Search	  Dog	  Founda@on 1996 1.2304 -­‐0.1769 0.3106 2.7036 1.3013 1.2449 Star Profit Star 1 2 1 121
Na@onal	  Educa@on	  for	  Assistance	  Dog	  Services 1976 -­‐0.0728 0.9727 -­‐0.3523 1.0835 1.756 1.0062 Poor Star Poor 4 1 4 414
Na@onal	  Humane	  Educa@on	  Society 1948 0.0176 0.0469 -­‐0.029 0.9994 0.9708 0.934 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Nevada	  Humane	  Society 1932 -­‐0.4517 -­‐0.1727 0.5585 0.7272 0.7206 0.9354 Poor Poor Growth 4 4 3 443
No	  More	  Homeless	  Pets	  in	  Utah 2000 -­‐0.3298 -­‐0.0646 0.2007 1.033 0.9333 1.028 Poor Poor Growth 4 4 3 443
North	  Carolina	  Veterinary	  Medical	  Founda@on 1978 0.0364 0.4673 -­‐0.1721 3.5883 2.0324 2.016 Profit Star Profit 2 1 2 212
North	  Shore	  Animal	  League	  America 1944 -­‐0.0449 0.09 0.0295 0.878 0.94 0.9473 Poor Poor Growth 4 4 3 443
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Northeast	  Animal	  Shelter 1976 -­‐0.0237 0.1923 -­‐0.1342 1.1354 1.7861 1.0992 Profit Star Profit 2 1 2 212
Northwest	  Organiza@on	  for	  Animal	  Help 1988 -­‐0.1367 0.4887 0.0055 0.927 1.123 1.0803 Poor Star Profit 4 1 2 412
Oregon	  Humane	  Society 1868 -­‐0.146 0.0917 0.0133 1.5054 1.3626 1.3003 Profit Profit Profit 2 2 2 222
Oshkosh	  Area	  Humane	  Society 1990 -­‐0.0102 0.0288 -­‐0.1936 0.8926 0.9279 0.7449 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Pasado's	  Safe	  Haven 1998 -­‐0.0928 0.3612 -­‐0.1074 2.1312 1.9065 1.4847 Profit Star Profit 2 1 2 212
Paws	  With	  A	  Cause 1979 0.0129 0.0391 -­‐0.0542 0.9231 1.0036 1.0515 Poor Poor Profit 4 4 2 442
Peggy	  Adams	  Animal	  Rescue	  League 1925 0.5218 2.0509 -­‐0.8316 1.1928 3.1676 0.5419 Star Star Poor 1 1 4 114
People	  for	  the	  Ethical	  Treatment	  of	  Animals 1980 0.1376 -­‐0.0142 0.0846 1.1443 1.0066 1.0062 Star Poor Growth 1 4 3 143
Pet	  Adop@on	  Fund 1983 0.1736 -­‐0.1326 -­‐0.1336 1.325 1.0945 0.916 Star Poor Poor 1 4 4 144
Pet	  Orphans	  of	  Southern	  California 1973 -­‐0.3188 0.3324 0.824 0.6777 1.0031 1.0934 Poor Growth Star 4 3 1 431
Pets	  in	  Need 1965 0.3417 -­‐0.1817 -­‐0.3973 2.2351 1.7516 1.2532 Star Profit Profit 1 2 2 122
Poeer	  League	  for	  Animals 1929 1.0866 0.0945 0.0458 2.3962 2.3437 1.8643 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Progressive	  Animal	  Welfare	  Society 1967 -­‐0.187 0.1062 0.2558 1.1216 1.2059 1.3564 Profit Star Star 2 1 1 211
Puppies	  Behind	  Bars 1997 0.2276 0.2457 0.0846 1.3727 1.4503 1.3605 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Ramapo-­‐Bergen	  Animal	  Refuge,	  Inc. 1978 0.1234 -­‐0.0534 -­‐0.0684 0.9834 0.9512 0.939 Growth Poor Poor 3 4 4 344
Rancho	  Coastal	  Humane	  Society 1960 0.4821 -­‐0.1888 0.5791 1.1074 0.8574 1.3056 Growth Poor Star 3 4 1 341
Richmond	  SPCA 1891 0.4125 0.0327 0.6269 1.2395 1.2367 1.8496 Star Profit Star 1 2 1 121
Roanoke	  Valley	  SPCA 1916 0.0056 0.1989 0.6294 0.9051 0.985 1.3758 Poor Growth Star 4 3 1 431
San	  Diego	  Humane	  Society	  and	  SPCA 1880 0.0972 0.3475 -­‐0.2976 1.33 1.6582 1.0054 Star Star Poor 1 1 4 114
San	  Francisco	  SPCA 1868 0.1613 0.7705 -­‐0.3244 1.1263 2.2594 1.4589 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
Santa	  Fe	  Animal	  Shelter	  &	  Humane	  Society 1939 0.0799 0.5871 -­‐0.1253 0.9118 1.2158 0.9713 Growth Star Poor 3 1 4 314
Seeing	  Eye	  (The) 1929 0.2231 0.1051 -­‐0.3813 1.5331 1.4922 0.9376 Star Star Poor 1 1 4 114
SNAP 1999 -­‐0.2664 0.0895 0.1267 1.0581 1.0654 1.0182 Poor Poor Growth 4 4 3 443
Southeastern	  Guide	  Dogs 1982 0.3062 0.0335 -­‐0.2966 1.825 1.8819 1.2023 Star Profit Profit 1 2 2 122
Southwest	  Missouri	  Humane	  Society 1956 0.537 0.1924 -­‐0.0371 1.1562 1.2205 1.291 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
SPCA	  for	  Monterey	  County	  (The) 1905 -­‐0.6888 0.5005 0.1604 0.8888 1.2935 1.303 Poor Star Star 4 1 1 411
SPCA	  of	  Central	  Florida 1937 0.3982 0.012 0.3244 1.2062 1.0644 1.3118 Star Poor Star 1 4 1 141
SPCA	  Serving	  Erie	  County 1867 0.014 0.0388 0.2344 1.0877 1.0135 1.1841 Poor Poor Star 4 4 1 441
SPCA	  Tampa	  Bay 1940 0.1186 0.161 0.1693 0.9857 1.0897 1.2043 Growth Growth Star 3 3 1 331
St.	  Hubert's	  Animal	  Welfare	  Center 1939 0.0864 0.1496 -­‐0.3258 1.258 1.4357 0.8894 Star Star Poor 1 1 4 114
Suncoast	  Humane	  Society 1971 -­‐0.2238 0.479 0.1049 0.8511 1.0651 0.9801 Poor Growth Growth 4 3 3 433
Thoroughbred	  Re@rement	  Founda@on 1982 -­‐0.0227 0.0328 -­‐0.0159 0.8088 0.8495 0.8567 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Tony	  La	  Russa's	  Animal	  Rescue	  Founda@on 1991 0.3359 0.4099 -­‐0.2141 1.3084 1.9408 1.4194 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
United	  Animal	  Na@ons 1987 -­‐0.2434 -­‐0.259 -­‐0.0391 1.3312 0.8967 0.8131 Profit Poor Poor 2 4 4 244
Upper	  Valley	  Humane	  Society 1974 -­‐0.102 0.0424 0.0408 0.8131 0.8568 0.9126 Poor Poor Growth 4 4 3 443
Virginia	  Beach	  SPCA 1966 0.2428 0.5711 -­‐0.0407 1.1996 1.5623 1.1857 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
Washington	  Animal	  Rescue	  League 1914 0.1012 0.5631 0.0772 0.7938 0.9603 0.8645 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
Wayside	  Waifs 1944 -­‐0.0403 0.4029 0.0061 1.0211 1.3332 1.1886 Poor Star Profit 4 1 2 412
Western	  Pennsylvania	  Humane	  Society 1874 0.1116 0.0222 0.18 1.1549 1.1217 1.1097 Star Profit Star 1 2 1 121
Willameee	  Humane	  Society 1965 0.1338 -­‐0.1622 0.1539 1.0166 0.8769 0.8697 Growth Poor Growth 3 4 3 343
Wisconsin	  Humane	  Society 1879 -­‐0.126 0.073 -­‐0.3936 1.1334 1.1749 0.6342 Profit Profit Poor 2 2 4 224
World	  Society	  for	  the	  Protec@on	  of	  Animals 1981 0.321 0.1842 0.335 1.0099 0.9209 1.1132 Growth Growth Star 3 3 1 331
MIN -­‐1.5645 -­‐2.7561 -­‐0.8316 -­‐0.8056 0.7206 0.5419
MAX 4.3132 2.0509 1.5925 4.6905 3.7236 2.6877
MEDIAN 0.0423 0.0942 0.0225 1.1074 1.1164 1.0287
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SCENARIO	  1 CAPACITY	  SCORES EFFICIENCY	  SCORES CATEGORY	  ALPHA CATEGORY	  NUMERICAL
2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 1:STAR	  2:PROFIT	  3:GROWTH	  4:POOR 1:STAR	  2:PROFIT	  3:GROWTH	  4:POOR
ORG_NAME CSCORE06 CSCORE07 CSCORE08 ESCORE06 ESCORE07 ESCORE08 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 CODE
Actors	  and	  Others	  for	  Animals 12.34 10.96 30 38.84 38.51 38.76 Profit Profit Star 2 2 1 221
Alley	  Cat	  Allies 25 27.5 25 33.04 38.38 30.31 Star Star Growth 1 1 3 113
Alley	  Cat	  Rescue 20 22.5 20 38.55 33.4 24.91 Profit Star Poor 2 1 4 214
American	  AnR-­‐VivisecRon	  Society 12.21 28.33 19.74 32.64 32.86 30.57 Poor Growth Poor 4 3 4 434
American	  Humane	  AssociaRon 20 10 30 35.47 33.01 28.18 Profit Poor Growth 2 4 3 243
American	  Kennel	  Club	  Canine	  Health	  FoundaRon 30 24.96 22.55 35.22 38.04 38.28 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
American	  Veterinary	  Medical	  FoundaRon 24.15 15.81 10 35.41 23.29 15.32 Star Poor Poor 1 4 4 144
Anderson	  Animal	  Shelter 23.41 22.46 15.9 32.21 27.38 30.03 Growth Growth Poor 3 3 4 334
Animal	  Haven 22.5 22.5 14.82 39.15 38.61 38.28 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
Animal	  Humane	  New	  Mexico 26.09 30 30 20.83 23.96 21.4 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
Animal	  ProtecRve	  AssociaRon	  of	  Missouri 30 20 24.3 34.86 24.91 32.15 Star Poor Growth 1 4 3 143
Animal	  Rescue 21.88 5.95 12.33 38.73 38.54 38 Profit Profit Profit 2 2 2 222
Animal	  Rescue	  League	  of	  Iowa 30 27.48 30 37.63 35.64 38.25 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Animal	  Welfare	  AssociaRon 23.11 28.09 27.06 39.25 39.03 38.87 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Animal	  Welfare	  InsRtute 30 28.2 20 39.45 39.54 39.58 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
Animal	  Welfare	  League 15 5 13.35 37.99 35.91 36.22 Profit Profit Profit 2 2 2 222
Animal	  Welfare	  League	  of	  Arlington 26.95 27.02 26.93 33.77 33.76 31.13 Star Star Growth 1 1 3 113
Animal	  Welfare	  Society 21.67 13.91 30 30.05 30.17 35.53 Poor Poor Star 4 4 1 441
AnR-­‐Cruelty	  Society	  (The) 27.43 20 17.91 32.28 29.64 27.1 Growth Poor Poor 3 4 4 344
Arizona	  Animal	  Welfare	  League	  and	  SPCA 28.94 20.07 27.5 23.69 17.87 37.83 Growth Poor Star 3 4 1 341
Arizona	  Humane	  Society 24.1 25.95 20.23 32.75 29.78 32.87 Growth Growth Poor 3 3 4 334
Associated	  Humane	  SocieRes 26.52 25.62 25.11 34.04 34.59 34.62 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Atlanta	  Humane	  Society 19.21 16.29 20.55 31.93 29.26 29.73 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Bangor	  Humane	  Society 27.5 22.47 23.11 31 36.83 38.32 Growth Star Profit 3 1 2 312
Best	  Friends	  Animal	  Society 22.5 25 27.5 27.81 30.27 33.21 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
Bideawee 13.68 13.59 20 28.74 31.78 22.95 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Born	  Free	  USA	  united	  with	  Animal	  ProtecRon	  InsRtute 26.39 19.6 20 32.77 32.86 30.24 Growth Poor Poor 3 4 4 344
Buddy	  Dog	  Humane	  Society 16.61 11.06 20 37.85 35.85 29.44 Profit Profit Poor 2 2 4 224
Canine	  Assistants 25 22.5 20.27 39.63 39.61 39.41 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
Canine	  Companions	  for	  Independence 18.07 20.98 24.87 30.28 30.18 30.21 Poor Poor Growth 4 4 3 443
Canine	  Partners	  For	  Life 21.05 25 30 32.99 33.51 33.3 Profit Star Star 2 1 1 211
Capital	  Area	  Humane	  Society 13.14 18.43 18.57 29.82 27.37 30.21 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Capital	  Humane	  Society 18.98 22.07 27.51 26.96 29.5 35.5 Poor Poor Star 4 4 1 441
Cat	  Care	  Society 21.92 20.87 22.5 38.81 36.1 35.45 Profit Profit Profit 2 2 2 222
Champaign	  County	  Humane	  Society 10 10 10 33.78 35.34 31.49 Profit Profit Poor 2 2 4 224
Charleston	  Animal	  Society 25.6 24.65 30 35.74 33.28 38.32 Star Growth Star 1 3 1 131
CiRzens	  for	  Animal	  ProtecRon 27.55 23.35 23.71 38.85 38.38 38.21 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
Cleveland	  Animal	  ProtecRve	  League 21.17 12.7 20.74 25.07 24.1 26.2 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Dane	  County	  Humane	  Society 21.85 6.38 17.48 35.64 30.08 30.29 Profit Poor Poor 2 4 4 244
Defenders	  of	  Animal	  Rights 30 26.24 19.22 38.84 38.8 38.76 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
Dogs	  for	  the	  Deaf 30 29.02 28.37 39.1 38.99 36.01 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Dumb	  Friends	  League 26.42 19.6 28.67 32.84 32.68 30.11 Growth Poor Growth 3 4 3 343
Dutchess	  County	  SPCA 20.02 30 30 32 35 33.08 Poor Star Growth 4 1 3 413
Elmsford	  Animal	  Shelter 27.5 27.5 22.22 39.81 39.73 39.62 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
Escondido	  Humane	  Society 22.5 17.09 15.15 25.34 27.55 32.81 Growth Poor Poor 3 4 4 344
FACT 30 26.29 30 27.47 29.85 29.17 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
Farm	  Sanctuary 27.5 26.34 24.28 32.9 32.94 32.91 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
Fidelco	  Guide	  Dog	  FoundaRon 30 30 29.5 35.34 37.93 37.87 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Front	  Range	  Equine	  Rescue 22.5 25 27.5 38.33 30.05 35.68 Star Growth Star 1 3 1 131
Greater	  Androscoggin	  Humane	  Society 15.03 19.13 17.5 26.69 29.52 30.05 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Greenhill	  Humane	  Society,	  SPCA 25 22.66 27.5 38.56 38.69 38.36 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Guide	  Dog	  FoundaRon	  for	  the	  Blind 21.37 20.88 22.06 33.31 38.51 38.54 Profit Profit Profit 2 2 2 222
Guide	  Dogs	  for	  the	  Blind 22.11 24.84 15.86 35.6 35.44 35.54 Profit Star Profit 2 1 2 212
Guide	  Dogs	  of	  America 25.65 18.43 20.95 26.69 26.61 26.4 Growth Poor Poor 3 4 4 344
Guide	  Dogs	  of	  the	  Desert 20 30 27.5 29.69 35.72 33.32 Poor Star Star 4 1 1 411
Guiding	  Eyes	  for	  the	  Blind 30 30 28.54 29.92 30.17 30.11 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
Hawaiian	  Humane	  Society 17.49 20.75 21.72 35.93 35.7 35.75 Profit Profit Profit 2 2 2 222
Heartland	  Humane	  Society 11.84 9.65 16.67 32.67 33.47 29.72 Poor Profit Poor 4 2 4 424
Hooved	  Animal	  Humane	  Society 13.73 10 11.99 23.98 21.47 28.04 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Humane	  Farming	  AssociaRon 28.57 20.9 20.67 38.89 38.83 36.22 Star Profit Profit 1 2 2 122
Humane	  League	  of	  Lancaster	  County 10 20 26.34 32.1 34.54 37.92 Poor Profit Star 4 2 1 421
Humane	  Society	  at	  Lollypop	  Farm 18.24 22.79 25.06 32.65 33.15 33.06 Poor Growth Growth 4 3 3 433
Humane	  Society	  for	  Seable/King	  County	  (The) 25.81 25.92 30 32.62 32.67 32.64 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
Humane	  Society	  for	  Southwest	  Washington 26.02 21.91 17.54 24.5 35.28 32.56 Growth Profit Poor 3 2 4 324
Humane	  Society	  of	  BalRmore	  County 17.02 27.5 16.37 27.89 38.7 35.97 Poor Star Profit 4 1 2 412
Humane	  Society	  of	  Broward	  County 27.65 28.48 28.71 30.21 30.29 30.44 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
Humane	  Society	  of	  Charlobe 20 30 30 35.72 30.4 30.18 Profit Growth Growth 2 3 3 233
Humane	  Society	  of	  El	  Paso 7.5 7.5 20 35.21 32.9 32.76 Profit Poor Poor 2 4 4 244
Humane	  Society	  of	  Greater	  Kansas	  City 9.43 15.85 27.5 29.92 29.94 30.32 Poor Poor Growth 4 4 3 443
Humane	  Society	  of	  Greater	  Miami	  Adopt-­‐A-­‐Pet 23.36 15 19.83 35.6 30.88 33.58 Star Poor Profit 1 4 2 142
Humane	  Society	  of	  Kent	  County	  (The) 10.25 10.98 12.53 29.57 26.29 25.66 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Humane	  Society	  of	  Missouri 30 27.76 26.77 35.78 33.23 33.28 Star Growth Star 1 3 1 131
Humane	  Society	  of	  San	  Antonio 30 28.23 29.06 38.52 32.58 35.29 Star Growth Star 1 3 1 131
Humane	  Society	  of	  South	  Mississippi 30 20 30 38.26 33.21 35.8 Star Poor Star 1 4 1 141
Humane	  Society	  of	  Southern	  Arizona 17.73 24.08 29.21 27.23 30.05 32.86 Poor Growth Growth 4 3 3 433
Humane	  Society	  of	  Tampa	  Bay 21.25 21.8 27.5 28.01 27.59 33.55 Poor Poor Star 4 4 1 441
Humane	  Society	  of	  the	  Pikes	  Peak	  Region 17.09 27.5 30 33.72 33.55 36.1 Profit Star Star 2 1 1 211
Humane	  Society	  of	  the	  Treasure	  Coast,	  Inc. 20.28 27.5 25.28 32.44 35.2 35.56 Poor Star Star 4 1 1 411
Humane	  Society	  of	  Vero	  Beach	  and	  Indian	  River	  County 24.86 25.82 23.62 32.28 35.15 32.64 Growth Star Poor 3 1 4 314
Humane	  Society	  Silicon	  Valley 8.43 15.37 24.32 30.16 32.89 32.62 Poor Poor Growth 4 4 3 443
In	  Defense	  of	  Animals 14.97 19.24 10 33.49 33.36 33.51 Profit Profit Profit 2 2 2 222
InternaRonal	  Fund	  for	  Animal	  Welfare 30 30 30 32.69 34.97 32.71 Growth Star Growth 3 1 3 313
Jacksonville	  Humane	  Society 16.85 20 16.4 35.36 35.2 27.61 Profit Profit Poor 2 2 4 224
Kentucky	  Horse	  Park	  FoundaRon 17.79 20 30 27.37 31.92 31.94 Poor Poor Growth 4 4 3 443
Kentucky	  Humane	  Society 27.5 27.5 27.5 32.77 35.61 33.11 Growth Star Growth 3 1 3 313
Leader	  Dogs	  for	  the	  Blind 25.41 23.87 24.7 26.52 27.18 32.51 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
League	  for	  Animal	  Welfare 28.45 20 30 38.78 39.15 39.36 Star Profit Star 1 2 1 121
Lexington	  Humane	  Society 23.43 22.1 19.84 32.85 29.66 29.57 Growth Poor Poor 3 4 4 344
Marin	  Humane	  Society	  (The) 27.91 15.86 13.71 39.17 38.99 38.95 Star Profit Profit 1 2 2 122
Maryland	  SPCA	  (The) 21.15 21.25 28.43 29.85 29.76 29.9 Poor Poor Growth 4 4 3 443
Michigan	  AnR-­‐Cruelty	  Society 17.39 30 30 38.56 38.93 39.18 Profit Star Star 2 1 1 211
Michigan	  Humane	  Society 26.59 21.57 24.08 30.33 30.69 33.25 Growth Poor Star 3 4 1 341
Monmouth	  County	  SPCA 30 30 25.16 35.56 32.8 35.55 Star Growth Star 1 3 1 131
Montgomery	  County	  SPCA 10 11.02 14.31 32.55 32.55 29.93 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Morris	  Animal	  FoundaRon 23.24 30 30 31 32.71 32.82 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
MSPCA-­‐Angell 19.62 18.48 13 36.54 36.35 35.53 Profit Profit Profit 2 2 2 222
Nashville	  Humane	  AssociaRon 18.97 27.5 26.79 35.78 38.39 35.53 Profit Star Star 2 1 1 211
NaRonal	  AnR-­‐VivisecRon	  Society 20 30 21.52 32.09 32.64 32.48 Poor Growth Poor 4 3 4 434
NaRonal	  Disaster	  Search	  Dog	  FoundaRon 17.5 27.5 27.5 23.43 26.72 32.49 Poor Growth Growth 4 3 3 433
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NaRonal	  EducaRon	  for	  Assistance	  Dog	  Services 30 30 30 38.74 38.84 38.79 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
NaRonal	  Humane	  EducaRon	  Society 12.05 11.05 15.37 37.03 29.55 35.29 Profit Poor Profit 2 4 2 242
Nevada	  Humane	  Society 20 13 24.47 24.02 29.66 32.34 Poor Poor Growth 4 4 3 443
No	  More	  Homeless	  Pets	  in	  Utah 2.5 2.5 22.5 27.61 25.09 36.04 Poor Poor Profit 4 4 2 442
North	  Carolina	  Veterinary	  Medical	  FoundaRon 30 30 30 33.06 36.19 30.42 Star Star Growth 1 1 3 113
North	  Shore	  Animal	  League	  America 12.91 13.7 14.23 23.76 18.11 24.03 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Northeast	  Animal	  Shelter 16.03 17.01 27.89 17.89 23.84 21.51 Poor Poor Growth 4 4 3 443
Northwest	  OrganizaRon	  for	  Animal	  Help 20 22.23 30 33.13 35.79 35.72 Profit Profit Star 2 2 1 221
Oregon	  Humane	  Society 21.55 28.86 29.08 33.08 35.95 38.73 Profit Star Star 2 1 1 211
Oshkosh	  Area	  Humane	  Society 25 12.5 11.44 38.04 32.77 28.72 Star Poor Poor 1 4 4 144
Pasado's	  Safe	  Haven 30 30 26.64 38.81 38.77 38.98 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Paws	  With	  A	  Cause 20.75 15.62 12.74 39.53 39.18 38.99 Profit Profit Profit 2 2 2 222
Peggy	  Adams	  Animal	  Rescue	  League 15.45 26.28 17.51 35.5 35.07 24.62 Profit Star Poor 2 1 4 214
People	  for	  the	  Ethical	  Treatment	  of	  Animals 23.91 17.75 21.89 33.19 33.35 33.34 Star Profit Profit 1 2 2 122
Pet	  AdopRon	  Fund 25.43 19.11 12.92 38.82 33.37 38.82 Star Profit Profit 1 2 2 122
Pet	  Orphans	  of	  Southern	  California 13.9 12.37 30 29.36 34.92 38.7 Poor Profit Star 4 2 1 421
Pets	  in	  Need 17.71 10 10 35.37 38.48 38.32 Profit Profit Profit 2 2 2 222
Pober	  League	  for	  Animals 23.5 24.51 23.78 26.7 26.46 17.61 Growth Growth Poor 3 3 4 334
Progressive	  Animal	  Welfare	  Society 16.19 14.7 24.99 27.95 27.97 30.27 Poor Poor Growth 4 4 3 443
Puppies	  Behind	  Bars 30 30 30 32.28 38.08 38.51 Growth Star Star 3 1 1 311
Ramapo-­‐Bergen	  Animal	  Refuge,	  Inc. 22.18 17.98 16.86 35.47 35.37 35.18 Profit Profit Profit 2 2 2 222
Rancho	  Coastal	  Humane	  Society 17.45 16.7 22.64 32.98 32.54 32.3 Profit Poor Poor 2 4 4 244
Richmond	  SPCA 30 25.08 23.43 36.01 35.92 33.42 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
Roanoke	  Valley	  SPCA 20 21.12 30 38.38 38.4 35.26 Profit Profit Star 2 2 1 221
San	  Diego	  Humane	  Society	  and	  SPCA 30 30 20 32.61 34.88 32.68 Growth Star Poor 3 1 4 314
San	  Francisco	  SPCA 22.99 21.92 22.24 31.85 38.01 38.09 Growth Profit Profit 3 2 2 322
Santa	  Fe	  Animal	  Shelter	  &	  Humane	  Society 24.89 27.5 30 29.87 32.28 27.04 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
Seeing	  Eye	  (The) 25.48 23.77 23.96 38.26 35.46 35.32 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
SNAP 2.5 6.02 8.56 30.23 27.76 33.03 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Southeastern	  Guide	  Dogs 20 20 20 37.72 37.81 38.02 Profit Profit Profit 2 2 2 222
Southwest	  Missouri	  Humane	  Society 16.02 17.69 17.5 38.45 38.37 38.43 Profit Profit Profit 2 2 2 222
SPCA	  for	  Monterey	  County	  (The) 20 30 30 29.11 32.9 32.84 Poor Growth Growth 4 3 3 433
SPCA	  of	  Central	  Florida 25 25 27.5 39.08 36.55 39.18 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
SPCA	  Serving	  Erie	  County 20.96 28.02 29.7 32.7 32.93 32.99 Poor Growth Growth 4 3 3 433
SPCA	  Tampa	  Bay 15.33 20.37 25.96 26.89 29.98 27.16 Poor Poor Growth 4 4 3 443
St.	  Hubert's	  Animal	  Welfare	  Center 19.08 17 17.29 35.43 32.95 30.41 Profit Poor Poor 2 4 4 244
Suncoast	  Humane	  Society 19.48 25 24.67 33.18 36.15 33.54 Profit Star Star 2 1 1 211
Thoroughbred	  ReRrement	  FoundaRon 21.69 15 2.5 30.47 34.59 34.15 Poor Profit Profit 4 2 2 422
Tony	  La	  Russa's	  Animal	  Rescue	  FoundaRon 20.57 22.46 22.7 33.34 38.67 38.9 Profit Star Profit 2 1 2 212
United	  Animal	  NaRons 30 20.57 22.06 37.95 35.61 35.44 Star Profit Profit 1 2 2 122
Upper	  Valley	  Humane	  Society 11.5 17.5 17.51 30.26 27.93 26.01 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Virginia	  Beach	  SPCA 30 30 30 36.47 39.08 39.15 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Washington	  Animal	  Rescue	  League 27.74 30 30 22.67 20.63 31.79 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
Wayside	  Waifs 25.91 26.05 30 27.13 29.96 27.36 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
Western	  Pennsylvania	  Humane	  Society 24.63 24.59 25.62 35.68 35.86 35.25 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Willamebe	  Humane	  Society 30 25.63 19.04 30.53 27.8 27.25 Growth Growth Poor 3 3 4 334
Wisconsin	  Humane	  Society 27.75 26.24 29.32 35.86 35.92 36.1 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
World	  Society	  for	  the	  ProtecRon	  of	  Animals 22.5 20 22.5 24.99 24.86 27.46 Growth Poor Poor 3 4 4 344
MIN 2.5 2.5 2.5 17.89 17.87 15.32
MAX 30 30 30 39.81 39.73 39.62
MEDIAN 22.18 22.23 23.96 32.98 33.28 33.21
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SCENARIO	  2 CAPACITY	  RATINGS	  	  (X) EFFICIENCY	  RATINGS	  (Y) CATEGORY	  ALPHA CATEGORY	  NUMERICAL
2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 1:STAR	  2:PROFIT	  3:GROWTH	  4:POOR 1:STAR	  2:PROFIT	  3:GROWTH	  4:POOR
ORG_NAME CRATE06 CRATE07 CRATE08 ERATE06 ERATE07 ERATE08 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 CODE
Actors	  and	  Others	  for	  Animals 1 1 4 4 4 4 Profit Profit Star 2 2 1 221
Alley	  Cat	  Allies 4 4 4 3 4 2 Star Star Growth 1 1 3 113
Alley	  Cat	  Rescue 3 4 3 4 3 1 Star Star Growth 1 1 3 113
American	  AnR-­‐VivisecRon	  Society 1 4 3 3 3 2 Profit Star Growth 2 1 3 213
American	  Humane	  AssociaRon 3 1 4 3 3 2 Star Profit Growth 1 2 3 123
American	  Kennel	  Club	  Canine	  Health	  FoundaRon 4 4 4 3 4 4 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
American	  Veterinary	  Medical	  FoundaRon 4 2 1 3 1 0 Star Poor Poor 1 4 4 144
Anderson	  Animal	  Shelter 4 3 2 2 1 2 Growth Growth Poor 3 3 4 334
Animal	  Haven 4 4 2 4 4 4 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
Animal	  Humane	  New	  Mexico 4 4 4 0 1 0 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
Animal	  ProtecRve	  AssociaRon	  of	  Missouri 4 3 4 3 1 2 Star Growth Growth 1 3 3 133
Animal	  Rescue 3 1 1 4 4 4 Star Profit Profit 1 2 2 122
Animal	  Rescue	  League	  of	  Iowa 4 4 4 4 3 4 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Animal	  Welfare	  AssociaRon 4 4 4 4 4 4 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Animal	  Welfare	  InsRtute 4 4 3 4 4 4 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Animal	  Welfare	  League 2 1 2 4 3 3 Profit Profit Profit 2 2 2 222
Animal	  Welfare	  League	  of	  Arlington 4 4 4 3 3 2 Star Star Growth 1 1 3 113
Animal	  Welfare	  Society 3 2 4 2 2 3 Growth Poor Star 3 4 1 341
AnR-­‐Cruelty	  Society	  (The) 4 3 3 2 2 1 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
Arizona	  Animal	  Welfare	  League	  and	  SPCA 4 3 4 1 0 4 Growth Growth Star 3 3 1 331
Arizona	  Humane	  Society 4 4 3 3 2 3 Star Growth Star 1 3 1 131
Associated	  Humane	  SocieRes 4 4 4 3 3 3 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Atlanta	  Humane	  Society 3 2 3 2 2 2 Growth Poor Growth 3 4 3 343
Bangor	  Humane	  Society 4 3 4 2 3 4 Growth Star Star 3 1 1 311
Best	  Friends	  Animal	  Society 4 4 4 2 2 3 Growth Growth Star 3 3 1 331
Bideawee 2 2 3 2 2 1 Poor Poor Growth 4 4 3 443
Born	  Free	  USA	  united	  with	  Animal	  ProtecRon	  InsRtute 4 3 3 3 3 2 Star Star Growth 1 1 3 113
Buddy	  Dog	  Humane	  Society 2 1 3 4 3 2 Profit Profit Growth 2 2 3 223
Canine	  Assistants 4 4 3 4 4 4 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Canine	  Companions	  for	  Independence 3 3 4 2 2 2 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
Canine	  Partners	  For	  Life 3 4 4 3 3 3 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Capital	  Area	  Humane	  Society 2 3 3 2 1 2 Poor Growth Growth 4 3 3 433
Capital	  Humane	  Society 3 3 4 1 2 3 Growth Growth Star 3 3 1 331
Cat	  Care	  Society 3 3 4 4 3 3 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Champaign	  County	  Humane	  Society 1 1 1 3 3 2 Profit Profit Poor 2 2 4 224
Charleston	  Animal	  Society 4 4 4 3 3 4 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
CiRzens	  for	  Animal	  ProtecRon 4 4 4 4 4 4 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Cleveland	  Animal	  ProtecRve	  League 3 2 3 1 1 1 Growth Poor Growth 3 4 3 343
Dane	  County	  Humane	  Society 3 1 2 3 2 2 Star Poor Poor 1 4 4 144
Defenders	  of	  Animal	  Rights 4 4 3 4 4 4 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Dogs	  for	  the	  Deaf 4 4 4 4 4 3 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Dumb	  Friends	  League 4 3 4 3 3 2 Star Star Growth 1 1 3 113
Dutchess	  County	  SPCA 3 4 4 2 3 3 Growth Star Star 3 1 1 311
Elmsford	  Animal	  Shelter 4 4 3 4 4 4 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Escondido	  Humane	  Society 4 2 2 1 2 3 Growth Poor Profit 3 4 2 342
FACT 4 4 4 1 2 2 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
Farm	  Sanctuary 4 4 4 3 3 3 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Fidelco	  Guide	  Dog	  FoundaRon 4 4 4 3 4 4 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Front	  Range	  Equine	  Rescue 4 4 4 4 2 3 Star Growth Star 1 3 1 131
Greater	  Androscoggin	  Humane	  Society 2 3 3 1 2 2 Poor Growth Growth 4 3 3 433
Greenhill	  Humane	  Society,	  SPCA 4 4 4 4 4 4 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Guide	  Dog	  FoundaRon	  for	  the	  Blind 3 3 3 3 4 4 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Guide	  Dogs	  for	  the	  Blind 3 4 2 3 3 3 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
Guide	  Dogs	  of	  America 4 3 3 1 1 1 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
Guide	  Dogs	  of	  the	  Desert 3 4 4 2 3 3 Growth Star Star 3 1 1 311
Guiding	  Eyes	  for	  the	  Blind 4 4 4 2 2 2 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
Hawaiian	  Humane	  Society 2 3 3 3 3 3 Profit Star Star 2 1 1 211
Heartland	  Humane	  Society 1 1 2 3 3 2 Profit Profit Poor 2 2 4 224
Hooved	  Animal	  Humane	  Society 2 1 1 1 0 2 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Humane	  Farming	  AssociaRon 4 3 3 4 4 3 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Humane	  League	  of	  Lancaster	  County 1 3 4 2 3 4 Poor Star Star 4 1 1 411
Humane	  Society	  at	  Lollypop	  Farm 3 4 4 3 3 3 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Humane	  Society	  for	  Sea`le/King	  County	  (The) 4 4 4 3 3 3 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Humane	  Society	  for	  Southwest	  Washington 4 3 3 1 3 3 Growth Star Star 3 1 1 311
Humane	  Society	  of	  BalRmore	  County 2 4 2 2 4 3 Poor Star Profit 4 1 2 412
Humane	  Society	  of	  Broward	  County 4 4 4 2 2 2 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
Humane	  Society	  of	  Charlo`e 3 4 4 3 2 2 Star Growth Growth 1 3 3 133
Humane	  Society	  of	  El	  Paso 1 1 3 3 3 3 Profit Profit Star 2 2 1 221
Humane	  Society	  of	  Greater	  Kansas	  City 1 2 4 2 2 2 Poor Poor Growth 4 4 3 443
Humane	  Society	  of	  Greater	  Miami	  Adopt-­‐A-­‐Pet 4 2 3 3 2 3 Star Poor Star 1 4 1 141
Humane	  Society	  of	  Kent	  County	  (The) 1 1 2 1 1 1 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Humane	  Society	  of	  Missouri 4 4 4 3 3 3 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Humane	  Society	  of	  San	  Antonio 4 4 4 4 3 3 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Humane	  Society	  of	  South	  Mississippi 4 3 4 4 3 3 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Humane	  Society	  of	  Southern	  Arizona 3 4 4 1 2 3 Growth Growth Star 3 3 1 331
Humane	  Society	  of	  Tampa	  Bay 3 3 4 2 2 3 Growth Growth Star 3 3 1 331
Humane	  Society	  of	  the	  Pikes	  Peak	  Region 2 4 4 3 3 3 Profit Star Star 2 1 1 211
Humane	  Society	  of	  the	  Treasure	  Coast,	  Inc. 3 4 4 2 3 3 Growth Star Star 3 1 1 311
Humane	  Society	  of	  Vero	  Beach	  and	  Indian	  River	  County 4 4 4 2 3 3 Growth Star Star 3 1 1 311
Humane	  Society	  Silicon	  Valley 1 2 4 2 3 3 Poor Profit Star 4 2 1 421
In	  Defense	  of	  Animals 2 3 1 3 3 3 Profit Star Profit 2 1 2 212
InternaRonal	  Fund	  for	  Animal	  Welfare 4 4 4 3 3 3 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Jacksonville	  Humane	  Society 2 3 2 3 3 2 Profit Star Poor 2 1 4 214
Kentucky	  Horse	  Park	  FoundaRon 3 3 4 1 2 2 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
Kentucky	  Humane	  Society 4 4 4 3 3 3 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Leader	  Dogs	  for	  the	  Blind 4 4 4 1 1 3 Growth Growth Star 3 3 1 331
League	  for	  Animal	  Welfare 4 3 4 4 4 4 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Lexington	  Humane	  Society 4 3 3 3 2 2 Star Growth Growth 1 3 3 133
Marin	  Humane	  Society	  (The) 4 2 2 4 4 4 Star Profit Profit 1 2 2 122
Maryland	  SPCA	  (The) 3 3 4 2 2 2 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
Michigan	  AnR-­‐Cruelty	  Society 2 4 4 4 4 4 Profit Star Star 2 1 1 211
Michigan	  Humane	  Society 4 3 4 2 2 3 Growth Growth Star 3 3 1 331
Monmouth	  County	  SPCA 4 4 4 3 3 3 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Montgomery	  County	  SPCA 1 1 2 3 3 2 Profit Profit Poor 2 2 4 224
Morris	  Animal	  FoundaRon 4 4 4 2 3 3 Growth Star Star 3 1 1 311
MSPCA-­‐Angell 3 3 2 3 3 3 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
Nashville	  Humane	  AssociaRon 3 4 4 3 4 3 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
NaRonal	  AnR-­‐VivisecRon	  Society 3 4 3 2 3 2 Growth Star Growth 3 1 3 313
NaRonal	  Disaster	  Search	  Dog	  FoundaRon 3 4 4 1 1 2 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
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NaRonal	  EducaRon	  for	  Assistance	  Dog	  Services 4 4 4 4 4 4 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
NaRonal	  Humane	  EducaRon	  Society 1 1 2 3 2 3 Profit Poor Profit 2 4 2 242
Nevada	  Humane	  Society 3 2 4 1 2 2 Growth Poor Growth 3 4 3 343
No	  More	  Homeless	  Pets	  in	  Utah 1 1 4 2 1 3 Poor Poor Star 4 4 1 441
North	  Carolina	  Veterinary	  Medical	  FoundaRon 4 4 4 3 3 2 Star Star Growth 1 1 3 113
North	  Shore	  Animal	  League	  America 2 2 2 1 0 1 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Northeast	  Animal	  Shelter 2 2 4 0 1 0 Poor Poor Growth 4 4 3 443
Northwest	  OrganizaRon	  for	  Animal	  Help 3 3 4 3 3 3 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Oregon	  Humane	  Society 3 4 4 3 3 4 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Oshkosh	  Area	  Humane	  Society 4 2 1 4 3 2 Star Profit Poor 1 2 4 124
Pasado's	  Safe	  Haven 4 4 4 4 4 4 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Paws	  With	  A	  Cause 3 2 2 4 4 4 Star Profit Profit 1 2 2 122
Peggy	  Adams	  Animal	  Rescue	  League 2 4 3 3 3 1 Profit Star Growth 2 1 3 213
People	  for	  the	  Ethical	  Treatment	  of	  Animals 4 3 3 3 3 3 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Pet	  AdopRon	  Fund 4 3 2 4 3 4 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
Pet	  Orphans	  of	  Southern	  California 2 1 4 2 3 4 Poor Profit Star 4 2 1 421
Pets	  in	  Need 3 1 1 4 4 4 Star Profit Profit 1 2 2 122
Po`er	  League	  for	  Animals 4 4 4 1 1 0 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
Progressive	  Animal	  Welfare	  Society 2 2 4 2 2 2 Poor Poor Growth 4 4 3 443
Puppies	  Behind	  Bars 4 4 4 2 4 4 Growth Star Star 3 1 1 311
Ramapo-­‐Bergen	  Animal	  Refuge,	  Inc. 3 3 2 3 3 3 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
Rancho	  Coastal	  Humane	  Society 2 2 4 3 3 2 Profit Profit Growth 2 2 3 223
Richmond	  SPCA 4 4 4 3 3 3 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Roanoke	  Valley	  SPCA 3 3 4 4 4 3 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
San	  Diego	  Humane	  Society	  and	  SPCA 4 4 3 3 3 3 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
San	  Francisco	  SPCA 4 3 3 2 4 4 Growth Star Star 3 1 1 311
Santa	  Fe	  Animal	  Shelter	  &	  Humane	  Society 4 4 4 2 2 1 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
Seeing	  Eye	  (The) 4 4 4 4 3 3 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
SNAP 1 1 1 2 2 3 Poor Poor Profit 4 4 2 442
Southeastern	  Guide	  Dogs 3 3 3 4 4 4 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Southwest	  Missouri	  Humane	  Society 2 3 3 4 4 4 Profit Star Star 2 1 1 211
SPCA	  for	  Monterey	  County	  (The) 3 4 4 2 3 3 Growth Star Star 3 1 1 311
SPCA	  of	  Central	  Florida 4 4 4 4 3 4 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
SPCA	  Serving	  Erie	  County 3 4 4 3 3 3 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
SPCA	  Tampa	  Bay 2 3 4 1 2 1 Poor Growth Growth 4 3 3 433
St.	  Hubert's	  Animal	  Welfare	  Center 3 2 2 3 3 2 Star Profit Poor 1 2 4 124
Suncoast	  Humane	  Society 3 4 4 3 3 3 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Thoroughbred	  ReRrement	  FoundaRon 3 2 1 2 3 3 Growth Profit Profit 3 2 2 322
Tony	  La	  Russa's	  Animal	  Rescue	  FoundaRon 3 3 4 3 4 4 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
United	  Animal	  NaRons 4 3 3 4 3 3 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Upper	  Valley	  Humane	  Society 1 3 3 2 2 1 Poor Growth Growth 4 3 3 433
Virginia	  Beach	  SPCA 4 4 4 3 4 4 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Washington	  Animal	  Rescue	  League 4 4 4 1 0 2 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
Wayside	  Waifs 4 4 4 1 2 1 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
Western	  Pennsylvania	  Humane	  Society 4 4 4 3 3 3 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Willame`e	  Humane	  Society 4 4 3 2 2 1 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
Wisconsin	  Humane	  Society 4 4 4 3 3 3 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
World	  Society	  for	  the	  ProtecRon	  of	  Animals 4 3 4 1 1 1 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
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SCENARIO	  3 Change	  in	  Revenue Fundraising	  Efficiency CATEGORY	  ALPHA CATEGORY	  NUMERICAL
2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 1:STAR	  2:PROFIT	  3:GROWTH	  4:POOR 1:STAR	  2:PROFIT	  3:GROWTH	  4:POOR
ORG_NAME YRFOUND REVCHG06 REVCHG07 REVCHG08 FUNEFF06 FUNEFF07 FUNEFF08 2006 2007 2006 2006 2007 2008 CODE
Actors	  and	  Others	  for	  Animals 1971 0.0729 0.0979 -­‐0.1813 0.04 0.03 0.03 Growth Growth Poor 3 3 4 334
Alley	  Cat	  Allies 1990 0.3417 0.114 0.0621 0.14 0.08 0.18 Star Growth Star 1 3 1 131
Alley	  Cat	  Rescue 1996 0.5672 0.5408 0.1262 0.08 0.10 0.22 Growth Growth Star 3 3 1 331
American	  AnX-­‐VivisecXon	  Society 1883 -­‐0.1477 -­‐0.1065 -­‐0.5788 0.09 0.17 0.26 Poor Profit Profit 4 2 2 422
American	  Humane	  AssociaXon 1877 4.3132 -­‐0.7697 0.2173 0.02 0.19 0.36 Growth Profit Star 3 2 1 321
American	  Kennel	  Club	  Canine	  Health	  FoundaXon 1995 -­‐0.0733 0.5195 -­‐0.3474 0.10 0.07 0.07 Poor Growth Poor 4 3 4 434
American	  Veterinary	  Medical	  FoundaXon 1963 -­‐0.6165 -­‐0.0514 -­‐0.1982 0.05 0.19 0.26 Poor Profit Profit 4 2 2 422
Anderson	  Animal	  Shelter 1966 -­‐0.2834 -­‐0.1849 -­‐0.096 0.12 0.25 0.29 Profit Profit Profit 2 2 2 222
Animal	  Haven 1967 -­‐0.0869 0.0482 -­‐0.1256 0.02 0.06 0.07 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Animal	  Humane	  New	  Mexico 1968 0.3706 0.0175 0.0572 0.21 0.30 0.32 Star Profit Star 1 2 1 121
Animal	  ProtecXve	  AssociaXon	  of	  Missouri 1922 0.5276 -­‐0.476 1.4045 0.07 0.47 0.08 Growth Profit Growth 3 2 3 323
Animal	  Rescue 1976 0.0817 -­‐0.1076 -­‐0.0586 0.04 0.07 0.06 Growth Poor Poor 3 4 4 344
Animal	  Rescue	  League	  of	  Iowa 1926 -­‐1.5645 -­‐2.7561 0.0667 0.07 0.14 0.08 Poor Profit Growth 4 2 3 423
Animal	  Welfare	  AssociaXon 1948 0.1861 0.8212 -­‐0.2301 0.08 0.04 0.09 Growth Growth Poor 3 3 4 334
Animal	  Welfare	  InsXtute 1951 -­‐0.643 0.2632 -­‐0.3237 0.00 0.01 0.01 Poor Growth Poor 4 3 4 434
Animal	  Welfare	  League 1935 0.0262 -­‐0.1711 0.1946 0.05 0.14 0.10 Poor Profit Growth 4 2 3 423
Animal	  Welfare	  League	  of	  Arlington 1944 0.0112 0.1261 0.2531 0.24 0.32 0.22 Profit Star Star 2 1 1 211
Animal	  Welfare	  Society 1967 0.2273 0.0867 0.1038 0.21 0.22 0.16 Star Profit Star 1 2 1 121
AnX-­‐Cruelty	  Society	  (The) 1899 0.0981 0.0325 -­‐0.2505 0.15 0.22 0.26 Star Profit Profit 1 2 2 122
Arizona	  Animal	  Welfare	  League	  and	  SPCA 1971 0.8265 -­‐0.0596 0.329 0.11 0.22 0.08 Growth Profit Growth 3 2 3 323
Arizona	  Humane	  Society 1957 -­‐0.0572 0.12 0.1176 0.18 0.20 0.13 Profit Star Growth 2 1 3 213
Associated	  Humane	  SocieXes 1906 0.1582 0.1571 -­‐0.0975 0.15 0.12 0.15 Star Growth Profit 1 3 2 132
Atlanta	  Humane	  Society 1873 -­‐0.0382 -­‐0.086 -­‐0.3769 0.08 0.17 0.14 Poor Profit Profit 4 2 2 422
Bangor	  Humane	  Society 1869 -­‐0.1079 0.064 1.1464 0.11 0.08 0.02 Poor Poor Growth 4 4 3 443
Best	  Friends	  Animal	  Society 1986 -­‐0.1242 0.2499 0.0885 0.20 0.15 0.11 Profit Star Growth 2 1 3 213
Bideawee 1903 0.4842 0.3088 -­‐0.1355 0.28 0.16 0.34 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
Born	  Free	  USA	  united	  with	  Animal	  ProtecXon	  InsXtute 1968 -­‐0.4776 0.1419 -­‐0.0776 0.17 0.12 0.17 Profit Growth Profit 2 3 2 232
Buddy	  Dog	  Humane	  Society 1961 0.304 -­‐0.2069 0.1261 0.08 0.12 0.09 Growth Poor Growth 3 4 3 343
Canine	  Assistants 1991 -­‐0.0948 0.1522 0.0558 0.00 0.01 0.01 Poor Growth Growth 4 3 3 433
Canine	  Companions	  for	  Independence 1975 -­‐0.4241 0.0472 0.2226 0.19 0.19 0.15 Profit Profit Star 2 2 1 221
Canine	  Partners	  For	  Life 1989 -­‐0.046 0.2945 0.1801 0.18 0.14 0.11 Profit Growth Growth 2 3 3 233
Capital	  Area	  Humane	  Society 1936 -­‐0.0238 0.0942 -­‐0.0813 0.20 0.20 0.20 Profit Profit Profit 2 2 2 222
Capital	  Humane	  Society 1902 0.0159 0.3285 0.7568 0.27 0.18 0.03 Profit Star Growth 2 1 3 213
Cat	  Care	  Society 1981 0.4682 -­‐0.1721 0.2109 0.06 0.16 0.14 Growth Profit Star 3 2 1 321
Champaign	  County	  Humane	  Society 1903 -­‐0.196 0.1862 -­‐0.0904 0.10 0.08 0.11 Poor Growth Poor 4 3 4 434
Charleston	  Animal	  Society 1874 2.4833 -­‐0.3845 0.131 0.04 0.11 0.07 Growth Poor Growth 3 4 3 343
CiXzens	  for	  Animal	  ProtecXon 1972 -­‐0.0423 0.6089 0.0567 0.07 0.08 0.08 Poor Growth Growth 4 3 3 433
Cleveland	  Animal	  ProtecXve	  League 1913 0.1785 -­‐0.0074 0.0207 0.37 0.41 0.25 Star Profit Profit 1 2 2 122
Dane	  County	  Humane	  Society 1921 -­‐0.4048 -­‐0.0693 0.1619 0.16 0.21 0.21 Profit Profit Star 2 2 1 221
Defenders	  of	  Animal	  Rights 1988 0.2416 -­‐0.0666 -­‐0.1251 0.04 0.05 0.06 Growth Poor Poor 3 4 4 344
Dogs	  for	  the	  Deaf 1977 0.319 0.2661 0.3187 0.05 0.05 0.06 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
Dumb	  Friends	  League 1910 0.1942 0.1005 0.1826 0.16 0.16 0.16 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Dutchess	  County	  SPCA 1871 -­‐0.2569 1.3168 -­‐0.3712 0.18 0.05 0.14 Profit Growth Profit 2 3 2 232
Elmsford	  Animal	  Shelter 1931 -­‐0.0822 0.49 -­‐0.2175 0.00 0.00 0.00 Poor Growth Poor 4 3 4 434
Escondido	  Humane	  Society 1915 0.0586 0.0768 -­‐0.0835 0.64 0.36 0.20 Star Profit Profit 1 2 2 122
FACT 1982 0.1222 0.0329 0.258 0.21 0.20 0.17 Star Profit Star 1 2 1 121
Farm	  Sanctuary 1986 0.1432 -­‐0.0209 0.154 0.12 0.13 0.14 Growth Poor Star 3 4 1 341
Fidelco	  Guide	  Dog	  FoundaXon 1960 1.4659 -­‐0.4526 -­‐0.018 0.04 0.09 0.08 Growth Poor Poor 3 4 4 344
Front	  Range	  Equine	  Rescue 1997 0.4611 0.225 0.1641 0.08 0.14 0.08 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
Greater	  Androscoggin	  Humane	  Society 1885 -­‐0.4683 0.3014 -­‐0.4919 0.15 0.16 0.26 Profit Star Profit 2 1 2 212
Greenhill	  Humane	  Society,	  SPCA 1944 0.4557 -­‐0.1989 0.3171 0.06 0.08 0.09 Growth Poor Growth 3 4 3 343
Guide	  Dog	  FoundaXon	  for	  the	  Blind 1946 0.1408 -­‐0.0805 0.1225 0.10 0.07 0.06 Growth Poor Growth 3 4 3 343
Guide	  Dogs	  for	  the	  Blind 1942 0.2558 -­‐0.0364 0.0225 0.11 0.11 0.17 Growth Poor Profit 3 4 2 342
Guide	  Dogs	  of	  America 1948 0.0889 0.0523 0.2119 0.17 0.19 0.15 Star Profit Star 1 2 1 121
Guide	  Dogs	  of	  the	  Desert 1972 1.078 0.7008 -­‐0.5102 0.11 0.05 0.18 Growth Growth Profit 3 3 2 332
Guiding	  Eyes	  for	  the	  Blind 1956 0.0538 0.2528 -­‐0.0287 0.18 0.15 0.16 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
Hawaiian	  Humane	  Society 1897 0.0081 0.1351 0.116 0.15 0.14 0.11 Profit Growth Growth 2 3 3 233
Heartland	  Humane	  Society 1966 -­‐0.0788 0.0251 0.151 0.15 0.19 0.23 Profit Profit Star 2 2 1 221
Hooved	  Animal	  Humane	  Society 1971 -­‐0.323 0.1523 -­‐0.3399 0.29 0.24 0.18 Profit Star Profit 2 1 2 212
Humane	  Farming	  AssociaXon 1985 0.1713 0.0115 -­‐0.0148 0.08 0.08 0.09 Growth Poor Poor 3 4 4 344
Humane	  League	  of	  Lancaster	  County 1917 -­‐0.4945 0.6371 0.6239 0.15 0.09 0.07 Profit Growth Growth 2 3 3 233
Humane	  Society	  at	  Lollypop	  Farm 1873 0.0854 0.0794 0.012 0.17 0.17 0.18 Star Profit Profit 1 2 2 122
Humane	  Society	  for	  Seadle/King	  County	  (The) 1897 -­‐0.0039 0.0739 0.3013 0.18 0.19 0.14 Profit Profit Star 2 2 1 221
Humane	  Society	  for	  Southwest	  Washington 1897 -­‐0.0858 1.0509 -­‐0.4586 0.23 0.05 0.15 Profit Growth Profit 2 3 2 232
Humane	  Society	  of	  BalXmore	  County 1927 -­‐0.0842 0.3139 -­‐0.2567 0.02 0.09 0.11 Poor Growth Poor 4 3 4 434
Humane	  Society	  of	  Broward	  County 1944 -­‐0.3691 0.1007 -­‐0.2007 0.22 0.23 0.23 Profit Star Profit 2 1 2 212
Humane	  Society	  of	  Charlode 1978 -­‐0.6841 0.3801 0.0163 0.13 0.21 0.29 Profit Star Profit 2 1 2 212
Humane	  Society	  of	  El	  Paso 1947 -­‐0.4557 -­‐0.3214 1.5925 0.08 0.01 0.00 Poor Poor Growth 4 4 3 443
Humane	  Society	  of	  Greater	  Kansas	  City 1912 0.1327 0.2004 0.1602 0.44 0.41 0.28 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Humane	  Society	  of	  Greater	  Miami	  Adopt-­‐A-­‐Pet 1936 -­‐0.4563 0.1547 0.6833 0.19 0.23 0.22 Profit Star Star 2 1 1 211
Humane	  Society	  of	  Kent	  County	  (The) 1883 0.0247 0.0396 0.1183 0.23 0.38 0.30 Profit Profit Star 2 2 1 221
Humane	  Society	  of	  Missouri 1870 0.5739 -­‐0.241 0.0439 0.11 0.27 0.22 Growth Profit Star 3 2 1 321
Humane	  Society	  of	  San	  Antonio 1952 0.5115 -­‐0.3015 0.1238 0.01 0.14 0.08 Growth Profit Growth 3 2 3 323
Humane	  Society	  of	  South	  Mississippi 1952 2.2043 -­‐0.6384 0.3089 0.04 0.26 0.10 Growth Profit Growth 3 2 3 323
Humane	  Society	  of	  Southern	  Arizona 1967 -­‐0.015 0.4757 -­‐0.1976 0.20 0.20 0.18 Profit Star Profit 2 1 2 212
Humane	  Society	  of	  Tampa	  Bay 1912 -­‐0.0329 0.3727 0.2073 0.33 0.25 0.14 Profit Star Star 2 1 1 211
Humane	  Society	  of	  the	  Pikes	  Peak	  Region 1949 0.1069 0.1075 0.1581 0.26 0.25 0.16 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Humane	  Society	  of	  the	  Treasure	  Coast,	  Inc. 1955 0.1903 -­‐0.1216 -­‐0.0483 0.17 0.19 0.17 Star Profit Profit 1 2 2 122
Humane	  Society	  of	  Vero	  Beach	  and	  Indian	  River	  County 1953 -­‐0.1351 0.5236 -­‐0.1381 0.15 0.07 0.10 Profit Growth Poor 2 3 4 234
Humane	  Society	  Silicon	  Valley 1929 -­‐0.0212 0.3256 1.2646 0.19 0.12 0.07 Profit Growth Growth 2 3 3 233
In	  Defense	  of	  Animals 1983 -­‐0.2233 0.3684 -­‐0.2371 0.12 0.10 0.12 Profit Growth Poor 2 3 4 234
InternaXonal	  Fund	  for	  Animal	  Welfare 1969 0.0217 0.7065 -­‐0.2723 0.11 0.09 0.11 Poor Growth Poor 4 3 4 434
Jacksonville	  Humane	  Society 1885 2.5246 0.317 -­‐0.7627 0.04 0.03 0.25 Growth Growth Profit 3 3 2 332
Kentucky	  Horse	  Park	  FoundaXon 1985 0.2648 0.2905 1.1542 0.13 0.09 0.04 Star Growth Growth 1 3 3 133
Kentucky	  Humane	  Society 1884 0.0102 0.2002 0.0852 0.17 0.18 0.23 Profit Star Star 2 1 1 211
Leader	  Dogs	  for	  the	  Blind 1939 -­‐0.1459 0.0879 -­‐0.0088 0.28 0.25 0.18 Profit Profit Profit 2 2 2 222
League	  for	  Animal	  Welfare 1964 0.0563 -­‐0.303 0.824 0.05 0.03 0.01 Growth Poor Growth 3 4 3 343
Lexington	  Humane	  Society 1944 -­‐0.0462 -­‐0.0923 0.0101 0.10 0.13 0.16 Poor Poor Profit 4 4 2 442
Marin	  Humane	  Society	  (The) 1907 0.2615 -­‐0.2931 0.1216 0.09 0.07 0.05 Growth Poor Growth 3 4 3 343
Maryland	  SPCA	  (The) 1869 -­‐0.045 0.613 -­‐0.4316 0.24 0.16 0.22 Profit Star Profit 2 1 2 212
Michigan	  AnX-­‐Cruelty	  Society 1935 1.3045 -­‐0.1362 0.6822 0.03 0.04 0.01 Growth Poor Growth 3 4 3 343
Michigan	  Humane	  Society 1877 0.1174 -­‐0.0891 0.0013 0.23 0.23 0.18 Star Profit Profit 1 2 2 122
Monmouth	  County	  SPCA 1955 0.1363 -­‐0.0721 -­‐0.5438 0.10 0.18 0.12 Growth Profit Poor 3 2 4 324
Montgomery	  County	  SPCA 1909 -­‐0.5697 0.1116 -­‐0.0438 0.01 0.01 0.01 Poor Growth Poor 4 3 4 434
Morris	  Animal	  FoundaXon 1948 0.8163 0.6575 -­‐0.1218 0.13 0.12 0.15 Star Growth Profit 1 3 2 132
MSPCA-­‐Angell 1868 0.0217 0.0314 -­‐0.0951 0.11 0.10 0.17 Poor Poor Profit 4 4 2 442
Nashville	  Humane	  AssociaXon 1887 0.0423 0.0445 0.2316 0.10 0.09 0.09 Growth Poor Growth 3 4 3 343
NaXonal	  AnX-­‐VivisecXon	  Society 1929 0.2808 0.3699 -­‐0.3395 0.12 0.10 0.18 Growth Growth Profit 3 3 2 332
NaXonal	  Disaster	  Search	  Dog	  FoundaXon 1996 1.2304 -­‐0.1769 0.3106 0.11 0.16 0.11 Growth Profit Growth 3 2 3 323
NaXonal	  EducaXon	  for	  Assistance	  Dog	  Services 1976 -­‐0.0728 0.9727 -­‐0.3523 0.07 0.03 0.06 Poor Growth Poor 4 3 4 434
NaXonal	  Humane	  EducaXon	  Society 1948 0.0176 0.0469 -­‐0.029 0.08 0.11 0.12 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Nevada	  Humane	  Society 1932 -­‐0.4517 -­‐0.1727 0.5585 0.34 0.12 0.04 Profit Poor Growth 2 4 3 243
No	  More	  Homeless	  Pets	  in	  Utah 2000 -­‐0.3298 -­‐0.0646 0.2007 0.34 0.35 0.12 Profit Profit Growth 2 2 3 223
North	  Carolina	  Veterinary	  Medical	  FoundaXon 1978 0.0364 0.4673 -­‐0.1721 0.06 0.07 0.11 Poor Growth Poor 4 3 4 434
North	  Shore	  Animal	  League	  America 1944 -­‐0.0449 0.09 0.0295 0.32 0.41 0.28 Profit Profit Star 2 2 1 221
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Northeast	  Animal	  Shelter 1976 -­‐0.0237 0.1923 -­‐0.1342 0.46 0.18 0.29 Profit Star Profit 2 1 2 212
Northwest	  OrganizaXon	  for	  Animal	  Help 1988 -­‐0.1367 0.4887 0.0055 0.16 0.11 0.11 Profit Growth Poor 2 3 4 234
Oregon	  Humane	  Society 1868 -­‐0.146 0.0917 0.0133 0.12 0.09 0.09 Profit Poor Poor 2 4 4 244
Oshkosh	  Area	  Humane	  Society 1990 -­‐0.0102 0.0288 -­‐0.1936 0.09 0.10 0.02 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Pasado's	  Safe	  Haven 1998 -­‐0.0928 0.3612 -­‐0.1074 0.02 0.02 0.01 Poor Growth Poor 4 3 4 434
Paws	  With	  A	  Cause 1979 0.0129 0.0391 -­‐0.0542 0.01 0.04 0.05 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Peggy	  Adams	  Animal	  Rescue	  League 1925 0.5218 2.0509 -­‐0.8316 0.16 0.03 0.39 Star Growth Profit 1 3 2 132
People	  for	  the	  Ethical	  Treatment	  of	  Animals 1980 0.1376 -­‐0.0142 0.0846 0.12 0.12 0.13 Growth Poor Growth 3 4 3 343
Pet	  AdopXon	  Fund 1983 0.1736 -­‐0.1326 -­‐0.1336 0.06 0.10 0.08 Growth Poor Poor 3 4 4 344
Pet	  Orphans	  of	  Southern	  California 1973 -­‐0.3188 0.3324 0.824 0.25 0.11 0.05 Profit Growth Growth 2 3 3 233
Pets	  in	  Need 1965 0.3417 -­‐0.1817 -­‐0.3973 0.00 0.01 0.04 Growth Poor Poor 3 4 4 344
Poder	  League	  for	  Animals 1929 1.0866 0.0945 0.0458 0.12 0.12 0.14 Growth Growth Star 3 3 1 331
Progressive	  Animal	  Welfare	  Society 1967 -­‐0.187 0.1062 0.2558 0.21 0.20 0.15 Profit Star Star 2 1 1 211
Puppies	  Behind	  Bars 1997 0.2276 0.2457 0.0846 0.09 0.07 0.06 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
Ramapo-­‐Bergen	  Animal	  Refuge,	  Inc. 1978 0.1234 -­‐0.0534 -­‐0.0684 0.05 0.06 0.18 Growth Poor Profit 3 4 2 342
Rancho	  Coastal	  Humane	  Society 1960 0.4821 -­‐0.1888 0.5791 0.10 0.17 0.05 Growth Profit Growth 3 2 3 323
Richmond	  SPCA 1891 0.4125 0.0327 0.6269 0.12 0.17 0.22 Growth Profit Star 3 2 1 321
Roanoke	  Valley	  SPCA 1916 0.0056 0.1989 0.6294 0.06 0.08 0.09 Poor Growth Growth 4 3 3 433
San	  Diego	  Humane	  Society	  and	  SPCA 1880 0.0972 0.3475 -­‐0.2976 0.11 0.09 0.17 Growth Growth Profit 3 3 2 332
San	  Francisco	  SPCA 1868 0.1613 0.7705 -­‐0.3244 0.06 0.03 0.04 Growth Growth Poor 3 3 4 334
Santa	  Fe	  Animal	  Shelter	  &	  Humane	  Society 1939 0.0799 0.5871 -­‐0.1253 0.20 0.15 0.21 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
Seeing	  Eye	  (The) 1929 0.2231 0.1051 -­‐0.3813 0.07 0.12 0.12 Growth Growth Poor 3 3 4 334
SNAP 1999 -­‐0.2664 0.0895 0.1267 0.26 0.35 0.31 Profit Profit Star 2 2 1 221
Southeastern	  Guide	  Dogs 1982 0.3062 0.0335 -­‐0.2966 0.05 0.04 0.07 Growth Poor Poor 3 4 4 344
Southwest	  Missouri	  Humane	  Society 1956 0.537 0.1924 -­‐0.0371 0.06 0.08 0.05 Growth Growth Poor 3 3 4 334
SPCA	  for	  Monterey	  County	  (The) 1905 -­‐0.6888 0.5005 0.1604 0.19 0.10 0.12 Profit Growth Growth 2 3 3 233
SPCA	  of	  Central	  Florida 1937 0.3982 0.012 0.3244 0.09 0.14 0.06 Growth Profit Growth 3 2 3 323
SPCA	  Serving	  Erie	  County 1867 0.014 0.0388 0.2344 0.14 0.17 0.13 Profit Profit Growth 2 2 3 223
SPCA	  Tampa	  Bay 1940 0.1186 0.161 0.1693 0.31 0.19 0.20 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
St.	  Hubert's	  Animal	  Welfare	  Center 1939 0.0864 0.1496 -­‐0.3258 0.17 0.15 0.23 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
Suncoast	  Humane	  Society 1971 -­‐0.2238 0.479 0.1049 0.21 0.14 0.17 Profit Growth Star 2 3 1 231
Thoroughbred	  ReXrement	  FoundaXon 1982 -­‐0.0227 0.0328 -­‐0.0159 0.20 0.17 0.11 Profit Profit Poor 2 2 4 224
Tony	  La	  Russa's	  Animal	  Rescue	  FoundaXon 1991 0.3359 0.4099 -­‐0.2141 0.10 0.05 0.05 Growth Growth Poor 3 3 4 334
United	  Animal	  NaXons 1987 -­‐0.2434 -­‐0.259 -­‐0.0391 0.07 0.10 0.12 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Upper	  Valley	  Humane	  Society 1974 -­‐0.102 0.0424 0.0408 0.24 0.22 0.21 Profit Profit Star 2 2 1 221
Virginia	  Beach	  SPCA 1966 0.2428 0.5711 -­‐0.0407 0.11 0.06 0.09 Growth Growth Poor 3 3 4 334
Washington	  Animal	  Rescue	  League 1914 0.1012 0.5631 0.0772 0.33 0.21 0.17 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Wayside	  Waifs 1944 -­‐0.0403 0.4029 0.0061 0.24 0.15 0.20 Profit Star Profit 2 1 2 212
Western	  Pennsylvania	  Humane	  Society 1874 0.1116 0.0222 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.06 Star Profit Growth 1 2 3 123
Willamede	  Humane	  Society 1965 0.1338 -­‐0.1622 0.1539 0.24 0.33 0.32 Star Profit Star 1 2 1 121
Wisconsin	  Humane	  Society 1879 -­‐0.126 0.073 -­‐0.3936 0.11 0.14 0.14 Poor Profit Profit 4 2 2 422
World	  Society	  for	  the	  ProtecXon	  of	  Animals 1981 0.321 0.1842 0.335 0.20 0.25 0.19 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
MIN -­‐1.5645 -­‐2.7561 -­‐0.8316 0 0 0
MAX 4.3132 2.0509 1.5925 0.64 0.47 0.39
MEDIAN 0.0423 0.0942 0.0225 0.12 0.14 0.13
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SCENARIO	  4 Change	  in	  Revenue Program	  "EBIT"	  Ra:o CATEGORY	  ALPHA CATEGORY	  NUMERICAL
2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 1:STAR	  2:PROFIT	  3:GROWTH	  4:POOR 1:STAR	  2:PROFIT	  3:GROWTH	  4:POOR
ORG_NAME YRFOUND REVCHG06 REVCHG07 REVCHG08 PGEBIT06 PGEBIT07 PGEBIT08 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 CODE
Alley	  Cat	  Rescue 1996 0.5672 0.5408 0.1262 0.0209 0.013 0.0168 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
American	  Humane	  Associa:on 1877 4.3132 -­‐0.7697 0.2173 0.1611 0.1459 0.1886 Growth Poor Growth 3 4 3 343
Anderson	  Animal	  Shelter 1966 -­‐0.2834 -­‐0.1849 -­‐0.096 0.2596 0.2979 0.2619 Profit Profit Poor 2 2 4 224
Animal	  Humane	  New	  Mexico 1968 0.3706 0.0175 0.0572 0.1884 0.2643 0.2813 Growth Profit Star 3 2 1 321
Animal	  Protec:ve	  Associa:on	  of	  Missouri 1922 0.5276 -­‐0.476 1.4045 0.2689 0.2778 0.2761 Star Profit Star 1 2 1 121
Animal	  Rescue 1976 0.0817 -­‐0.1076 -­‐0.0586 0.1116 0.1206 0.1533 Growth Poor Poor 3 4 4 344
Animal	  Rescue	  League	  of	  Iowa 1926 -­‐1.5645 -­‐2.7561 0.0667 0.4861 0.4809 0.3922 Profit Profit Star 2 2 1 221
Animal	  Welfare	  Associa:on 1948 0.1861 0.8212 -­‐0.2301 0.4535 0.4564 0.4463 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
Animal	  Welfare	  League 1935 0.0262 -­‐0.1711 0.1946 0.617 0.6187 0.6934 Profit Profit Star 2 2 1 221
Animal	  Welfare	  League	  of	  Arlington 1944 0.0112 0.1261 0.2531 0.657 0.7492 0.7339 Profit Star Star 2 1 1 211
Animal	  Welfare	  Society 1967 0.2273 0.0867 0.1038 0.3906 0.4198 0.3464 Star Profit Star 1 2 1 121
An:-­‐Cruelty	  Society	  (The) 1899 0.0981 0.0325 -­‐0.2505 0.1218 0.1125 0.1006 Growth Poor Poor 3 4 4 344
Arizona	  Animal	  Welfare	  League	  and	  SPCA 1971 0.8265 -­‐0.0596 0.329 0.0917 0.0222 0.0972 Growth Poor Growth 3 4 3 343
Arizona	  Humane	  Society 1957 -­‐0.0572 0.12 0.1176 0.2445 0.2471 0.245 Profit Growth Growth 2 3 3 233
Associated	  Humane	  Socie:es 1906 0.1582 0.1571 -­‐0.0975 0.36 0.3815 0.4312 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
Atlanta	  Humane	  Society 1873 -­‐0.0382 -­‐0.086 -­‐0.3769 0.1572 0.227 0.3214 Poor Poor Profit 4 4 2 442
Bangor	  Humane	  Society 1869 -­‐0.1079 0.064 1.1464 0.3252 0.3115 0.3337 Profit Profit Star 2 2 1 221
Bideawee 1903 0.4842 0.3088 -­‐0.1355 0.2792 0.2764 0.3035 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
Buddy	  Dog	  Humane	  Society 1961 0.304 -­‐0.2069 0.1261 0.2361 0.2555 0.2052 Growth Profit Growth 3 2 3 323
Canine	  Companions	  for	  Independence 1975 -­‐0.4241 0.0472 0.2226 0.0075 0.0062 0.0066 Poor Poor Growth 4 4 3 443
Capital	  Area	  Humane	  Society 1936 -­‐0.0238 0.0942 -­‐0.0813 0.386 0.4183 0.3447 Profit Star Profit 2 1 2 212
Capital	  Humane	  Society 1902 0.0159 0.3285 0.7568 0.496 0.5076 0.5481 Profit Star Star 2 1 1 211
Cat	  Care	  Society 1981 0.4682 -­‐0.1721 0.2109 0.1169 0.1577 0.2127 Growth Poor Growth 3 4 3 343
Champaign	  County	  Humane	  Society 1903 -­‐0.196 0.1862 -­‐0.0904 0.2148 0.2044 0.1917 Poor Growth Poor 4 3 4 434
Charleston	  Animal	  Society 1874 2.4833 -­‐0.3845 0.131 0.646 0.6723 0.5135 Star Profit Star 1 2 1 121
Cleveland	  Animal	  Protec:ve	  League 1913 0.1785 -­‐0.0074 0.0207 0.2331 0.2643 0.2639 Growth Profit Profit 3 2 2 322
Dane	  County	  Humane	  Society 1921 -­‐0.4048 -­‐0.0693 0.1619 0.3284 0.3386 0.4064 Profit Profit Star 2 2 1 221
Defenders	  of	  Animal	  Rights 1988 0.2416 -­‐0.0666 -­‐0.1251 0.0966 0.0973 0.0891 Growth Poor Poor 3 4 4 344
Dumb	  Friends	  League 1910 0.1942 0.1005 0.1826 0.1948 0.1767 0.1975 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
Dutchess	  County	  SPCA 1871 -­‐0.2569 1.3168 -­‐0.3712 0.2371 0.2406 0.2544 Profit Growth Poor 2 3 4 234
Elmsford	  Animal	  Shelter 1931 -­‐0.0822 0.49 -­‐0.2175 0.061 0.0279 0.0496 Poor Growth Poor 4 3 4 434
Escondido	  Humane	  Society 1915 0.0586 0.0768 -­‐0.0835 0.8193 0.6694 0.5852 Star Profit Profit 1 2 2 122
Farm	  Sanctuary 1986 0.1432 -­‐0.0209 0.154 0.0001 0.0012 0.0003 Growth Poor Growth 3 4 3 343
Fidelco	  Guide	  Dog	  Founda:on 1960 1.4659 -­‐0.4526 -­‐0.018 0.0469 0.0461 0.0468 Growth Poor Poor 3 4 4 344
Front	  Range	  Equine	  Rescue 1997 0.4611 0.225 0.1641 0.0098 0.0182 0.0174 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
Greater	  Androscoggin	  Humane	  Society 1885 -­‐0.4683 0.3014 -­‐0.4919 0.2443 0.2467 0.2744 Profit Growth Profit 2 3 2 232
Greenhill	  Humane	  Society,	  SPCA 1944 0.4557 -­‐0.1989 0.3171 0.309 0.3184 0.3624 Star Profit Star 1 2 1 121
Guide	  Dogs	  for	  the	  Blind 1942 0.2558 -­‐0.0364 0.0225 0.0101 0.0083 0.008 Growth Poor Poor 3 4 4 344
Guiding	  Eyes	  for	  the	  Blind 1956 0.0538 0.2528 -­‐0.0287 0.0244 0.0207 0.0162 Growth Growth Poor 3 3 4 334
Hawaiian	  Humane	  Society 1897 0.0081 0.1351 0.116 0.6279 0.6414 0.6353 Profit Star Star 2 1 1 211
Heartland	  Humane	  Society 1966 -­‐0.0788 0.0251 0.151 0.0899 0.387 0.4088 Poor Profit Star 4 2 1 421
Hooved	  Animal	  Humane	  Society 1971 -­‐0.323 0.1523 -­‐0.3399 0.0441 0.0492 0.0416 Poor Growth Poor 4 3 4 434
Humane	  League	  of	  Lancaster	  County 1917 -­‐0.4945 0.6371 0.6239 0.2829 0.2875 0.2917 Profit Star Star 2 1 1 211
Humane	  Society	  at	  Lollypop	  Farm 1873 0.0854 0.0794 0.012 0.3389 0.3419 0.3187 Star Profit Profit 1 2 2 122
Humane	  Society	  for	  Seacle/King	  County	  (The) 1897 -­‐0.0039 0.0739 0.3013 0.3201 0.2868 0.2561 Profit Profit Growth 2 2 3 223
Humane	  Society	  for	  Southwest	  Washington 1897 -­‐0.0858 1.0509 -­‐0.4586 0.4805 0.4533 0.3758 Profit Star Profit 2 1 2 212
Humane	  Society	  of	  Bal:more	  County 1927 -­‐0.0842 0.3139 -­‐0.2567 0.2027 0.1483 0.145 Poor Growth Poor 4 3 4 434
Humane	  Society	  of	  Broward	  County 1944 -­‐0.3691 0.1007 -­‐0.2007 0.197 0.2392 0.2413 Poor Growth Poor 4 3 4 434
Humane	  Society	  of	  Charloce 1978 -­‐0.6841 0.3801 0.0163 0.278 0.337 0.3332 Profit Star Profit 2 1 2 212
Humane	  Society	  of	  El	  Paso 1947 -­‐0.4557 -­‐0.3214 1.5925 0.4845 0.4822 0.368 Profit Profit Star 2 2 1 221
Humane	  Society	  of	  Greater	  Kansas	  City 1912 0.1327 0.2004 0.1602 0.6413 0.6634 0.582 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Humane	  Society	  of	  Greater	  Miami	  Adopt-­‐A-­‐Pet 1936 -­‐0.4563 0.1547 0.6833 0.2952 0.3236 0.4239 Profit Star Star 2 1 1 211
Humane	  Society	  of	  Kent	  County	  (The) 1883 0.0247 0.0396 0.1183 0.3273 0.3621 0.3533 Profit Profit Star 2 2 1 221
Humane	  Society	  of	  Missouri 1870 0.5739 -­‐0.241 0.0439 0.4639 0.4939 0.4729 Star Profit Star 1 2 1 121
Humane	  Society	  of	  San	  Antonio 1952 0.5115 -­‐0.3015 0.1238 0.2058 0.2208 0.234 Growth Poor Growth 3 4 3 343
Humane	  Society	  of	  South	  Mississippi 1952 2.2043 -­‐0.6384 0.3089 0.4642 0.4664 0.4396 Star Profit Star 1 2 1 121
Humane	  Society	  of	  Southern	  Arizona 1967 -­‐0.015 0.4757 -­‐0.1976 0.3645 0.3396 0.3783 Profit Star Profit 2 1 2 212
Humane	  Society	  of	  Tampa	  Bay 1912 -­‐0.0329 0.3727 0.2073 0.4081 0.3949 0.3835 Profit Star Star 2 1 1 211
Humane	  Society	  of	  the	  Pikes	  Peak	  Region 1949 0.1069 0.1075 0.1581 0.7682 0.8085 0.8454 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Humane	  Society	  of	  the	  Treasure	  Coast,	  Inc. 1955 0.1903 -­‐0.1216 -­‐0.0483 0.1113 0.2918 0.2804 Growth Profit Profit 3 2 2 322
Humane	  Society	  of	  Vero	  Beach	  and	  Indian	  River	  County 1953 -­‐0.1351 0.5236 -­‐0.1381 0.166 0.1774 0.1814 Poor Growth Poor 4 3 4 434
Humane	  Society	  Silicon	  Valley 1929 -­‐0.0212 0.3256 1.2646 0.2109 0.226 0.2834 Poor Growth Star 4 3 1 431
In	  Defense	  of	  Animals 1983 -­‐0.2233 0.3684 -­‐0.2371 0.0337 0.0262 0.0225 Poor Growth Poor 4 3 4 434
Jacksonville	  Humane	  Society 1885 2.5246 0.317 -­‐0.7627 0.0863 0.0753 0.123 Growth Growth Poor 3 3 4 334
Kentucky	  Horse	  Park	  Founda:on 1985 0.2648 0.2905 1.1542 0.2765 0.3279 0.229 Star Star Growth 1 1 3 113
Kentucky	  Humane	  Society 1884 0.0102 0.2002 0.0852 0.6334 0.6414 0.6685 Profit Star Star 2 1 1 211
Lexington	  Humane	  Society 1944 -­‐0.0462 -­‐0.0923 0.0101 0.22 0.2077 0.2337 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Marin	  Humane	  Society	  (The) 1907 0.2615 -­‐0.2931 0.1216 0.638 0.1852 0.202 Star Poor Growth 1 4 3 143
Maryland	  SPCA	  (The) 1869 -­‐0.045 0.613 -­‐0.4316 0.273 0.2722 0.2679 Profit Star Profit 2 1 2 212
Michigan	  An:-­‐Cruelty	  Society 1935 1.3045 -­‐0.1362 0.6822 0.05 0.0352 0.0297 Growth Poor Growth 3 4 3 343
Michigan	  Humane	  Society 1877 0.1174 -­‐0.0891 0.0013 0.4967 0.4467 0.4566 Star Profit Profit 1 2 2 122
Monmouth	  County	  SPCA 1955 0.1363 -­‐0.0721 -­‐0.5438 0.3292 0.3548 0.3501 Star Profit Profit 1 2 2 122
Montgomery	  County	  SPCA 1909 -­‐0.5697 0.1116 -­‐0.0438 0.2134 0.2231 0.2155 Poor Growth Poor 4 3 4 434
MSPCA-­‐Angell 1868 0.0217 0.0314 -­‐0.0951 0.6183 0.5352 0.4848 Profit Profit Profit 2 2 2 222
Nashville	  Humane	  Associa:on 1887 0.0423 0.0445 0.2316 0.1737 0.1457 0.1749 Growth Poor Growth 3 4 3 343
Na:onal	  Educa:on	  for	  Assistance	  Dog	  Services 1976 -­‐0.0728 0.9727 -­‐0.3523 0.3065 0.2692 0.2644 Profit Star Profit 2 1 2 212
Na:onal	  Humane	  Educa:on	  Society 1948 0.0176 0.0469 -­‐0.029 0.0512 0.0602 0.0806 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Nevada	  Humane	  Society 1932 -­‐0.4517 -­‐0.1727 0.5585 0.2233 0.1734 0.2096 Poor Poor Growth 4 4 3 443
No	  More	  Homeless	  Pets	  in	  Utah 2000 -­‐0.3298 -­‐0.0646 0.2007 0.5253 0.4405 0.439 Profit Profit Star 2 2 1 221
North	  Shore	  Animal	  League	  America 1944 -­‐0.0449 0.09 0.0295 0.1033 0.1523 0.1244 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Northeast	  Animal	  Shelter 1976 -­‐0.0237 0.1923 -­‐0.1342 0.3551 0.3783 0.3465 Profit Star Profit 2 1 2 212
Northwest	  Organiza:on	  for	  Animal	  Help 1988 -­‐0.1367 0.4887 0.0055 0.2174 0.2543 0.3037 Poor Growth Profit 4 3 2 432
Oregon	  Humane	  Society 1868 -­‐0.146 0.0917 0.0133 0.197 0.1594 0.1692 Poor Growth Poor 4 3 4 434
Oshkosh	  Area	  Humane	  Society 1990 -­‐0.0102 0.0288 -­‐0.1936 0.216 0.2546 0.2432 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Pasado's	  Safe	  Haven 1998 -­‐0.0928 0.3612 -­‐0.1074 0.0962 0.0725 0.0403 Poor Growth Poor 4 3 4 434
Peggy	  Adams	  Animal	  Rescue	  League 1925 0.5218 2.0509 -­‐0.8316 0.3243 0.3037 0.2523 Star Star Poor 1 1 4 114
People	  for	  the	  Ethical	  Treatment	  of	  Animals 1980 0.1376 -­‐0.0142 0.0846 0.0235 0.018 0.0199 Growth Poor Growth 3 4 3 343
Pets	  in	  Need 1965 0.3417 -­‐0.1817 -­‐0.3973 0.097 0.1031 0.0884 Growth Poor Poor 3 4 4 344
Pocer	  League	  for	  Animals 1929 1.0866 0.0945 0.0458 0.4347 0.3759 0.2955 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Progressive	  Animal	  Welfare	  Society 1967 -­‐0.187 0.1062 0.2558 0.2178 0.2361 0.1943 Poor Growth Growth 4 3 3 433
Rancho	  Coastal	  Humane	  Society 1960 0.4821 -­‐0.1888 0.5791 0.3629 0.3556 0.327 Star Profit Star 1 2 1 121
Richmond	  SPCA 1891 0.4125 0.0327 0.6269 0.1507 0.1703 0.1706 Growth Poor Growth 3 4 3 343
Roanoke	  Valley	  SPCA 1916 0.0056 0.1989 0.6294 0.1117 0.1092 0.1428 Poor Growth Growth 4 3 3 433
San	  Diego	  Humane	  Society	  and	  SPCA 1880 0.0972 0.3475 -­‐0.2976 0.1095 0.1116 0.102 Growth Growth Poor 3 3 4 334
San	  Francisco	  SPCA 1868 0.1613 0.7705 -­‐0.3244 0.2624 0.3158 0.314 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
Santa	  Fe	  Animal	  Shelter	  &	  Humane	  Society 1939 0.0799 0.5871 -­‐0.1253 0.2084 0.2429 0.2877 Growth Growth Profit 3 3 2 332
Seeing	  Eye	  (The) 1929 0.2231 0.1051 -­‐0.3813 0.0009 0.0008 0.0008 Growth Growth Poor 3 3 4 334
SNAP 1999 -­‐0.2664 0.0895 0.1267 0.6024 0.7166 0.6441 Profit Profit Star 2 2 1 221
Southwest	  Missouri	  Humane	  Society 1956 0.537 0.1924 -­‐0.0371 0.3362 0.242 0.2279 Star Growth Poor 1 3 4 134
SPCA	  for	  Monterey	  County	  (The) 1905 -­‐0.6888 0.5005 0.1604 0.1714 0.1799 0.1947 Poor Growth Growth 4 3 3 433
SPCA	  of	  Central	  Florida 1937 0.3982 0.012 0.3244 0.6314 0.6968 0.6473 Star Profit Star 1 2 1 121
SPCA	  Serving	  Erie	  County 1867 0.014 0.0388 0.2344 0.2401 0.2697 0.2829 Profit Profit Star 2 2 1 221
SPCA	  Tampa	  Bay 1940 0.1186 0.161 0.1693 0.126 0.112 0.1277 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
St.	  Hubert's	  Animal	  Welfare	  Center 1939 0.0864 0.1496 -­‐0.3258 0.5044 0.5409 0.5139 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
Suncoast	  Humane	  Society 1971 -­‐0.2238 0.479 0.1049 0.3464 0.292 0.1935 Profit Star Growth 2 1 3 213
Tony	  La	  Russa's	  Animal	  Rescue	  Founda:on 1991 0.3359 0.4099 -­‐0.2141 0.1171 0.1276 0.146 Growth Growth Poor 3 3 4 334
United	  Animal	  Na:ons 1987 -­‐0.2434 -­‐0.259 -­‐0.0391 0.0738 0.0365 0.0241 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Upper	  Valley	  Humane	  Society 1974 -­‐0.102 0.0424 0.0408 0.3172 0.2829 0.29 Profit Profit Profit 2 2 2 222
Virginia	  Beach	  SPCA 1966 0.2428 0.5711 -­‐0.0407 0.2134 0.1721 0.1666 Growth Growth Poor 3 3 4 334
Washington	  Animal	  Rescue	  League 1914 0.1012 0.5631 0.0772 0.0762 0.1065 0.104 Growth Growth Growth 3 3 3 333
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Wayside	  Waifs 1944 -­‐0.0403 0.4029 0.0061 0.329 0.2951 0.3023 Profit Star Profit 2 1 2 212
Western	  Pennsylvania	  Humane	  Society 1874 0.1116 0.0222 0.18 0.4986 0.55 0.4382 Star Profit Star 1 2 1 121
Willamece	  Humane	  Society 1965 0.1338 -­‐0.1622 0.1539 0.2283 0.1492 0.1038 Growth Poor Growth 3 4 3 343
Wisconsin	  Humane	  Society 1879 -­‐0.126 0.073 -­‐0.3936 0.2246 0.2548 0.3026 Poor Poor Profit 4 4 2 442
MIN -­‐1.5645 -­‐2.7561 -­‐0.8316 0.0001 0.0008 0.0003
MAX	   4.3132 2.0509 1.5925 0.8193 0.8085 0.8454
MEDIAN 0.03425 0.09085 0.04235 0.2366 0.25515 0.2629
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SCENARIO	  5 Change	  in	  ASSETS "Profit"	  Ra8o CATEGORY	  ALPHA CATEGORY	  NUMERICAL
2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 1:STAR	  2:PROFIT	  3:GROWTH	  4:POOR1:STAR	  2:PROFIT	  3:GROWTH	  4:POOR
ORG_NAME YRFOUND CHGASS06 CHGASS07 CHGASS08 PFTEXP06 PFTEXP07 PFTEXP08 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 CODE
Actors	  and	  Others	  for	  Animals 1971 0.0482 -­‐0.0005 -­‐0.1661 1.1532 1.0435 0.6508 Profit Poor Poor 2 4 4 244
Alley	  Cat	  Allies 1990 0.1309 0.1231 -­‐0.1569 1.0242 1.0295 0.9354 Growth Growth Poor 3 3 4 334
Alley	  Cat	  Rescue 1996 0.1896 2.03 -­‐0.3496 1.0247 1.1164 0.8987 Growth Growth Poor 3 3 4 334
American	  An8-­‐Vivisec8on	  Society 1883 0.161 0.0393 -­‐0.3037 2.1097 1.5925 0.6054 Star Profit Poor 1 2 4 124
American	  Humane	  Associa8on 1877 3.1383 -­‐0.0069 -­‐0.209 4.6905 0.9516 0.6827 Star Poor Poor 1 4 4 144
American	  Kennel	  Club	  Canine	  Health	  Founda8on 1995 0.1475 0.0819 -­‐0.2027 1.1257 1.3626 0.8167 Star Star Poor 1 1 4 114
American	  Veterinary	  Medical	  Founda8on 1963 -­‐0.0004 0.0171 -­‐0.1083 0.8592 1.0567 0.8279 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Anderson	  Animal	  Shelter 1966 0.1164 0.0825 -­‐0.3782 1.2004 0.9213 0.7496 Star Growth Poor 1 3 4 134
Animal	  Haven 1967 0.0127 0.4207 -­‐0.1673 1.0106 0.9606 0.8391 Poor Growth Poor 4 3 4 434
Animal	  Humane	  New	  Mexico 1968 0.1727 0.0855 -­‐0.1122 1.3848 1.1348 1.0259 Star Star Poor 1 1 4 114
Animal	  Protec8ve	  Associa8on	  of	  Missouri 1922 0.1152 0.0136 0.1117 1.5987 0.7785 1.8888 Star Poor Star 1 4 1 141
Animal	  Rescue 1976 -­‐0.0617 -­‐0.126 -­‐0.0408 0.925 0.9084 0.946 Poor Poor Growth 4 4 3 443
Animal	  Rescue	  League	  of	  Iowa 1926 -­‐0.3905 0.5888 0.4812 -­‐0.8056 1.3424 1.1709 Poor Star Star 4 1 1 411
Animal	  Welfare	  Associa8on 1948 0.2259 1.4653 0.1555 1.1109 1.8943 1.3603 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Animal	  Welfare	  Ins8tute 1951 0.1448 0.1425 -­‐0.0408 2.0547 1.8458 0.8841 Star Star Growth 1 1 3 113
Animal	  Welfare	  League 1935 0.0483 0.0297 -­‐0.1435 1.0895 0.8558 0.9538 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Animal	  Welfare	  League	  of	  Arlington 1944 0.0536 0.0876 0.0673 1.0688 1.1212 1.2598 Growth Star Star 3 1 1 311
Animal	  Welfare	  Society 1967 0.0037 0.0476 -­‐0.0263 0.9552 1.042 0.976 Poor Poor Growth 4 4 3 443
An8-­‐Cruelty	  Society	  (The) 1899 0.0865 0.0506 -­‐0.1926 1.3175 1.2783 0.8589 Star Profit Poor 1 2 4 124
Arizona	  Animal	  Welfare	  League	  and	  SPCA 1971 0.3362 -­‐0.0727 0.0818 1.3043 0.9035 1.0412 Star Poor Star 1 4 1 141
Arizona	  Humane	  Society 1957 0.0044 0.0402 -­‐0.0177 0.917 0.927 1.1273 Poor Poor Star 4 4 1 441
Associated	  Humane	  Socie8es 1906 -­‐0.1276 0.0038 -­‐0.1794 0.8371 0.9582 0.8908 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Atlanta	  Humane	  Society 1873 0.0824 0.0613 -­‐0.1851 1.5859 1.3317 0.7908 Star Star Poor 1 1 4 114
Bangor	  Humane	  Society 1869 -­‐0.0447 -­‐0.0709 0.3513 0.8699 0.897 1.9683 Poor Poor Star 4 4 1 441
Best	  Friends	  Animal	  Society 1986 -­‐0.1518 0.065 0.0199 0.8386 1.0444 1.0678 Poor Growth Star 4 3 1 431
Bideawee 1903 -­‐0.0539 0.058 -­‐0.0875 0.8073 1.1912 0.9025 Poor Star Poor 4 1 4 414
Born	  Free	  USA	  united	  with	  Animal	  Protec8on	  Ins8tute 1968 -­‐0.1515 -­‐0.0614 -­‐0.2629 0.6762 0.9437 0.8116 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Buddy	  Dog	  Humane	  Society 1961 0.0184 0.0276 -­‐0.0461 1.2422 0.9716 0.9345 Profit Poor Poor 2 4 4 244
Canine	  Assistants 1991 0.0131 -­‐0.0885 0.0163 0.9433 1.0042 0.9951 Poor Poor Growth 4 4 3 443
Canine	  Companions	  for	  Independence 1975 0.0106 0.0291 0.0423 0.9977 1.0098 1.1416 Poor Poor Star 4 4 1 441
Canine	  Partners	  For	  Life 1989 -­‐0.0073 0.036 0.0576 0.9833 1.1129 1.2074 Poor Poor Star 4 4 1 441
Capital	  Area	  Humane	  Society 1936 0.0836 0.341 -­‐0.0432 1.1126 1.23 1.033 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
Capital	  Humane	  Society 1902 0.0108 0.0491 0.2241 0.9555 1.1691 2.0603 Poor Profit Star 4 2 1 421
Cat	  Care	  Society 1981 -­‐0.0357 -­‐0.0312 -­‐0.0158 1.2283 0.8565 0.9925 Profit Poor Growth 2 4 3 243
Champaign	  County	  Humane	  Society 1903 -­‐0.0796 0.0417 -­‐0.0754 0.7653 1.095 0.9162 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Charleston	  Animal	  Society 1874 0.7863 0.7326 -­‐0.0062 3.3992 1.8384 1.4065 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Ci8zens	  for	  Animal	  Protec8on 1972 3.3206 0.6678 0.0811 0.9267 1.3771 1.3176 Growth Star Star 3 1 1 311
Cleveland	  Animal	  Protec8ve	  League 1913 -­‐0.03 -­‐0.0333 -­‐0.1992 0.8773 0.9167 0.8634 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Dane	  County	  Humane	  Society 1921 -­‐0.0329 -­‐0.0811 -­‐0.0671 0.8464 0.7968 0.944 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Defenders	  of	  Animal	  Rights 1988 0.114 0.0784 0.0105 1.3485 1.3118 1.0413 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Dogs	  for	  the	  Deaf 1977 0.1599 0.2412 0.0907 1.6421 2.0949 2.3471 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Dumb	  Friends	  League 1910 0.0737 0.131 -­‐0.0417 1.1473 1.185 1.2134 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
Dutchess	  County	  SPCA 1871 0.0396 1.0974 0.1381 1.0479 2.2403 1.3131 Poor Star Star 4 1 1 411
Elmsford	  Animal	  Shelter 1931 -­‐0.0376 0.0435 -­‐0.0514 0.9073 1.098 0.8825 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Escondido	  Humane	  Society 1915 0.3981 -­‐0.0325 -­‐0.033 0.9512 0.9355 0.8325 Growth Poor Growth 3 4 3 343
FACT 1982 0.0361 -­‐0.0185 -­‐0.0837 0.8675 0.7475 0.9563 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Farm	  Sanctuary 1986 0.0571 -­‐0.0269 -­‐0.0004 1.0666 0.993 1.0287 Growth Poor Growth 3 4 3 343
Fidelco	  Guide	  Dog	  Founda8on 1960 0.5136 0.0273 -­‐0.1298 2.2876 1.1833 1.1068 Star Profit Profit 1 2 2 122
Front	  Range	  Equine	  Rescue 1997 2.1905 0.2265 0.197 1.181 1.145 1.2909 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Greater	  Androscoggin	  Humane	  Society 1885 0.1192 0.1519 -­‐0.0483 1.7016 1.8205 0.7382 Star Star Poor 1 1 4 114
Greenhill	  Humane	  Society,	  SPCA 1944 0.1839 -­‐0.0589 0.0896 1.2445 0.9031 1.1138 Star Poor Star 1 4 1 141
Guide	  Dog	  Founda8on	  for	  the	  Blind 1946 0.0113 0.0615 0.0409 1.1625 1.1453 1.1836 Profit Star Star 2 1 1 211
Guide	  Dogs	  for	  the	  Blind 1942 0.1072 0.1438 -­‐0.1051 1.7245 1.5174 1.476 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
Guide	  Dogs	  of	  America 1948 0.1571 0.1472 0.0966 1.3484 1.3709 1.5509 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Guide	  Dogs	  of	  the	  Desert 1972 0.1708 0.5464 -­‐0.1635 1.6234 2.061 0.6264 Star Star Poor 1 1 4 114
Guiding	  Eyes	  for	  the	  Blind 1956 0.0764 0.1157 -­‐0.089 1.2499 1.3853 1.2684 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
Hawaiian	  Humane	  Society 1897 0.0363 0.0701 0.07 1.0487 1.1442 1.2305 Poor Star Star 4 1 1 411
Heartland	  Humane	  Society 1966 -­‐0.0462 -­‐0.0478 -­‐0.0051 0.9268 0.9262 1.0066 Poor Poor Growth 4 4 3 443
Hooved	  Animal	  Humane	  Society 1971 -­‐0.0198 -­‐0.0011 -­‐0.1499 0.8068 0.9705 0.6026 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Humane	  Farming	  Associa8on 1985 0.072 0.0754 0.0083 1.1989 1.2106 1.2298 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Humane	  League	  of	  Lancaster	  County 1917 -­‐0.0966 0.0372 0.0607 0.6826 1.0484 1.4828 Poor Poor Star 4 4 1 441
Humane	  Society	  at	  Lollypop	  Farm 1873 0.051 0.0977 -­‐0.0411 1.0871 1.132 1.08 Poor Star Profit 4 1 2 412
Humane	  Society	  for	  Seaele/King	  County	  (The) 1897 0.0431 0.0607 0.0927 1.067 1.0662 1.2029 Poor Growth Star 4 3 1 431
Humane	  Society	  for	  Southwest	  Washington 1897 0.339 0.5712 0.219 1.4654 3.2043 1.4787 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Humane	  Society	  of	  Bal8more	  County 1927 0.0387 0.2652 -­‐0.2667 1.036 1.1657 0.793 Poor Star Poor 4 1 4 414
Humane	  Society	  of	  Broward	  County 1944 0.0204 0.0564 -­‐0.1388 0.9982 1.0912 0.8128 Poor Growth Poor 4 3 4 434
Humane	  Society	  of	  Charloee 1978 -­‐0.1025 -­‐0.0206 -­‐0.2503 0.6886 0.943 0.7404 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Humane	  Society	  of	  El	  Paso 1947 0.3913 0.0864 0.9047 1.292 1.1973 2.6105 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Humane	  Society	  of	  Greater	  Kansas	  City 1912 -­‐0.0377 -­‐0.0109 0.0164 0.9296 1.0023 1.0142 Poor Poor Growth 4 4 3 443
Humane	  Society	  of	  Greater	  Miami	  Adopt-­‐A-­‐Pet 1936 -­‐0.175 -­‐0.0291 0.1969 0.6823 0.919 1.3596 Poor Poor Star 4 4 1 441
Humane	  Society	  of	  Kent	  County	  (The) 1883 -­‐0.028 -­‐0.0152 0.0078 0.8125 0.7934 0.8796 Poor Poor Growth 4 4 3 443
Humane	  Society	  of	  Missouri 1870 0.1611 0.0413 -­‐0.1996 1.3817 0.9917 0.9393 Star Poor Poor 1 4 4 144
Humane	  Society	  of	  San	  Antonio 1952 0.0658 0.0085 -­‐0.1724 1.3701 0.9113 0.9209 Star Poor Poor 1 4 4 144
Humane	  Society	  of	  South	  Mississippi 1952 1.0594 -­‐0.0861 -­‐0.0954 2.6051 0.7277 0.8297 Star Poor Poor 1 4 4 144
Humane	  Society	  of	  Southern	  Arizona 1967 0.0722 0.3532 0.01 1.0624 1.4087 1.087 Growth Star Star 3 1 1 311
Humane	  Society	  of	  Tampa	  Bay 1912 -­‐0.0056 0.1535 -­‐0.054 0.9448 1.0887 1.069 Poor Growth Profit 4 3 2 432
Humane	  Society	  of	  the	  Pikes	  Peak	  Region 1949 0.0311 0.0459 0.0096 0.9996 1.0788 1.1578 Poor Poor Star 4 4 1 441
Humane	  Society	  of	  the	  Treasure	  Coast,	  Inc. 1955 0.0287 -­‐0.0524 -­‐0.0876 1.062 0.9204 0.8087 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Humane	  Society	  of	  Vero	  Beach	  and	  Indian	  River	  County 1953 -­‐0.0283 0.0544 -­‐0.0048 0.8786 1.2084 1.06 Poor Profit Star 4 2 1 421
Humane	  Society	  Silicon	  Valley 1929 0.0211 0.1732 1.847 1.0174 1.3337 2.6877 Poor Star Star 4 1 1 411
In	  Defense	  of	  Animals 1983 -­‐0.0265 0.0344 -­‐0.0605 0.9929 1.1892 0.9313 Poor Profit Poor 4 2 4 424
Interna8onal	  Fund	  for	  Animal	  Welfare 1969 0.1084 0.7606 -­‐0.0653 1.1484 1.4721 1.0063 Star Star Poor 1 1 4 114
Jacksonville	  Humane	  Society 1885 1.3669 0.9561 -­‐0.0564 2.5932 3.7236 0.7635 Star Star Poor 1 1 4 114
Kentucky	  Horse	  Park	  Founda8on 1985 0.1863 0.3279 0.5991 1.3181 1.5154 2.4124 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Kentucky	  Humane	  Society 1884 -­‐0.0248 0.127 0.0039 1.0819 1.2077 1.1532 Poor Star Star 4 1 1 411
Leader	  Dogs	  for	  the	  Blind 1939 0.0246 0.076 -­‐0.0792 1.1934 1.2472 1.1274 Profit Star Profit 2 1 2 212
League	  for	  Animal	  Welfare 1964 0.2952 -­‐0.1133 -­‐0.0957 1.4847 0.7754 1.2771 Star Poor Profit 1 4 2 142
Lexington	  Humane	  Society 1944 0.2676 0.3441 -­‐0.1254 1.3693 1.1733 1.0434 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
Marin	  Humane	  Society	  (The) 1907 0.1549 -­‐0.032 -­‐0.0476 1.2921 0.872 1.0104 Star Poor Poor 1 4 4 144
Maryland	  SPCA	  (The) 1869 0.0736 0.0467 -­‐0.2321 1.291 1.7818 0.8729 Star Profit Poor 1 2 4 124
Michigan	  An8-­‐Cruelty	  Society 1935 0.1437 0.0635 0.242 1.7068 1.1981 1.625 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Michigan	  Humane	  Society 1877 0.0995 -­‐0.0218 -­‐0.1196 1.1285 0.9918 0.9924 Star Poor Poor 1 4 4 144
Monmouth	  County	  SPCA 1955 0.2236 0.1174 0.138 1.6726 1.4196 0.5925 Star Star Growth 1 1 3 113
Montgomery	  County	  SPCA 1909 0.0931 0.0529 -­‐0.1823 0.9795 1.0115 0.8949 Growth Poor Poor 3 4 4 344
Morris	  Animal	  Founda8on 1948 0.2005 0.2095 0.0544 1.1529 1.4846 1.1526 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
MSPCA-­‐Angell 1868 -­‐0.0006 -­‐0.0144 -­‐0.1795 0.9708 1.0257 0.8053 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Nashville	  Humane	  Associa8on 1887 -­‐0.036 0.0204 0.0042 1.1381 1.048 1.2972 Profit Poor Star 2 4 1 241
Na8onal	  An8-­‐Vivisec8on	  Society 1929 0.1637 0.3389 -­‐0.1031 1.2402 1.5308 0.9866 Star Star Poor 1 1 4 114
Na8onal	  Disaster	  Search	  Dog	  Founda8on 1996 1.6615 0.1763 0.9661 2.7036 1.3013 1.2449 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
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Na8onal	  Educa8on	  for	  Assistance	  Dog	  Services 1976 0.0762 0.4246 -­‐0.0435 1.0835 1.756 1.0062 Growth Star Poor 3 1 4 314
Na8onal	  Humane	  Educa8on	  Society 1948 0.1353 0.0136 -­‐0.071 0.9994 0.9708 0.934 Growth Poor Poor 3 4 4 344
Nevada	  Humane	  Society 1932 -­‐0.1079 -­‐0.1358 -­‐0.1292 0.7272 0.7206 0.9354 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
No	  More	  Homeless	  Pets	  in	  Utah 2000 0.0626 -­‐0.3009 0.8514 1.033 0.9333 1.028 Growth Poor Growth 3 4 3 343
North	  Carolina	  Veterinary	  Medical	  Founda8on 1978 0.2265 0.261 0.0153 3.5883 2.0324 2.016 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
North	  Shore	  Animal	  League	  America 1944 -­‐0.0647 -­‐0.0045 -­‐0.1915 0.878 0.94 0.9473 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Northeast	  Animal	  Shelter 1976 0.0471 1.0485 -­‐0.1387 1.1354 1.7861 1.0992 Profit Star Profit 2 1 2 212
Northwest	  Organiza8on	  for	  Animal	  Help 1988 -­‐0.0231 0.0241 0.0076 0.927 1.123 1.0803 Poor Profit Star 4 2 1 421
Oregon	  Humane	  Society 1868 0.2004 0.1303 -­‐0.0453 1.5054 1.3626 1.3003 Star Star Profit 1 1 2 112
Oshkosh	  Area	  Humane	  Society 1990 -­‐0.0311 0.0182 -­‐0.1398 0.8926 0.9279 0.7449 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Pasado's	  Safe	  Haven 1998 0.3045 0.2909 0.1325 2.1312 1.9065 1.4847 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Paws	  With	  A	  Cause 1979 -­‐0.0367 0.0175 0.0019 0.9231 1.0036 1.0515 Poor Poor Star 4 4 1 441
Peggy	  Adams	  Animal	  Rescue	  League 1925 0.0561 0.322 -­‐0.088 1.1928 3.1676 0.5419 Star Star Poor 1 1 4 114
People	  for	  the	  Ethical	  Treatment	  of	  Animals 1980 0.2316 0.028 0.0387 1.1443 1.0066 1.0062 Star Poor Growth 1 4 3 143
Pet	  Adop8on	  Fund 1983 0.1305 0.0352 -­‐0.0313 1.325 1.0945 0.916 Star Poor Growth 1 4 3 143
Pet	  Orphans	  of	  Southern	  California 1973 -­‐0.0834 0.0023 0.0295 0.6777 1.0031 1.0934 Poor Poor Star 4 4 1 441
Pets	  in	  Need 1965 0.1788 0.1471 -­‐0.0132 2.2351 1.7516 1.2532 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Poeer	  League	  for	  Animals 1929 0.4281 0.389 0.5294 2.3962 2.3437 1.8643 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Progressive	  Animal	  Welfare	  Society 1967 0.1109 0.1378 0.1381 1.1216 1.2059 1.3564 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Puppies	  Behind	  Bars 1997 0.2822 0.3493 0.1994 1.3727 1.4503 1.3605 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Ramapo-­‐Bergen	  Animal	  Refuge,	  Inc. 1978 -­‐0.0202 -­‐0.0089 -­‐0.0465 0.9834 0.9512 0.939 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Rancho	  Coastal	  Humane	  Society 1960 0.0463 0.0255 0.0599 1.1074 0.8574 1.3056 Profit Poor Star 2 4 1 241
Richmond	  SPCA 1891 0.0345 0.0691 -­‐0.1347 1.2395 1.2367 1.8496 Profit Star Profit 2 1 2 212
Roanoke	  Valley	  SPCA 1916 -­‐0.0411 -­‐0.014 0.0504 0.9051 0.985 1.3758 Poor Poor Star 4 4 1 441
San	  Diego	  Humane	  Society	  and	  SPCA 1880 0.1086 0.2014 -­‐0.0731 1.33 1.6582 1.0054 Star Star Poor 1 1 4 114
San	  Francisco	  SPCA 1868 0.0507 0.3707 0.1122 1.1263 2.2594 1.4589 Profit Star Star 2 1 1 211
Santa	  Fe	  Animal	  Shelter	  &	  Humane	  Society 1939 -­‐0.078 -­‐0.0127 -­‐0.0696 0.9118 1.2158 0.9713 Poor Profit Poor 4 2 4 424
Seeing	  Eye	  (The) 1929 0.0608 0.1167 -­‐0.1209 1.5331 1.4922 0.9376 Star Star Poor 1 1 4 114
SNAP 1999 -­‐0.2012 0.0309 0.2475 1.0581 1.0654 1.0182 Poor Poor Growth 4 4 3 443
Southeastern	  Guide	  Dogs 1982 0.4046 0.3428 0.029 1.825 1.8819 1.2023 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
Southwest	  Missouri	  Humane	  Society 1956 0.057 0.2736 0.2578 1.1562 1.2205 1.291 Star Star Star 1 1 1 111
SPCA	  for	  Monterey	  County	  (The) 1905 -­‐0.0027 0.1591 0.0545 0.8888 1.2935 1.303 Poor Star Star 4 1 1 411
SPCA	  of	  Central	  Florida 1937 0.2383 0.0563 0.2988 1.2062 1.0644 1.3118 Star Growth Star 1 3 1 131
SPCA	  Serving	  Erie	  County 1867 0.1051 0.0929 0.0079 1.0877 1.0135 1.1841 Growth Growth Star 3 3 1 331
SPCA	  Tampa	  Bay 1940 0.0511 0.0946 0.0252 0.9857 1.0897 1.2043 Growth Growth Star 3 3 1 331
St.	  Hubert's	  Animal	  Welfare	  Center 1939 0.0677 0.1211 0.0147 1.258 1.4357 0.8894 Star Star Growth 1 1 3 113
Suncoast	  Humane	  Society 1971 -­‐0.0797 0.0433 -­‐0.1045 0.8511 1.0651 0.9801 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Thoroughbred	  Re8rement	  Founda8on 1982 -­‐0.0084 0.0002 -­‐0.162 0.8088 0.8495 0.8567 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Tony	  La	  Russa's	  Animal	  Rescue	  Founda8on 1991 -­‐0.0224 0.0968 0.083 1.3084 1.9408 1.4194 Profit Star Star 2 1 1 211
United	  Animal	  Na8ons 1987 0.192 -­‐0.061 -­‐0.1833 1.3312 0.8967 0.8131 Star Poor Poor 1 4 4 144
Upper	  Valley	  Humane	  Society 1974 -­‐0.1104 -­‐0.0754 -­‐0.0512 0.8131 0.8568 0.9126 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Virginia	  Beach	  SPCA 1966 0.0507 0.2028 -­‐0.0192 1.1996 1.5623 1.1857 Profit Star Star 2 1 1 211
Washington	  Animal	  Rescue	  League 1914 0.0413 0.0096 -­‐0.1333 0.7938 0.9603 0.8645 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Wayside	  Waifs 1944 0.0227 0.1924 0.0273 1.0211 1.3332 1.1886 Poor Star Star 4 1 1 411
Western	  Pennsylvania	  Humane	  Society 1874 0.0212 0.0589 -­‐0.0947 1.1549 1.1217 1.1097 Profit Star Profit 2 1 2 212
Willameee	  Humane	  Society 1965 0.0047 -­‐0.0237 -­‐0.1094 1.0166 0.8769 0.8697 Poor Poor Poor 4 4 4 444
Wisconsin	  Humane	  Society 1879 0.0404 0.0262 -­‐0.102 1.1334 1.1749 0.6342 Profit Profit Poor 2 2 4 224
World	  Society	  for	  the	  Protec8on	  of	  Animals 1981 0.0991 -­‐0.0361 -­‐0.1244 1.0099 0.9209 1.1132 Growth Poor Profit 3 4 2 342
MIN -­‐0.3905 -­‐0.3009 -­‐0.3782 -­‐0.8056 0.7206 0.5419
MAX 3.3206 2.03 1.847 4.6905 3.7236 2.6877
MEDIAN 0.0511 0.0563 -­‐0.0408 1.1074 1.1164 1.0287
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